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Thesis Summary 
 Human faces are naturally captivating and display a variety of facial cues that 
can be accurately identified as mood state or inherent traits. This process of giving 
meaning to behaviours or signals that we observe is called attribution. When this is 
directed to self, we make self-attributions and when directed at others, we make 
social-attributions. Previous research demonstrates that attributions are affected by 
mood and wellbeing states, and personality traits, and in the initial chapter I discuss 
how wellbeing state and neuroticism trait predict depressive mood-state. I further 
aimed to develop an attribution task using self and others’ face. Studies so far have 
used self-face to understand perceptions of attractiveness, self-esteem and depression, 
but not specifically to investigate self-attributions relating to changes in mood state, 
wellbeing and neuroticism.  
Measuring attributions of facial appearance using self and others’ face is a 
new approach. It was important that the self and social attributions were meaningfully 
measured and easily comparable. I piloted the stimuli and the novel task; the latter is 
discussed in this thesis. I compared three 19-point face scales created using face 
composites of neuroticism, depression and agreeableness. The Neurotic Face Scale 
was chosen for the self and social attribution tasks on the basis of the results from the 
pilot study. I also demonstrate the different positive and negative attributions that are 
systematically made to neurotic facial cues. 
 In the main experimental chapters, I investigate the association of self and 
social attributions of facial appearances with individual’s mood, wellbeing and 
neuroticism. Participants’ own photograph is used for the self-attribution task, while 
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selected portraits of ‘other’ individuals were used for the social-attribution task. I also 
compare the participant’s self and social attributions with independent observers’ 
attributions (of the participants). I demonstrate that participant’s increasing severity of 
depressive symptoms, decreasing hedonic wellbeing and increasing neuroticism relate 
to misattributions of self and others, but does not affect independent observers’ 
attributions. I discuss participants displaying classic social projection based on the 
similarities between their self and social attributions. Finally, I triangulate self, social 
and observer attributions to demonstrate that misattributions displayed by participants 
experiencing depression were specifically for positive attributions, whilst maintaining 
consistent negative attributions as the independent observers. Self-attributions, 
however, are more sensitive to mood, wellbeing and inherent traits than social 
attributions. I further calculate discrepancies between basic self-attributions to 
demonstrate increasing self-negativity with increasing severity of depressive 
symptoms, neuroticism and decreasing hedonic wellbeing, as well as increasing self-
discrepancy with decreasing hedonic wellbeing. 
I further investigate the longitudinal changes (11 weeks) of self-attributions in 
participants who are clinically depressed. I demonstrate decreasing severity of 
depressive symptoms overlapping with decreasing self-negativity and self-
discrepancy, and increasing self-positivity. I further demonstrate that an increase in 
self-positivity and decrease in self-negativity in the first week predicts depressive 
symptoms at week 11. Finally in a pilot study, I demonstrate increase in self-positivity 
after eight weeks of mindfulness practice; a practice that focuses on non-judgemental 
self-referential processing to increase self-positivity. This pilot study is included in 
the final chapter for general discussion, to demonstrate the future research potential 
for the self-attribution task.  
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
മുഖം മനസസ്ിെ൯റ കണ്ണാടി 
 (Face, the mirror of mind) 
- Unknown (ancient folk saying in Malayalam, a native regional language 
of Kerala, a southern state of India) 
Ut imago est animi voltus sic indices oculi 
(The face is a picture of the mind as the eyes are its interpreter) 
- Marcus Tillius Cicero (106 – 44 B.C.) 
Faces are arguably the most entrancing stimuli around us. Our fascination for 
faces and reading information from faces is part of our social behaviour as human 
beings. Even as new-borns, we track face-like stimuli more consistently than non-face 
like stimuli (Easterbrook, Kisilevsky, Muir, & Laplante, 1999). These face-processing 
capabilities rapidly advance, and the new-borns make preference for their mother’s 
face compared to a paired female face (Bushnell, 1982; Pascalis, de Schonen, Morton, 
Deruelle, & Fabre-Grenet, 1995; Walton, Bower, & Bower, 1992) and even 
preference for attractive faces over unattractive faces (Slater et al., 1998; Slater et al., 
2000). Thus, the inherent pursuit of faces help the new-borns to learn to differentiate, 
understand and imitate the facial cues they see and thus develop their social skills  
(Meltzoff & Moore, 2002; Reissland, 1988).  
Even as adults, we are prone to seeing faces in vaguely face-like random 
patterns in the clouds, on the moon or on a burnt toast (Bainbridge, Isola, & Oliva, 
2013). Despite faces having a general composition and layout, they also have 
subjective differences (Little, Jones, & DeBruine, 2011). From our experiences we 
know that some faces are remembered better than others. For example, attractive faces 
can capture more attention and studies have shown that they have greater face-
symmetry (Mealey, Bridgstock, & Townsend, 1999), but interestingly they are also 
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associated with individual’s health (Fink, Neave, Manning, & Grammer, 2006; Jones 
et al., 2001). Such subjective displays of facial cues, therefore, forms the basic social 
networking tools and trigger automatic social processes of mentalizing of others (Frith 
& Frith, 2008). Mentalizing (Theory of mind) refers to the ability to read other’s state 
of mind (Frith & Frith, 2006a; Frith & Frith, 2006b; Frith & Frith, 2003). In this 
manner social alliances are made or unmade, stressing the importance of face 
processing in social functioning (Frith & Frith, 2010; Frith & Frith, 2008). Thus, a 
face is more than what meets the eye. So what are the different signals that we read 
from faces? 
1.1 Face, the mirror of mind 
When you are in a room full of strangers, with whom do you choose to start a 
conversation? Although it could be any one in the room, you will probably end up 
starting a conversation with somebody who looks friendly, approachable and less 
intimidating. Despite having limited information on any of the individuals, your 
judgement would have been heavily influenced on the basis of facial cues. It does 
appear that our faces, even with neutral expressions, can reflect some of our 
characteristics. Personality is considered a stable characteristic with 25 – 50% 
heritability (Henderson, 1982; Kendler & Baker, 2007; Martin et al., 1986), despite 
differential familial and environmental factors (Bouchard, 1994; Bouchard & Loehlin, 
2001; Rushton, Bons, & Hur, 2008). The stable personality of an individual is also 
associated with their transient mental and physical health (Barnhofer & Chittka, 2010; 
Goodwin & Friedman, 2006; Hooker, 2002; Weiss, Bates, & Luciano, 2008), and 
such characteristics are reflected on individual’s faces. Previous research shows that 
faces display a wealth of information including age (Porcheron, Mauger, & Russell, 
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2013; Rhodes, 2009), sex (Cellerino, Borghetti, & Sartucci, 2004; Killgore, 2000), 
race (Carroo, 1986; Golby, Gabrieli, Chiao, & Eberhardt, 2001; Malpass & Kravitz, 
1969), emotions (Ekman, Rolls, Perrett, & Ellis, 1992), dominance (Mueller & 
Mazur, 1997), attractiveness (Jones, Kramer, & Ward, 2014; Kramer, Jones, & 
Sharma, 2013), mental health (Scott, Kramer, Jones, & Ward, 2013), physical health 
(Kramer & Ward, 2010) and personality traits (Kramer & Ward, 2010). By nature, 
some of these characteristics including age, attractiveness, physical-health and 
mental-health can change with time, environmental factors and biological factors (Fox 
& Davidson, 2010; McKinlay, McKinlay, & Brambilla, 1987b; Singh-Manoux et al., 
2010; Williams, Cunich, & Byles, 2013). More recently researchers have viewed 
facial cues and facial adaptations from an anthropological perspective (Schmidt & 
Cohn, 2001). Facial cues are reported to reflect the changes in individual’s 
circumstances, including mood (Girard, Cohn, Mahoor, Mavadati, & Rosenwald, 
2013) and physical-health (VanSwearingen, 2008). In this light, face characteristics 
are considered as phenotypical variants (Chinthapalli et al., 2012; Hammond et al., 
2012; Schmidt & Cohn, 2001).  
So far we looked at how individual’s facial cues reflect their mind. There is 
also evidence of individual differences in how those facial cues are perceived. 
Perceptions have been associated to individual’s age, sex, transient mental-state and 
stable personality traits (Frith & Frith, 2008). This adds another level of complexity to 
social interactions. Subjective differences are therefore not limited to the observed 
faces, but also to the ‘eyes’ that perceive. Recent studies have reported genetic basis 
of face recognition, indicating the heritability of these mechanisms  (Shakeshaft & 
Plomin, 2015). Face processing deficits and social dysfunction are also associated 
with heritable factors such as personality (Andric et al., 2016; Doty, Japee, Ingvar, & 
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Ungerleider, 2013; Saito, Nakamura, & Endo, 2005), mood disorders  (Leppänen, 
Milders, Bell, Terriere, & Hietanen, 2004; Leppänen & Nelson, 2006), anxiety 
disorders (McClure, Pope, Hoberman, Pine, & Leibenluft, 2003), psychotic disorders 
(Brennan, Harris, & Williams, 2014; Li, Chan, Zhao, Hong, & Gong, 2010)  and 
developmental disorders (Golarai, Grill-Spector, & Reiss, 2006). Although this opens 
up a wide scope for discussing face-processing deficits, in this thesis I will focus on 
the ability to make attributions to faces of self and others in relation to individuals’ 
mood and wellbeing states, and personality traits. 
1.2  What the eye perceives 
Perception is quite subjective and reflective of your mood-state, traits and 
experiences. Looking through dark glasses is a common but evocative description for 
individual’s experience of depressive symptoms and how it distorts perception. A 
wide range of research supports this anecdotal evidence. Depressive mood-state is 
found to elicit attention bias for negative cues (Gollan, Pane, McCloskey, & Coccaro, 
2008; Liu, Huang, Wang, Gong, & Chan, 2012), and improved accuracy for negative 
facial expressions such as sad (Linden, Jackson, Subramanian, Healy, & Linden, 
2011; Lopez-Duran, Kuhlman, George, & Kovacs, 2012) and fearful (Yang, Zald, & 
Blake, 2007). Isaac et al. (2014) reported shorter gaze duration whilst processing 
happy facial cues in currently depressed individuals, unlike in remitted or non-
depressed individuals. This could explain the extensive tendency to attend to negative 
more than positive cues, whilst experiencing sad mood (Isaac, Vrijsen, Rinck, 
Speckens, & Becker, 2014; Liu et al., 2012). Due to this tendency for negative 
perception, individuals experiencing depressive symptoms misattribute neutral facial 
expression as more negative (Leppänen et al., 2004). In contradiction, research has 
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also reported individual’s accuracy for happy facial expression when experiencing sad 
mood (Surguladze et al., 2004), suggesting wider misreading of facial cues relating to 
depression.  
Attributions of facial cues is affected not only by depression but also factors 
associated with it, such as early life stress or abuse (Heim & Binder, 2012; Pollak, 
2008), neuroticism (Canli, 2004; Kehoe, Toomey, Balsters, & Bokde, 2011; Perlman, 
Hein, & Stepp, 2014) and wellbeing (Heller et al., 2013; van Reekum et al., 2007; 
Vittersø & Dahl, 2013). Research so far suggests not just excessive negative 
perception but also altered processing of positive cues relating to neuroticism trait 
(Andric et al., 2016) and depressive state (Fox, Ridgewell, & Ashwin, 2009; 
Surguladze et al., 2004). It therefore seems that the underlying neural mechanisms 
that are associated with stress and affective state also affects the processing of facial 
cues and influence social behaviours. 
1.3 The underlying neural mechanisms 
Face processing is complex, and the required neural mechanisms comprise 
diverse and sometimes specialised regions, including the fusiform face area, inferior 
temporal lobe and superior temporal sulcus (Tsao & Livingstone, 2008). Furthermore, 
the main focus of this thesis are the attributions made to self and to others on the basis 
of facial cues, and these attributions are likely to recruit additional networks relating 
to the attributions of emotions (Ebner, Johnson & Fischer, 2012) and theory of mind 
(Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink & Piefke, 2007). 
Attributions of emotions to various facial cues activate prefrontal and anterior 
temporal cortex (Spunt, Ellsworth & Adolphs, 2016), while attributions to self and 
others’ facial cues activate left lateral orbitofrontal, medial prefrontal (MPFC), 
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bilateral inferior frontal cortices, superior temporal sulci, temporal poles and right 
cerebellum (Schulte-Rüther et al., 2007). Attributions of self and others can trigger 
self-referential processes, which activate MPFC, the posterior cingulate 
cortex/precuneus and the temporo-parietal junction bilaterally (Schulte-Rüther et al., 
2007). While recognition of neutral faces activate anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
sad faces activate caudate (Hagan, Hoeft, Mackey, Mobbs and Reiss, 2008), 
nonconscious processing of sad versus happy faces activated amygdala and ACC 
(Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2004). These evidences show some common networks 
being activated when making attributions to different types of facial cues of self or 
others, which are aberrant when experiencing depression.    
As discussed previously, when individuals are experiencing depression their 
processing of facial cues is affected and so are the related cortico-limbic activations 
(Feng, et al., 2015). The negatively biased attributions relating to depression show 
reduced cortical activity in ACC, prefrontal and superior parietal cortices (Disner, 
Beevers, Haigh & Beck, 2011; Kaiser, Bledowski & Dietrich, 2014). This can overlap 
with increased activity in the subcortical areas such as subgenual cingulate, caudate, 
putamen, amygdala, thalamus and hippocampus (Disner et al. 2011; Kaiser, et al., 
2014). Self-referential processing when experiencing depression shows 
hyperactivation in these subcortical areas along with differential activation in ACC 
and MPFC (Disner et al. 2011; Lemogne et al., 2012; Li et al., 2017). Similar 
activations and deactivations in the cortico-limbic networks are observed during the 
perception of facial cues in individuals with high neuroticism (Canli, 2004; Hooker, 
Verosky, Miyakawa, Knight & D’Esposito, 2008) and reduced wellbeing (Canli, 
2004; Green & Malhi, 2006; Kong et al., 2015).      
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Although without our awareness, our transient mood state and more stable 
traits are modulated by our underlying mechanisms such as neurobiology and neural 
networks. These mechanisms are constantly responsive to various stimuli in our 
environment, and forming our behavioural responses. So, although we would like to 
believe in our autonomy as human beings, we are also part of nature’s bio-
mechanism. These concepts lead us to the biological theory of emotion processing. 
1.4 Theories of emotion processing 
James-Lang biological theory of emotion (James, 1884; Lange & Haupt, 1922) 
: According to this theory, a stimuli or an event produces arousal and physiological 
responses in the body, for example increased heartbeat or sweating when facing a 
group. We interpret these physiological responses as the emotions that we feel, for 
example as fear or anxiety when facing a group. Similarly, we feel sad because of 
some physical changes in response to some personal loss. This process is illustrated in 
Figure 1.1. This theory, however, was limited because of exclusive focus on bodily 
processes and interpretation of emotion as one entity, and not as cognitive processes.  
 
Figure 1.1. Illustration of the process of interpreting emotions according to James-Lange theory of 
emotion. 
Schachter’s cognitive theory of emotion (Schachter & Singer, 1962): 
Schachter further developed the biological theory of emotion by including the process 
of making attributions. In an experiment with two groups of participants, both injected 
with epinephrine to induce arousal, Schachter found differential emotional experience 
between the groups on the basis of their external situational experiences. This 
suggested that the groups made attributions to their physiological arousal on the basis 
S"mulus	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(heartbeat,	  palpita"ons,	  
sweaty	  palms	  etc)	  
Emo"on	  
(experience)	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of what they perceived around them and hence experienced the respective emotion. 
On this basis, Schachter added the crucial component of attribution into the previous 
model (shown in Figure 1.2). Besides the external situational factors, attributions are 
also affected by internal factors such as personality traits (Seligman, Abramson, 
Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979). Thus internal and external factors modulate 
attributions, and therefore the interpretation of the experienced emotion (Markus & 
Wurf, 1987).  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Illustration of the processing of emotions according to Schatcher’s cogntive theory of 
emotion. 
Attribution process has since been used to explain behaviours, such as learned 
helplessness, depressive attributions (Seligman et al., 1979) and negative cognitions 
relating to depressive state (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), p.11). Thus by 
including the aspect of attribution to the above theory, the role of cognitive processes 
in the experience of emotion became as prominent as the underlying neurobiology. It 
showed that the inherent neurobiological process might not be the only reason for 
maladaptation relating to depressive disorder, which is the focus of this thesis. 
Furthermore, the dynamic cognitive processes being responsive to both internal 
underlying mechanisms as well as the external situations added complexity to the 
theoretical basis of depressive disorders. This complexity is also observed in the 
actual experience or presentation of related symptoms of depression and the criteria 
for a clinical diagnosis.  
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1.5 Diagnostic criteria for depression 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - 4th 
edition (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & 
Williams, 2002), the symptoms for a depressive episode include depressed or irritable 
mood (melancholia), decreased pleasure or interest (anhedonia), and reduced energy 
or activity (fatigue) as the core symptoms. Additional symptoms include low self-
esteem or confidence, feelings of guilt/worthlessness, pessimistic thoughts, disturbed 
sleep and appetite, and self-harm or suicidal tendencies or thoughts. A diagnosis can 
be made when at least five of the above symptoms, including the three core symptoms 
are persistent nearly every day for at least two weeks. Besides, the diagnostic criteria 
for the severity of depression are gauged on the basis of how strongly the individual 
experience the above symptoms. A variety of models were proposed to explain the 
depressive disorder with its heterogeneous clusters of symptoms. To discuss all the 
models of depression will be outside the remit of this thesis, and therefore I will focus 
on those pertinent to the neurobiological and cognitive processes that overlap with the 
theories of emotions.   
1.6 Neurocognitive models of depression 
In 1937, Papez proposed the role of neural circuit (i.e. limbic system) in the 
processing of emotions (Rajmohan & Mohandas, 2007) and this has been the basis for 
the neurobiological model of emotion. Neurobiological model posits that early life 
stress or abuse, which is also strongly associated with depression (Cohen et al., 2006; 
Heim & Binder, 2012), contributes to neurobiological alterations (Felger & Lotrich, 
2013). Sustained stress levels relate to hyperactive hypothalamic pituitary adrenal 
(HPA) axis, producing high levels of cortisol, which is further linked to cytokines 
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(cellular inflammation), hormones (epinephrine), and neurotransmitters (serotonin) 
that affect depressive mood-state (Haddad, Saadé, & Safieh-Garabedian, 2002; 
Pariante & Lightman, 2008; Tian, Hou, Li, & Yuan, 2014). Meanwhile, cognitive 
theorists posit negative self-evaluations, exaggerated negativity, systematic negative 
bias, negative schemata and misattributions as depressive cognitions (Beck, 2008). It 
was proposed that the affective state could be improved by correcting these cognitions 
(Beck & Bredemeier, 2016).  
Reflecting on the theories of emotion, we can see that the above models of 
depression bilaterally feed into each other. The behavioural or cognitive implications 
of serotonin mechanisms have been widely researched using neuromodulators such as 
tryptophan, the precursor for serotonin (Crockett & Fehr, 2014). Tryptophan depletion 
(TD) studies artificially lowered the brain tryptophan levels, and depleted brain 
serotonin levels to mimic a depressive neurobiology (Harmer, Rogers, Tunbridge, 
Cowen, & Goodwin, 2003b; Ruhe, Mason, & Schene, 2007). Studies using face 
paradigms reported altered facial emotion processing with TD (Harmer, Hill, Taylor, 
Cowen, & Goodwin, 2003), while blocking serotonin 2A receptors in the prefrontal-
amygdala networks specifically affected the processing of negative facial cues 
(Hornboll et al., 2013; Passamonti et al., 2012). The fronto-limbic networks are 
consistently found as aberrant in depressed patients (Anderson, Shippen et al., 2011; 
Harmer et al., 2003), emphasizing the role of this network in mood disorders and face 
perception.  
The interesting finding from these studies was the effect of TD on face 
perception observed within five hours after depletion and before any experience of 
mood change, suggesting early changes of subtle behaviours (Harmer et al., 2003b; 
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Merens, Booij, Haffmans, & van der Does, 2008). Combining the findings from the 
TD studies to Schatcher’s cognitive theory of emotions, we can add another process 
of early behavioural change prior to the experience of emotion, as illustrated in Figure 
1.3. This is exciting because such early behavioural changes could be targeted to 
assess early intervention response for depression (illustrated in Figure 1.4). It could 
even be a behavioural marker of depression (Owens et al., 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3. Illustration of the processing of emotions, after combining Schatcher’s cogntive theory of 
emotion and early behavioural changes due to neurobiological changes as demonstrated by acute 
tryptophan depletion studies. ECT, Electroconvulsive therapy; rTMS, Repeated Transcranial magnetic 
sitmulation; VNS, Vegus nerve stimulation; DBS, Deep brain stimulation; CBT, Cognitive behavioural 
therapy; MBCT, Mindfulness based cognitive therapy; DBT, Dialectical behaviour therapy. 
 Figure 1.4. Illustration of the proposed process for identifying early behvaioural changes. 
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1.7 Implications of behavioural marker  
The need for behavioural markers that can contribute to early prediction of 
intervention response directly relates to the complexity of depressive disorder, and the 
non-existence of a single effective intervention that works for all (Trivedi et al., 
2013). Existing interventions include talk therapies, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, 
mindfulness therapy, Dialectical Behavioral Therapy and antidepressants for mild to 
moderate depression, and Electroconvulsive Therapy, repeated Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation, Vegus Nerve Stimulation and Deep Brain Stimulation for severe 
depression (Wong & Licinio, 2001; Mayberg, 2003). Currently, the effective 
intervention for each individual is identified by administering series of monotherapies 
or combinations (Dunlop & Aaron, 2010; Dunlop et al., 2012). It can take at least two 
to three weeks to identify response to treatments through self-reports of improved 
mood (Thase, Shelton, & Khan, 2006; Tranter et al., 2009; Trivedi et al., 2006). 
Unfortunately, all the interventions require similar testing periods which prolong the 
overall trial and error period. This means the individual is in a depressive state for 
longer than optimal, impacting on prolonged disease burden. Disease burden is a 
measure of time lost on the basis of reduced quality of life or loss of life due to 
suicides (World Health Organization, 2007). By identifying early predictors, such as 
bio or behavioural markers, we can essentially reduce the trial and error period in 
identifying the effective intervention (Owens et al., 2014; Roiser, Elliott, & Sahakian, 
2012; Thase, 2014). Effective interventions at an early stage of depressive disorder 
will naturally improve the outcome, quality of life and reduce disease burden 
(Schoenbaum et al., 2001; Unützer et al., 2002). National Health Service can thereby 
improve the cost effectiveness of interventions for depression, and society can further 
   
 Page 15 
benefit from the productivity of those with improved functioning following remission 
(Beddington et al., 2008; Wittchen et al., 2011).  
1.8 A new behavioural task: face processing and depression  
 The next step is to identify the best behavioural task that can measure these 
early and subtle behavioural changes. A face paradigm seems an obvious choice since 
face processing shares the neural networks that are known to be aberrant in depression 
(Hall et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2015; Stuhrmann, Suslow, & Dannlowski, 2011) and 
involves visual stimuli processing that requires less cognitive load  (Klingner, 
Tversky, & Hanrahan, 2011). Currently, the face paradigms used to investigate 
depression-related perceptions are limited to facial emotions (Harmer, Goodwin, & 
Cowen, 2009; Harmer, Mackay, Reid, Cowen, & Goodwin, 2006; Joormann, Gilbert, 
& Gotlib, 2010; Pagliaccio, Luby, Luking, Belden, & Barch, 2014). Some studies 
have used such emotional face-processing tasks longitudinally to track changes in 
perception with changes in mood over time, but used different emotions and 
paradigms (Johnstone et al., 2005; Münkler, Rothkirch, Dalati, Schmack, & Sterzer, 
2015; Victor, Furey, Fromm, Öhman, & Drevets, 2010). However, the keynotes from 
the results of these studies were increased amygdala reactivity to fearful expressions 
(Johnstone et al., 2005); greater intensity of happy expression required for recognition 
(Münkler et al., 2015); negative perceptual bias relating to current clinical mood state 
(Münkler et al., 2015); and resolving negative bias coupled with developing positive 
bias after antidepressant treatment (Victor et al., 2010). Behavioural effects relating to 
depressive symptoms were also demonstrated as reduced accuracy for sad, angry, and 
fearful faces (Anderson et al., 2011).  
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Interestingly, greater misattribution of neutral expression compared to 
emotions has been demonstrated, when experiencing depression (Leppänen et al., 
2004; Maniglio et al., 2014). Metaphorically, a neutral face could be described as a 
blank screen onto which individuals project their internal experience. The famous 
painting of Mona Lisa (La Gioconda) by Leonardo da Vinci is a timeless classic that 
still captivates people’s imagination by the enigmatic ‘smile’. Some people see the 
famous expression as a smile of contentment, while others see it as a hidden 
heartbreak; the opposite ends of the emotion spectrum. The American lyricist Ray 
Evans and songwriter Jay Harold Livingston queried in their classic song Mona Lisa, 
‘Do you smile to tempt a lover, Mona Lisa, Or is this your way to hide a broken 
heart’, trying to unravel this ambiguity (Bennett, 2013). Kontsevich and Tyler (2004) 
investigated the perception of the subtle facial expression by manipulating noise 
(grains) to the picture and location-specific features (areas of eyes and mouth), but 
found that only corners of the mouth related to sad-happy change of facial expression. 
This research overlooked the crucial influence of observer’s transient mood state and 
inherent traits on their perceptions, which would have provided subjective meanings  
(Kontsevich & Tyler, 2004).  
Research has shown evidence of mood-congruent misattributions of neutral 
faces as sad when experiencing depressive symptoms (Maniglio et al., 2014). Similar 
misattribution errors are identified when neutral and low-arousal facial expressions 
are perceived as emotions with greater arousal (Csukly, Czobor, Szily, Takács, & 
Simon, 2009; Maniglio et al., 2014). The potential to investigate similar 
misattributions relating to depression in self-context is more intriguing. There is 
evidence of increased self-descriptive negative memory (verbal) during depressive 
episode and increased positive memory with improved mood (Johnson, Joormann, & 
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Gotlib, 2007; Tranter et al., 2009; Warren, Pringle, & Harmer, 2015). It therefore 
seems reasonable to propose that with improved mood, neutral looking self-faces 
could be attributed as more positive. This shift in perception of a neutral self-face 
could be a better demonstration of mood-congruent face perception, and by measuring 
this change we could target the shift in the internal affective experience of individuals. 
1.9 Self-attribution and depression 
Prior studies have used neutral looking self-face to investigate self-recognition 
and individual’s mental representation of self (Allen, Brady, & Tredoux, 2009; 
Felisberti & Musholt, 2014; Kircher et al., 2001). Allen et al. (2009) investigated 
individual’s preference for the appearance of their actual face or caricatures (with 
exaggerated features that stand out) or anti-caricatures (with understated average 
features). The study reported anti-caricature bias for self and friend, and consistent 
with previous result (Rhodes & Moody, 1990), suggests that memory for a specific 
face is not a caricature but is more similar to an average face than the actual face. 
Average faces are typically judged to be attractive (Langlois & Roggman, 1990; 
Rhodes & Tremewan, 1996; Valentine, Darling, & & Donnelly, 2004) and because 
anti-caricature images are more similar to an average face than the actual face, the 
observed bias could be explained as the preference for more attractive faces. 
Allen et al. (2009) further demonstrated the advantage for quicker recognition 
of caricature due to exaggerated features, which concurs with previous result of 
greater memory for caricatures (Mauro & Kubovy, 1992). It appears that individuals 
experiencing depression require similarly exaggerated facial expression for accurate 
perception (LeMoult, Joormann, Sherdell, Wright, & Gotlib, 2009), because they are 
less able to discriminate between varying intensity of facial emotional expressions 
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(Anderson et al., 2011). Therefore, individuals experiencing depression rely on 
exaggerated appearances than ambiguous ones, which is contrary to the average anti-
caricature bias demonstrated in the general population. Such individual differences in 
perception of facial expressions have also been associated with inherent personality 
traits relating to depression, such as alexithymia and neuroticism (Cremers et al., 
2009; Suslow et al., 2016), and even genetic variance  (Tamm, Kreegipuu, & Harro, 
2016). 
Additionally, Felisberti and Musholt (2014) reported individual differences in 
mental representation of self whilst perceiving self-face. Their results demonstrated 
accuracy for self-face. However, they also demonstrated the preference of individuals 
with lower self-esteem to manipulate their facial appearance in order to increase 
attractiveness. This indicates that individuals with lower self-esteem are unsatisfied 
by their actual appearance as is evidenced by previous research (Barker & Bornstein, 
2010), and the opposing proposition would be increased self-esteem enhancing 
satisfaction with self-appearance (Tiwari, 2014). Increased self-esteem is associated 
with improved mood (Ikegami, 2002; Kim et al., 2015), and therefore supports the 
potential for paradigms with self-face to measure changes in self-attribution with 
improving mood.  
The core depressive symptoms are strongly anchored as internalising 
negativity to self and contrastingly, mood improvements imply reducing self-
negativity. It is quite intriguing how these self-perceptions change with a change in 
affective state, and this could be explained by the common underlying neural 
activations. Functional imaging studies have reported altered prefrontal, anterior 
cingulate and limbic activations with sad or depressive mood (Davidson, Pizzagalli, 
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Nitschke, & Putnam, 2002; Mayberg et al., 1999; F. C. Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & 
Lawrence, 2003; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). Incidentally, the same 
neural networks including fronto-limbic networks are also involved in the processing 
of self-face and self-referential mental processes (Keenan, Wheeler, Gallup Jr, & 
Pascual-Leone, 2000; Kircher et al., 2000; Northoff et al., 2006; Northoff & 
Panksepp, 2008; Platek, Wathne, Tierney, & Thomson, 2008; Qin & Northoff, 2011; 
Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007), which could explain increasing self-
negativity whilst experiencing depression. Thus, a neutral looking self-face seems to 
be the ideal stimuli to measure the early behavioural response to change in fronto-
limbic networks that relate to depressive symptoms. This could provide measures of 
mood-sensitive self-attributions that change in response to effective interventions. 
1.10 The current thesis 
As discussed through this chapter, there is ample evidence for subjective 
signals of transient state and stable traits being displayed on neutral looking faces. 
Furthermore, the processing of facial cues relies heavily on perceivers’ mood and 
personality traits, and shares neural networks that are altered when experiencing 
depression. Investigations of depression related misattribution of faces have so far 
used paradigms with facial emotions, whereas, the use of self-attributions have 
generally been limited to investigating self-recognition and attractiveness. There is 
simply inadequate knowledge about self-face processing in relation to subjective 
mood-state and stable traits, and we do not yet know whether or how attributions 
about one's own facial appearances relate to depressive symptoms. It will be useful to 
understand if general self-negativity relating to depressive state is also observed when 
processing self-face. I aim to develop a new paradigm using self-face that will be 
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sensitive to subtle behavioural changes associated with changes in severity of 
depression and wellbeing state, the process of which will be demonstrated through 
this thesis.  
There is also the question, whether a construed self-perception when 
experiencing depression can affect one’s perception of others. Projecting experiences 
of self onto others whilst making inferences or attributions is explained as social 
projection (Robbins & Krueger, 2005), and describes how misattributions occur and 
could lead to maladaptive social behaviours or dysfunctions (Van Boven & 
Loewenstein, 2003). More specifically, in the cognitive model of depression, Beck et 
al. (1979) proposed the dysfunctional belief system affecting dysfunctional 
behaviours using the negative cognitive triad; that is negativity of self, the world, and 
the future. I endeavour to measure such negative cognitions relating to self and other 
individuals using our proposed face paradigm. This will provide new insight into how 
current mood state can modulate more implicit cognitive processes relating to 
attributions of faces of self and others. Finally, I measure changes of such cognitive 
processes that relate to change in severity of depression and wellbeing state, which 
will provide evidence for potential behavioural markers to predict early intervention 
response.     
This thesis contains four main parts. Part A is titled ‘The Prelude’, which presents 
a study that informs later studies that investigate mood congruent attributions. In 
Chapter 2, I investigate the behavioural composition of a representative population of 
Bangor University students. The aim is to investigate wellbeing and neuroticism as 
the predictors of depression in this population. 
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Part B has two chapters (i.e. Chapter 3 and 4) and is titled ‘The Development’, as 
it presents the process of developing our attribution task using face stimuli. In Chapter 
3, I develop and pilot an attribution task with the aim to identify the best of three 
(agreeableness, neuroticism, and depression) implicit face scales. Based on the results 
thus far, the neurotic face scale is selected for the later attribution studies. In Chapter 
4, there are two studies in which I aim to investigate the various positive and negative 
attributions as well as attributions of fear individuals make to neurotic facial cues, 
indicating related biases. 
Part C is titled ‘Attributions Of Facial Appearance’ and it presents the studies on 
self- (Chapter 5), social- (Chapter 6), and observer- attributions, and compares the 
three contexts (Chapter 7). In Chapter 5, I investigate our novel self-attribution task 
and the sensitivity of its individualised measures to subjective mood, wellbeing and 
neuroticism. This is the first of the main experimental chapters in this thesis in which 
I aim to measure changes in self-attribution, specifically increase in self-negativity, 
with increasing severity of depression, wellbeing and neuroticism. In Chapter 6, I 
investigate the sensitivity of our social attribution task to the subjective measures 
mentioned above and the process of social projection in visual modality. This is the 
second experimental chapter in which I aim to measure changes in social attribution 
relating to increasing severity of depression, wellbeing and neuroticism, and 
demonstrate evidence for social projection with social attribution being similar to self-
attribution. In Chapter 7, I compare the attributions of observers with actor’s self and 
social attributions as a triangulation study. I also investigate the association of 
observers’ attributions with actor’s mood, wellbeing and neuroticism. In this final 
experimental chapter in Part C, I aim to identify the similarities and dissimilarities 
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between actor’s self-attribution and observers’ attributions of the actors, and the 
relation of these attributions to actor’s depression. 
Part D is titled ‘The Clinical Application Of Self-attribution’ and it presents the 
clinical study (Chapter 8). In Chapter 8, I use our self and social attribution tasks in a 
longitudinal study with individuals experiencing clinical depression. The design has 
five time-points over a period of 11-12 weeks. I investigate the sensitivity of self-
attributions to the changes in the severity of depressive symptoms and wellbeing, over 
the study period. In this experimental chapter, I aim to measure the changes in self 
and social attributions longitudinally over 11-12 weeks that overlaps with changes in 
depression. I also aim to measure the change in self-attribution in the first week to 
predict depression score at Week 11, as an attempt to identify potential early 
behavioural predictors of mood-state. 
Finally in Chapter 9, I discuss the experimental findings, limitations, future 
implications and further research. Within this chapter, I briefly discuss the results 
from a small pilot study showing increase in self-positivity after mindfulness practice, 
to demonstrate the potential use of our self-attribution task in future research.
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PART A – The prelude 
 In this section, I will discuss a study that forms the prelude to later studies. 
This study will provide evidence to support and rationalise later studies in this thesis 
relating to appearance, depression, and the associations among depression-related 
traits. 
In Chapter 2, we investigate the composition of a sample student population at 
Bangor University with regard to their mood, wellbeing and personality traits. Besides 
giving a picture of the underlying behavioural composition of this population, the 
results of this study would inform later studies. For example, underlying sex 
difference in some personality traits in the population could skew the results of later 
studies; therefore exploring the population composition equips us to interpret later 
results meaningfully. It also provides a strong indication of the predictors of 
depression in our student population. This predictor model will be used in later studies 
to investigate its association with self and social attributions. 
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CHAPTER 2 – Neuroticism and wellbeing: Predictors of depression 
Abstract 
Depression is related to various factors including genetic, biological, 
behavioural and social factors. Although some predictors of depression such as trait 
neuroticism seem robust, depression is a heterogeneous disorder and we wished to 
better understand the variable structure that best described depression-related traits in 
our test population. We use behavioural and social factors to construct models that 
predict depression in our target population, the students at Bangor University. Prior 
studies have reported age, sex, personality traits and wellbeing as some of the factors 
associated with depression. We measured personality traits, eudemonic wellbeing and 
hedonic wellbeing to construct models that were tested using linear regression. The 
results indicate that neuroticism and wellbeing (eudemonic and hedonic) are 
predictors of depression. Neither age nor sex were significant predictors of depression 
in this sample. These findings suggest that the global constructs of neuroticism and 
wellbeing but not age or sex, as predictors of depression apply to our target 
population. 
  
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss the characteristics of the target population that is 
relevant to later studies. My key interest was to explore the interplay of personality 
traits, wellbeing and mood state within the student population of Bangor University. 
The knowledge of causes and consequences of these characteristics will be 
informative of the group’s behaviour and attribution within this social environment.  
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Previous research reported personality traits, especially neuroticism, as 
strongly associated with depression (Fergusson, Horwood, & Lawton, 1989; Lahey, 
2009; Takano et al., 2007). Neurotic traits are described by the Mini International 
Personality Item Pool (MIPIP) as frequent experience of extreme emotions or anxiety 
(Donnellan et al., 2006). Neurotic individuals understandably experience negative 
emotions more frequently, and this can impact on subjective wellbeing (Steel, 
Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008b) and mood state (Lahey, 2009). Thus, combinations of 
different traits, internal and external factors also can mediate and moderate depression  
(Papakostas & Fava, 2008). Studies have found that being introvert and neurotic can 
decrease individual’s happiness (Hotard, McFatter, McWhirter, & Stegall, 1989; 
Pavot, Diener, & Fujita, 1990), which is closely related to individual’s subjective 
wellbeing. 
Subjective wellbeing refers to a combination of eudemonic and hedonic 
wellbeing (Deci & Ryan, 2008; Vanhoutte, 2014), and has been identified as another 
moderator of mental health (Huppert, 2009). Previous studies have found low 
wellbeing as highly associated with incidence of depressive disorder (Grant, Guille, & 
Sen, 2013). Research on wellbeing has used a variety of subjective measures that may 
be relevant to the respective population. Eudemonic wellbeing refers to happiness 
within ones own control (Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008; Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 
2008a), living a life of virtue and self-actualisation (Delle Fave, Massimini, & Bassi, 
2011) , where as hedonic wellbeing refers to maximising ones pleasurable experiences 
(Delle Fave et al., 2011). 
In this study, we investigate the associations between individuals’ mood state, 
wellbeing (hedonic and eudemonic) state and personality traits in the population 
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targeted for further research. Wellbeing and neuroticism are proposed as significant 
predictors of depression in the target student population. Besides the main hypothesis, 
this study has another implication. Part of the data included in the main analysis here 
includes those obtained from participants who completed the self and social 
attribution study which is later discussed in Part C. Therefore the interrelations 
between wellbeing, traits and mood state discussed in this study will inform the 
attribution measures in the respective later studies. 
2.2 Methods 
We collected data over two separate studies with independent participants. 
The School of Psychology Ethics and Governance Committee, Bangor University 
approved the studies. Initially, 209 (128 female) participants with mean age of 
21.63±5 and range of 17 – 54 completed measures for depression, personality traits 
and wellbeing. Later, the same measures were obtained from the 100 (69 female) 
participants with mean age of 20.41±4.75 and age range of 18 – 56, from the self and 
social attribution studies. Data from both studies are used here. All participants were 
recruited from Bangor University’s student population, debriefed at the end of the 
study and provided with information regarding available psychological support. 
Depression was measured using the Inventory of Depressive Symptomology – 
self rated  (IDS) (Rush et al., 1986; Rush, Gullion, Basco, Jarrett, & and Trivedi, 
1996). This measure assessed severity of all depressive symptoms in the seven day 
period prior to assessment, according to DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). There are 30 questions with responses from 0 (symptom not present) – 3 
(symptom present always). Sum of 28 responses provided the total score that ranged 
from 0 to 84. From the two questions on increase or decrease of appetite and weight, 
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only one response for each was used to calculate the total score. Severity was graded 
as follows; 0–13 as ‘not depressed’, 14–25 as ‘mildly depressed’, 26–38 as 
‘moderately depressed’, 39–48 as ‘severely depressed’, and 49–84 as ‘very severely 
depressed’. 
In this study, the subjective wellbeing comprised of measures of eudemonic 
and hedonic wellbeing. Eudemonic wellbeing was measured using the Flourishing 
Scale (FS) (Diener et al., 2010), which had eight items describing aspects of human 
functioning, ranging from positive relationships to feelings of competence and 
purpose in life. The responses from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree) were 
summed to obtain the total wellbeing score that range from 8 (lowest) to 56 (highest). 
Hedonic wellbeing was measured using the Scale for Positive and Negative 
Experiences (SPANE) (Diener et al., 2010), which is a 12-item questionnaire with six 
items to assess occurrence of positive feelings and the other six items relating to 
occurrence of negative feelings. The responses varied from 1 (very rarely or never) to 
5 (very often or always). The score for positive experiences was the sum of responses 
for positive feeling, and the score for negative experiences was the sum of the 
responses for negative feelings. Both these scores vary from 6 (lowest) to 30 
(highest), that is bigger scores indicating more frequent positive and negative 
experiences. Affect balance is computed by subtracting experience scores of negative 
from positive, indicating a balanced experience. The scores ranged from -24 
(unhappiest) to 24 (highest balanced experience); positive/bigger scores indicate more 
positive than negative experiences.  
The personality traits were measured using the MIPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006), 
which is a 20-item questionnaire; four questions relating to each of the big five 
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personality traits. Reponses varied from 1 (very inaccurate) to 5 (very accurate), and 
they were averaged per trait to obtain scores for agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, neuroticism and openness. The scores ranged from 0 (lowest trait 
quality) to 5 (most trait quality). 
2.3 Results 
The group mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of the measures are given in 
Table 2.1. The initial study had a total of 209 (128 female) participants (age M = 
21.63, SD = 5.00, age range 17 – 54) and in the later study we recruited a total of 100 
(69 female) participants (age M = 20.41, SD = 4.72, and range = 18 – 56). The 
distribution of depression and wellbeing, of the merged data, is shown in Figure 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Mean and standard deviation of age, depression, wellbeing and personality 
for females, males, and total group.  
Note. Descriptive statistics are reported as mean (standard deviation); n, Sample size; IDS, Inventory of 
Depressive Symptomology; FS, Flourishing Scale, SPANE, Scale of Positive and Negative Experiences. 
 Females (n = 197) Males (n = 112) Total (n = 309) 
Age  21.47 (5.676) 20.79 (3.251) 21.22 (4.939) 
Depression score (IDS) 19.47 (9.143) 17.61 (9.027) 18.80 (9.131) 
Flourishing Scale (FS) 
 
44.40 (6.531) 44.11 (6.901) 44.29 (6.658) 
Scale of positive and negative experiences (SPANE) 
Positive experience 23.23 (4.349) 22.80 (3.982) 23.08 (4.218) 
Negative experience 13.43 (3.952) 12.63 (3.470) 13.14 (3.798) 
Balanced experience 9.80 (7.665) 10.18 (6.717) 9.94 (7.327) 
Personality traits 
Agreeableness 4.162 (0.648) 3.978 (0.718) 4.09 (0.679) 
Conscientiousness 3.405 (0.862) 3.212 (0.808) 3.335 (0.847) 
Extraversion 3.307 (0.963) 3.383 (0.915) 3.334 (0.945) 
Neuroticism 3.026 (0.819) 2.511 (0.904) 2.839 (0.884) 
Openness 3.815 (0.654) 4.049 (0.717) 3.899 (0.686) 
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Figure 2.1. Distribution of depression and wellbeing measured in the target population. 
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We used one-way ANOVA to examine sex difference. Additional analyses 
were conducted using correlation and linear regression with three models to identify 
the predictors for depression. The base model (Model 1) included only the 
neuroticism score, the FS score was entered to the base model to form Model 2, and 
the balanced experience score was entered to the second model to form Model 3. This 
sample satisfactorily met all the assumptions of multiple linear regression analysis. 
2.3.1 Sex difference 
There were significant sex difference in scores of neuroticism, F(1, 308) = 
26.146, p < .001, agreeableness F(1, 308) = 5.318, p = .02, and openness, F(1, 308) = 
8.543, p = .004 (greater openness for males). However, no significant sex difference 
was found for depression scores, F(1, 308) = 2.99, p = .085, despite mean depression 
score being greater for females (19.47±9.14) than males (17.61±9.03 ). 
2.3.2 Generalizability of the depression measured using IDS 
One sample t test shows that the group mean depression score of 18.80 
measured from the Bangor University student population was not significantly 
different, t(308) = 0.82, p = 0.41, from the mean score of 18.37 from a population 
sample of Netherlands with n = 2981 (Licht et al., 2008) or, t(308) = 1.03, p = .30, 
from the mean score of 18.26 from a population sample of South Carolina (Pincus et 
al., 2010). This suggests the depression measure used in this study is providing a 
measure that is generalizable and not displaying characteristics specific to the student 
population at Bangor University. The two datasets used in the analysis within this 
chapter were collected at different times across the academic year. One-way ANOVA 
comparing depression scores from the two datasets showed no significant difference, 
F(1, 307) = .004, p = 0.95. This result and the comparisons with population samples 
   
 Page 31 
suggest the depression measure used in this study is not displaying characteristics 
specific to students during any particular time in the academic year. 
2.3.3 Correlations analysis 
Age did not correlate with any of the measures. 
Personality scores: Agreeableness correlated positively with extraversion (r = 
.162, p = .004), and openness (r = .163, p = .004). Conscientiousness correlated 
negatively with neuroticism (r = -.116, p = .04) and openness (r = -.144, p = .01). 
Extraversion correlated negatively with neuroticism (r = -.148, p = .009) and 
positively with openness (r = .130, p = .02).  
Mood state: Depression (IDS) correlated significantly with eudemonic 
wellbeing scores of FS (r = -.486, p < .001), and hedonic wellbeing scores of positive 
experience (r = -.551, p < .001), negative experience (r = .604, p < .001) and balanced 
experience (r = -.630, p < .001). It was also significantly correlated with neuroticism 
(r = .492, p < .001). The significant correlations are shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2. The significant correlations of depression score with the predictor variables of hedonic 
wellbeing, eudemonic wellbeing, and neuroticism scores. SPANE, Scale of Positive and Negative 
Experiences. 
Eudemonic wellbeing: The FS score correlated significantly with hedonic 
wellbeing scores of positive experience (r = .587, p < .001), negative experience (r = -
.506, p < .001) and balanced experience (r = .600, p < .001). It correlated positively 
with agreeableness (r = .215, p < .001), conscientiousness (r = .276, p < .001), 
extroversion (r = .303, p < .001) and negatively with neuroticism (r = -.340, p < .001). 
Hedonic wellbeing: Positive experience significantly correlated with negative 
experience (r = -.670, p < .001) and balanced experience (r = .923, p < .001). It also 
correlated positively with agreeableness (r = .164, p = .004), conscientiousness (r = 
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.172, p = .002), extroversion (r = .261, p < .001) and negatively with neuroticism (r = 
-.424, p < .001). 
Negative experience significantly correlated with balanced experience (r = -
.904, p < .001). It also correlated negatively with conscientiousness (r = -.194, p = 
.001), extroversion (r = -.199, p < .001) and positively with neuroticism (r = .573, p < 
.001).   
Balanced experience correlated positively with conscientiousness (r = .200, p 
< .001), extroversion (r = .254, p < .001) and negatively with neuroticism (r = -.541, p 
< .001). 
2.3.4 Multiple regression analysis  
Model 1 with neuroticism [r2 = .243, F(1, 307) = 98.29 p < .001], Model 2 
including  eudemonic wellbeing [r2 = .357, F(2, 306) = 84.99, p < .001] and Model 3 
including hedonic wellbeing [r2 = .447, F(3, 305) = 82.10, p < .001] were all 
significant predictors of depression. The results are shown in Table 2.2.  
The beta coefficient for neuroticism (β = .211, t = 4.157 p < .001) maintains 
the positive relationship, that is, an increase in neuroticism will increase depression. 
Eudemonic wellbeing (β = -.163, t = -3.059, p = .002) and hedonic wellbeing (β = -
.419, t = -7.030, p < .001) indicate a negative relationship, that is, an increase in 
subjective wellbeing relates to decreasing depression. 
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Table 2.2. The r2 and F values for each of the three models predicting depression and 
the β and t values of each predictor variables within the respective models. 
Models r2 F Predictor 
variables 
β t Part2 
1 .243 98.29 ** Neuroticism .492 9.914** 24.21% 
2 .357 84.99** Neuroticism .370 7.589** 12.11% 
   Flourishing -.360 -7.385** 11.49% 
3 .447 82.10** Neuroticism .211 4.157** 3.13% 
   Flourishing -.163 -3.059* 1.69% 
   Balanced 
experience 
-.419 -7.030** 8.9% 
Note. ** p < .001, * p < .005 
2.4 Discussion   
We investigated predictors of depression in the student population at Bangor 
University. The main theme throughout the later studies is the effect of mood, 
wellbeing and personalities on individual’s attributions. It is therefore, essential to 
understand the interrelations between these measures obtained from our target group.  
Contrary to existing evidence, neither age nor sex showed association with 
depression. One-way ANOVA comparing mean depression score showed no 
significant sex difference. Previous population studies have shown females having 
higher incidence of depression (Kessler et al., 2003; Piccinelli & Wilkinson, 2000). It 
is not clear why our group did not show similar sex difference, although the mean 
depression score was greater for females than males. The limited age range in this 
sample, with a composition of 90% aged 17 – 24 and 10% aged 25 – 56, may have 
implications on limited life experiences and other mediating factors of depression. 
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Regression analysis showed strong association of depression scores with 
wellbeing and neuroticism scores. Model 3 with neuroticism, eudemonic and hedonic 
wellbeing was a significant predictor of depression. It was evident from the β 
coefficients for hedonic wellbeing, neuroticism and eudemonic wellbeing that they 
contributed towards predicting depression, in that order. The results showed that an 
increase in neuroticism and decrease in subjective wellbeing (that is, hedonic and 
eudemonic wellbeing) could increase depression in this sample student population. It 
is interesting that by including hedonic wellbeing into Model 3, the β coefficient for 
neuroticism was reduced. This is consistent with existing evidence that improving 
wellbeing can moderate the effect of neuroticism (inherent trait) as a predictor of 
depressive disorder (Barnhofer, Duggan, & Griffith, 2011). Previous studies have 
found neuroticism trait as a significant predictor of most mental health disorders 
(Lahey, 2009). Studies have also found low wellbeing as a risk factor for depressive 
symptoms under stress (Grant et al., 2013), although the wellbeing measures were 
different from those used in this study. Thus, our study has provided insight into the 
construct of mental health using the measures of FS, SPANE and IDS in our target 
population. The target population of this study is limited to the students in Bangor 
University, although they make up a sample from countries across the world including 
European, Middle East and Asian countries. 
We reported eudemonic wellbeing being correlated with hedonic wellbeing. 
Greater eudemonic wellbeing can affect how life events are experienced or in another 
perspective, a balanced (more positive and less negative) experience in life can 
improve eudemonic wellbeing. This mutually contributing relationship has been 
demonstrated in previous studies (Diener et al., 2010; Schotanus-Dijkstra et al., 2016).  
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Individual’s wellbeing was also associated with personality traits in this study. 
Conscientious, extrovert and less neurotic traits were found to be associated with 
greater hedonic wellbeing. The three traits, along with agreeableness, were also found 
to be associated with greater eudemonic wellbeing in our study. Villieux et al., 
(2016), using the French version of FS, reported similar relationship of eudemonic 
wellbeing with conscientiousness, extroversion and less neuroticism. Steel et al., 
(2008a) also found similar associations between personality traits and subjective 
wellbeing providing a consistent picture of wellbeing as an inherent trait. Adoption 
and twin studies showed evidence for genetic influence on 80% of the stability of 
subjective wellbeing (Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Nes, Røysamb, Tambs, Harris, & 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2006), which is unlike individual’s mood-state that is mainly 
affected by environmental factors (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005; Steel et al., 
2008a). Diener and Lucas (1999) concluded that a substantial portion of stable 
subjective wellbeing is due to personality.  
The impact of personality on wellbeing seems self-explanatory, although the 
attributions made to different personality traits can be subjective and vary between 
individuals. Agreeable person is friendly, and therefore more successful in social 
bonding (quality and quantity). A conscientious person is meticulous, highly focused 
and well planned in work and life. This could account for self-realisation, improved 
self-esteem and over all life satisfaction. An extrovert has the drive and energy to 
meet new people and develop relationships. Increased socialising can improve self-
esteem, life experiences and over all life satisfaction. A less neurotic person would be 
emotionally better equipped to deal with the dynamics of social relationships in a 
stable manner. This emotional stability can mediate individual’s subjective experience 
by moderating extreme negative feelings and impact subjective wellbeing (Villieux, 
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Sovet, Jung, & Guilbert, 2016). Although the personality inventories measure and 
identify individuals’ traits, they do not give a full picture of individuals’ social 
behaviour. Social behaviours are influenced by complex interactions between 
individuals, and this can be affected when different personality traits are attributed as 
positive or negative. All the studies discussed in this chapter provide greater 
understanding of such influences, but also identifies the need for further research on 
the interaction between personality and social behaviour. 
2.5 Conclusion 
We investigated the interactions of personality and wellbeing on mood in our 
target population. It can be concluded that neuroticism, eudemonic wellbeing and 
hedonic wellbeing individually, as well as in unison, are significant predictors of 
depression. The combination of factors, with increasing neuroticism and decreasing 
wellbeing (eudemonic and hedonic) predicted increase in depression. Individual’s 
wellbeing was also modulated by core personality traits. Agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion and emotional stability were associated with greater 
wellbeing. In this sample, neither age nor sex was associated with depression scores. 
These results provide a construct of mental health in the sample student population at 
Bangor University. 
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PART B – The development 
 Social communication and social behaviour is heavily dependent on social 
cues, including face signals that could facilitate or hinder social interactions. Prior 
research has found reduced accuracy for facial expressions in individuals with mood, 
psychotic and developmental disorders (Archer, Hay, & Young, 1992; Bediou et al., 
2012; Linden et al., 2011; Riby, Doherty-Sneddon, & Bruce, 2008). In future chapters 
(5, 6, 7, in Part C), we report the use of a visual self-attribution task in which the 
presented self-face can be manipulated by participants to display visual evidence of 
depression. The development of this scale will be discussed in this part. 
Here I would like to mention that, although not included in this thesis, we 
conducted few pilot studies prior to finalising the current face scale. Initially we 
created a scale using 22 images, however the change in facial cues was not very 
observable, and hence created the current scale. Following the study discussed in 
Chapter 3, I further tested the agreeableness scale to ensure the observed 
inconsistency was not an artefact of low quality of our original stimuli. These studies 
replicated our original result. Thus the face scale has been controlled as much as 
possible to allow the images to display changes in face signals whilst limiting 
distortions. I do not report the full details of these small pilot studies, as they involved 
only simple tinkering and tweaks of stimulus presentation and method, and were not 
addressing ideas of any particular theoretical interest (e.g. whether the progression of 
items works better with 19 or 22 frames). The studies in this section, therefore, have a 
much more developmental character than the main experimental chapters in Part C. 
There are two chapters (3 and 4) in this section, in which I will discuss three different 
studies.  
   
 Page 39 
In Chapter 3, I will discuss the process of developing a 19-point face scale, 
using face composites of agreeableness, neuroticism, and depression. I will compare 
three face scales to identify the scale that provides consistent response from both male 
and female participants for male and female faces. Based on this result, I will select 
the best face scale for self, social and observer attribution studies in Part C. In Chapter 
4, I will discuss two studies that explore the different social attributes made to the 
neurotic composite faces selected for creating the attribution task.
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CHAPTER 3 – A pilot study to choose a face scale 
 Abstract 
Attributions refer to the inference of the causes of observed behaviour and 
events. Such individual differences in attributions could relate to individual’s 
personality and mental health. Thus, subjective attributions could be used creatively 
to investigate individuals’ mood state. With this focus, we developed a face task with 
three categories, that is, neuroticism, agreeableness and depression. On this task, 
observers viewed a sequence of images giving an impression of subtly changing face 
signals. The aim was to identify the most accurate category that is consistent across 
sex (stimuli and observer), and we found neuroticism face scale to produce such 
systematic responses. The neurotic face scale was, therefore, chosen for exploring self 
and social attributions of individuals in future studies. Depression face scale was also 
accurate but the accuracy differed for male and female faces, where as agreeableness 
face scale had differential accuracy across stimulus and sex of observer. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Social interactions are heavily dependant on observing social cues and making 
appropriate attributions, which could be compromised when experiencing mental 
health disorders (Couture, Penn, & Roberts, 2006). In order to investigate 
stereotypical and biased attributions, prior studies have used two alternative forced 
choice paradigms (Kramer & Ward, 2010; Scott et al., 2013). This is appropriate to 
understand the general attribution on average, but limited in investigating individual 
differences. In this study, we endeavour to develop a face scale that allows greater 
variance in responses. 
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3.1.1 Measuring individual differences in attributions 
Individual differences relate to the variability of individual’s behaviour. 
Despite adherence to general social norms each individual has unique beliefs, 
behaviours and experiences, and therefore display individualistic perceptions and 
attributions. This variability is reflected in individual’s experience of social 
interactions, maladaptation or adaptation, and disorders (Allen-Walker & Beaton, 
2015; Linden et al., 2011). Our intention is to capture variance in observer’s 
attributions and potentially tap into individual’s behavioural differences relating to 
their state of health and wellbeing. An individualised measure of attribution will 
provide more sensitive information about individual’s perceptions, which will be 
more informative about subjective dynamics within the social dynamics.  
3.1.2 Face stimuli for implicit measures 
We read multitudes of social information such as emotions (Ekman et al., 
1992), mental and physical health (Scott et al., 2013), and personalities (Kramer & 
Ward, 2010) from the face. Adapting face stimulus to measure individual differences 
could potentially give the added benefit of tapping on to more automatic processes 
relating to implicit cognitions (Axelrod, Bar, & Rees, 2015; Northoff, 2016).  
This study aims to create a visual scale of face variation between two anchors, 
reflecting different trait values relating to depression. To illustrate in Figure 3.1, the 
neutral target face is progressively transformed between two extreme anchor values. 
On the one side the anchor is a composite with emotionally stable or without 
depressive traits and on the other side it is a composite with neurotic or depressive 
traits. The target face changes smoothly across the gradient to take on characteristics 
to reflect the difference between the anchors. For example, in Figure 3.1, one can 
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among other characteristics, see the gentle lowering of eye-gaze and brow as we move 
from one end of the scale to the other. Our intention was to find anchors to create a 
scale of variation that would be relevant to individual differences in attribution and 
depression. 
We used two traits relating closely to depression: neuroticism (Kramer & 
Ward, 2010) and depressive symptoms (Scott et al., 2013). The development work 
here also included agreeableness as a comparison, even though an agreeableness 
variation was not being considered for our scale.  
There are five main questions to be answered in this study. (1) Are systematic 
attributions made to the different forms of face variation? (2) Are the responses 
congruent to the instruction and scale for all the categories? (3) Are the responses 
consistent for both male and female faces? (4) Are the responses consistent from male 
and female participants in this task? (5) Which trait offers the best properties for 
future use based on the congruence of responses to instructions, the scale and across 
sex (stimuli and participants)? 
3.2 Methods 
We invited Bangor University students to participate in this study, which was 
approved by the Ethics and Governance Committee, School of Psychology at Bangor 
University. There were a total of 50 (40 females) participants with mean age of 19.70 
±1.876 and range (18 – 27). The study adhered to School of Psychology and Bangor 
University research guidelines, and participants were compensated for their time. In 
this study the participants completed the face task that is explained below. After 
participation students were debriefed and provided with information regarding 
available psychological support, should they feel the need for it. 
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3.2.1 Stimuli creation 
We selected a total of 20 (10 female, 10 male) portraits from the lab’s face 
database. Portraits in the database are neutral looking full frontal photographs of 
Bangor University students, who consented for their photographs to be used in future 
studies. All the portraits were screened for facial emotion expressions, make-up, face 
piercings, facial tattoos and facial hair. The selected portraits were cropped and 
rotated to present the correct pupil alignment along the transverse plane to minimise 
differences due to posture or angle of the head. Finally, each portrait was warped 
towards the three pairs of sex-congruent composites of neuroticism, depression and 
agreeableness. 
In order to create the composite faces, the full-face portraits of 15 male and 15 
females with neutral expression were selected for high and low of each category 
(agreeableness, depression and neuroticism). Exclusion criteria of facial expression, 
facial hairs, facial tattoos, head rotation, facial piercing and make up were applied 
during selection. A total of 139 landmarks were identified on each of the selected face 
and then each set of 15 faces was averaged using JPsychomorph (Tiddeman, Burt, & 
Perrett, 2001) to create the composite faces. The process of compositing or averaging 
of faces washes out any individuality and maintains only the common or salient 
features of the respective traits shared by the selected faces.  
  Warping was done using JPsychomorph (Chen & Tiddeman, 2010). In this 
process 139 landmarks were identified on each photograph and then warped towards 
the respective high and low composites, also accounting for their shape, colour and 
texture to create 19 images. In the resultant face scale, the original face was the mid-
point, and gradually changed with high trait and state characteristics towards one end, 
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and lower trait and state characteristic towards the other end of the scale. The scores 
on the 19-point scale were from -9 (least trait) through 0 (original face) to +9 (most 
trait). In this implicit task, participants were not aware of the three underlying 
categories of the face scale. This process and the resultant scale are illustrated in 
Figure 3.1. 
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3.2.2 The attribution task 
The task presented with three blocks (categories: agreeableness, neuroticism 
and depression) x 20 trials (identity: 10 male and 10 female faces) x 19 images (face 
warps).  The blocks (categories) were randomly selected per presentation. The order 
of the trials (identity) was randomly selected in the first block, but maintained through 
rest of the blocks in the presentation. The first image of each trial (19 face warps) was 
presented randomly, but followed the order of sequence on the 19-point scale. The 19 
images of each face (identity) were presented (500x500 pixels) one at a time in the 
middle of a computer screen, with instructions at the top. The presentation was not 
timed and allowed each face (identity) to be changed between low and high of the 
respective scale in order of sequence on the 19-point scale. The scale was presented 
on the screen as a circle, and therefore its lateral representation was not obvious to the 
participants. The face was displayed from the hairline to chin, vertically and face 
contour close to the ears, horizontally. 
The instructions were specific to each block (category). For the neuroticism 
scale, the instruction was to make the face look ‘most anxious and emotionally 
unstable’ and ‘most calm or emotionally stable and well balanced’. For the depression 
scale, the instruction was to make the face look ‘unhappy and least content’ and ‘most 
happy and contented’. For agreeableness, the instruction was to make the face look 
‘most agreeable and friendly’ and ‘least agreeable and unfriendly’. In order for all 
responses to indicate increasing neuroticism, depression, and agreeableness, the 
responses were reverse scored for the second instruction per category. The 
presentation is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. An illustration of a trial from the attribution task as presented on a computer screen, and 
viewed by the participants. When they press either the right or left arrow keys, the presented face will 
appear to be changing. By continued pressing of either of the keys, will present the 19 images in a 
continuous looped sequence. Without a lateral representation the end points of the scale was not 
obvious to the participants. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
We used the responses from the face task to compute group average scores per 
category, giving a total of six scores (3 categories x 2 sex of stimuli). Prior to 
averaging scores, we reverse scored the responses where the instructions were to 
make the face look least agreeable, emotionally stable or happy. Therefore, all the 
responses consistently reflected the face being made more agreeable, neurotic or 
depressed. In this manner, when the responses were congruent to the instructions the 
scores were greater than zero. The scale ranged from -9 to +9 indicating least 
agreeable, happy or emotionally stable and most agreeable, depressed or neurotic 
respectively. A mid point of the scale with a score of zero indicated the original face.  
Using one sample t-test against the test value of zero, we examined whether 
participants’ response concurred with the instructions. When the mean was greater 
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than zero, it indicated the concurrence between responses and instructions. In a further 
analysis, we used 2 (sex of participants) * 6 (2 (sex of stimuli) * 3(task categories)) 
repeated measures ANOVA (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons). The six 
categories 2 (sex of stimuli) * 3 (task categories) were within-subjects factors and sex 
of participants was the between-subjects factor. This analysis identified the main 
effect of the sex of participants and any interactions. 
3.4 Results 
A total of 50 (40 females) participants with age M = 19.70, SD = 1.876 and 
range (18 – 27) completed this study. The group mean and standard deviation of the 
responses to the six task categories are shown in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1. Mean accuracy (M) and standard deviation (SD) for the scores from the 
face task. 
 Agreeableness Neuroticism Depression 
Female faces  -2.184 (3.612) 2.835 (3.490) 1.112 (3.278) 
Male faces 2.492 (2.904) 2.245 (2.906) 4.308 (3.356) 
Note. Descriptive statistics are reported as mean (standard deviation). 
One sample t-test, corrected for multiple comparisons, showed that 
participants selected a face that was significantly different from the original face for 
all categories. When the participants made changes to the faces to look more neurotic, 
it was concurrent with the scale: female faces, t(49) = 5.743, p < .001, 95% CI(1.842, 
3.826); male faces, t(49) = 5.463, p < .001, 95% CI(1.419, 3.070), and the positive t 
values for male and female faces indicated consistency across sex of stimulus. 
Similarly, consistent responses were seen for depression: female faces, t(49) = 2.399, 
p = .003, 95% CI(.180, 2.043); male faces, t(49) = 9.077, p < .001, 95% CI(3.354, 
5.262). The male faces had a greater score than female faces, although the direction of 
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the change was the same. Except for agreeableness, responses were differential to sex 
of stimuli: female faces, t(49) = -4.272, p < .001, 95% CI(-3.211, -1.156); male faces, 
t(49) = 6.068, p < .001, 95% CI(1.666, 3.317). The male faces were changed in 
concurrence with the instructions and the scale but changes to female faces were 
made opposing to the instructions. 
A 2 (sex of participant) * 6 (2 sex of stimulus) * 3 (categories)) repeated 
measures ANOVA (Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons) showed no 
significant main effect of sex of participant, F(1, 48) = .627, p = .432. There was a 
significant within-subjects main effect of sex of stimulus, F(1, 48) = 19.069, p < .001, 
which was due to the estimated mean (EM) score for female faces (0.800) being lower 
than male faces (3.047). This reflects on the lower score for female faces on the 
agreeableness and depression scale, as seen in Table 3.3. There was also a significant 
within-subjects main effect of category, F(2, 48) = 17.190, p < .001. Pairwise 
comparisons showed that the EM response on the agreeableness scale (EM = 0.355) 
was significantly different from the depression scale (EM = 3.299, p < .001) and the 
neuroticism scale (EM = 2.117, p = .007). The response on depression scale was also 
significantly different from response on neuroticism scale (p = .047). 
In addition, we observed a significant interaction between sex of stimulus and 
category, F(2, 48) = 7.051, p = .001. This suggests that the difference in accuracy for 
the categories were different across sex of stimulus. The EMs highlights this 
difference for male and female faces as observed for agreeableness (female, -.1.51; 
male, 2.22) and depression (female, 1.69; male, 4.90) scales, but not for neuroticism 
(female, 2.21; male, 2.02) scale. This interaction between category*sex of stimulus is 
show in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3. Interaction of category (agreeableness, neuroticism, and depression) and sex of stimulus 
(female and male faces), showing differential response for male and female faces on agreeableness and 
depression scales, but not neuroticism.  
Finally, we found a significant category*sex of participant interaction, F(1, 
48) = 5.667, p = .005, indicating differential accuracy for categories across sex of 
participants, which is explained by the estimated means shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Estimated marginal means to explain the category*sex of participants 
interaction. 
 Agreeableness Neuroticism Depression 
Female participants 0.02 2.82 2.32 
Male participants 0.69 1.41 4.28 
Despite the EMs being similar on the agreeableness scale across sex of 
participants, it has to be noted that the low mean score reflect the opposing scores for 
male and female faces as reported in Table 3.1. Both male and female participants 
made changes consistent to instructions only to male faces on the agreeableness scale. 
On the depression and neuroticism face scales, female participants made quite similar 
changes unlike male participants, which reflects on this significant difference. Male 
participants made greater changes to faces on the depression scale than on the 
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neuroticism scale. Thus showing least difference across sex of participant in the 
accuracy for the neuroticism scale. 
3.5 Discussion 
This is a pilot study to develop and test the face task with the intent to identify 
the best of three face scales. The best scale will be used to measure self and social 
attributions in later studies. The three scales included agreeableness, depression and 
neuroticism, with the scores from -9 (lower trait/state) to +9 (higher trait/state). The 
midpoint of the scale was zero, representing the original face. There were five main 
questions to be answered with this study. 
The first question was whether the face task would elicit systematic 
attributions. This can be confirmed by the results of the one sample t-test against the 
test value zero, representing the original face. That is, if responses were made at 
random the mean response would be zero, representing the original face. The results 
showed that participants selected a face that was significantly different from the 
original face, for all the three categories.  
The second question was whether the responses were congruent to the 
instruction and gradation of the scale, for all the categories. We can answer this 
question by further exploring the results from the one-sample t tests. The t values for 
the neurotic and depression scales indicated that the faces were changed to look more 
neurotic and depressed respectively, which was congruent to the instruction and the 
scale, and consistent across sex of stimulus. However, the t values for the 
agreeableness scale indicated a differential response. The male faces were changed to 
look more agreeable, which was instruction-scale congruent. Whereas, the female 
faces were changed to look less agreeable, which was instruction-scale incongruent. 
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Thus, the responses to instructions were congruent on the neuroticism and depression 
scales, and to male faces on the agreeableness scale. 
The third question was whether the responses are consistent to male and 
female faces in this task. As explained above, the response on the agreeableness scale 
was differential to sex of stimulus. Regarding the depression and neuroticism scales, 
the results confirm the changes made to both male and female faces were congruent to 
the scale. On the depression scale, there were differences in how male and female 
faces were perceived, as confirmed by the significant interaction of sex of stimulus 
and category (shown in Figure 3.3). Thus, it was only the neuroticism scale that 
elicited consistent responses across male and female faces. 
The fourth question was whether the responses are consistent from male and 
female participants in this task. The repeated measures ANOVA showed no main 
effect of sex of participant. It has to be noted however the study sample could not be 
controlled for sex ratio and had a small number of males, which is a limitation of this 
study. Although we did not observe any significant sex differences, it is possible that 
with a much larger sample of males we might have measured a significant difference 
in the degree to which traits influenced attributions to self and to others' faces. 
However, it should be noted that the general patterns relating attribution to traits was 
always in the same direction for men and for women.  
Finally, the fifth question related to identifying the best of three scales based 
on instruction-scale congruence across sexes (stimulus and participants). From the 
results so far, the neurotic scale was instruction-scale congruent across sexes 
(stimulus and participant) and therefore clearly the best of the three categories.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
In this study, we created a 19-point visual scale using face stimuli that could 
be adapted for future studies. On the basis of five criteria relating to validity and 
consistency, the neurotic scale was identified as the best of three scales used in this 
study and therefore chosen for future studies to investigate self and social attributions 
of individuals. 
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CHAPTER 4 – Neurotic face signals: What we perceive? 
 Abstract 
Previous research has shown the accuracy for facial cues of neuroticism was 
reduced with tryptophan depletion (TD), which was similar to reduced accuracy for 
facial emotions of fear as reported by other TD studies. We propose that neuroticism 
trait overlaps with social and emotional information. In Study 1, we investigate the 
different social attributions that could be associated with neuroticism trait. We 
propose that the facial cues of high and low neuroticism are differentiated, and 
associated with perceptions of respective mood state. We further examine the 
subjective perceptions of attractiveness and perceptions of sex-typicality that are 
associated with high neuroticism. In Study 2, we investigate the perception of fear-
related characteristics associated with high neuroticism. The results from Study 1 
showed that high and low neurotic facial cues were systematically differentiated, and 
associated with appropriate mood state. Additionally, high neuroticism was 
systematically perceived as unattractive, but was perceived as feminine from female 
face and as masculine from male face. In Study 2, fear-related characteristics were 
systematically associated with high neuroticism. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we found that the neurotic face scale elicited the most 
consistent and accurate responses from participants. This scale is anchored in the 
statistical regularities of visual appearance relating to high and low neuroticism, as 
embodied by the composites of men and women with extreme trait neuroticism 
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scores. In this chapter, I present two studies investigating some of the social attributes 
that are consistently associated with the visual appearance of neuroticism. 
Attribution refers to the inferences of the cause of behaviour and events 
individuals observe (Kelley & Michela, 1980; Malle, 2011a; Weiner, Nierenberg, & 
Goldstein, 1976). Attributions made in a social context refer to social attribution and 
this includes the processing of social cues from the faces of other individuals. Some 
social cues, such as the concept of emotions, have generally accepted attributions in 
the wider society. For instance, faces expressing pain were attributed as sad  
(Kappesser & Williams, 2002). So certain facial expressions, including subtle facial 
cues can derive some widely accepted attributions. Scott et al. (2013) reported 
depressive facial cues being perceived as less socially acceptable. Neurotic face 
composites used in our previous study would have comparable facial cues with 
depression, and therefore reasonable to query what social attributes could be 
associated with neurotic traits. We propose that face signals of neuroticism could also 
be associated with some social attributes. 
In the two studies here, we looked in more detail at the attributions made to 
these composite faces that display cues of high and low in trait neuroticism. In Study 
1, we investigated average perceptions of neuroticism and mood state associated with 
neurotic face signals; specifically, whether high neurotic face signals will be 
perceived as anxious and unhappy, and less neurotic face signals will be perceived as 
emotionally stable and happy. A consensus of such attributions of neurotic facial cues 
across male and female faces can confirm the widely accepted positive and negative 
social concepts relating to these traits. This could further confirm the quality of the 
neurotic composites.  
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Besides these typical perceptions, Study 1 also investigated subjective 
perceptions associated with neurotic facial traits, such as concepts of femininity-
masculinity and attractiveness-unattractiveness. Prior research reported facial cues of 
high neuroticism being attributed as feminine from female composite faces  
(Cunningham, 1986; Jones & Hill, 1993; Rhodes, Hickford, & Jeffery, 2000) , but did 
not demonstrate such clear attribution of male faces (Little, Jones, Penton-Voak, Burt, 
& Perrett, 2002; Little & Hancock, 2002; Perrett et al., 1998). Inconsistency regarding 
masculinity could be related to changing social norms that encourage men to be 
expressive, cuddle and nurture their offspring, which might be preferred by 
contemporary women. Sexual dimorphism also affects differential perceptions of 
attractiveness, showing strong correlation with femininity but not with masculinity 
(Komori, Kawamura, & Ishihara, 2009; Rhodes et al., 2000). Thus, this study will 
provide insight into perceptions driven by facial cues of neuroticism. 
We further examine other biases relating to neurotic facial cues. We used a 
different pair of neurotic composites along with composites of other Big Five 
personality traits in a previous TD study (Ward, Sreenivas & Rogers, 2016) and 
reported decreased accuracy only for neurotic traits following TD. Previous TD 
studies using emotional faces found similar decreased accuracy for fear (Harmer et 
al., 2003b). Fear is widely associated with anxiety, and studies have reported reduced 
accuracy for fear in individuals diagnosed with anxiety and depressive disorders 
(Reeb-Sutherland et al., 2014; Walker, Jiang, Vetter, & Sczesny, 2011). Signals of 
fear and the accuracy for processing these signals are therefore closely linked with 
behavioural maladaptation relating to wider psychological disorders. Such evidence 
prompted the question, whether fear and neurotic traits have shared or overlapping 
face signals. Study 2 was designed to investigate whether the neurotic face signals are 
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attributed as more fearful. This will provide insight into the attributions made to face 
signals of neurotic traits and as we will see later, support the rationale for using the 
neurotic face composites in future studies which could have clinical implications.  
Ultimately, both studies here shed light on the quality of the neurotic face 
composites. In Study 1, we propose that high neurotic traits will be perceived as 
anxious and unhappy, while low neurotic traits will be perceived as emotionally stable 
and happy. These elements of positive and negative attributions have general 
connotations, and therefore we hypothesis consistency of such perceptions for male 
and female faces. We further examine whether more neurotic traits are perceived as 
feminine or masculine and as attractive or unattractive. In Study 2, we propose that 
the facial cues of neuroticism will be attributed as fear-related characteristics.  
4.2 Methods 
The School of Psychology Ethics and Governance Committee at Bangor 
University approved both studies. We invited students from Bangor University who 
gave informed consent and participated in both studies; 130 participants completed 
Study 1 and 34 participants completed Study 2. They completed two-alternative 
forced choice task, where 2 pairs ((high–low) neurotic * (male–female) faces) of 
neurotic face composites were presented using Matlab. Only sex-congruent pairs 
(high-low) were presented. The questions appeared at the top of the screen and the 
participants responded by selecting a face for the answer. The tasks used in both 
studies had 16 trials (8 questions x 2 sex-congruent neurotic face pairs). The neurotic 
composites used in the previous study to create the 19-point face scale were used in 
the current studies. The process of developing composite faces is explained previously 
in Chapter 3. 
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In Study 1, participants selected whether the composite high or low in 
neuroticism was the better match for socially desirable and undesirable 
characteristics. The questions comprised, “Who is happier?”, “Who is unhappy?”, 
“Who is more emotionally stable?”, and “Who is more anxious?”. Choice of 
emotionally stable face as happy or emotionally stable and neurotic face as unhappy 
or anxious were accounted as accurate. Two questions relating to perceptions of sex 
(“Who is more feminine?” and “Who is more masculine?”) and attractiveness (“Who 
is more attractive?” and “Who is least attractive?”) were also included, to examine 
how the visual appearance of neuroticism mapped onto perceptions of sex-typicality 
and attractiveness.  
In Study 2, the questions relating to less fearful characteristics included, “Who 
looks more courageous?”, “Who looks more confident?”, “Who looks calmer?” and 
“Who looks happier?”. The questions relating to more fearful characteristics include, 
“Who looks more frightened?”, “Who looks more fearful?”, “Who looks more 
afraid?”, and “Who looks sadder?”. The choice of less neurotic face for less fearful, 
and more neurotic face for fearful characteristics, were accounted as accurate. 
We aggregated the responses to obtain group mean accuracies. Using one 
sample t-test against the test value of 0.5 (50% accuracy), we examined the better than 
chance accuracy. In addition, we used paired samples t-test to examine stimuli-sex 
difference. Since the previous study confirmed consistent accuracy for neurotic traits 
from male and female observers, we did not look at observer-sex difference. 
 
 
   
 Page 59 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Study 1 
A total of 130 observers participated in this study. Using one sample t-test 
against the test value of .50 (corrected for multiple comparisons), we observed 
significant accuracy for identifying less neurotic facial cues as happy (female face, 
t(129) = 11.38, p < .001; male face, t(129) = 7.89, p < .001) and emotionally stable 
(female face, t(129) = 5.91, p < .001; male face, t(129) = 7.56, p < .001). Similarly, 
we observed significant accuracy for identifying facial cues of high neuroticism as 
unhappy (female face, t(129) = 8.52, p < .001; male face, t(129) = 8.52, p < .001) and 
anxious (female face, t(129) = 5.42, p < .001; male face, t(129) = 10.45, p < .001). 
The paired sample t-test (corrected for multiple comparisons) showed significant 
difference in the accuracy for perceiving neurotic traits as anxious from female and 
male faces, t(129) = -2.40, p = .001. This differential accuracy was driven by greater 
accuracy for perceiving anxiousness from male composite face, rather than lack of 
accuracy from female composite face. Thus, we demonstrate that positive and 
negative perceptions are on average made consistently to low and high neurotic facial 
traits respectively. The group mean accuracies (Figure 4.1), and 95% confidence 
intervals for each category, are given in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1. Mean accuracy (M) and 95% CI of positive and negative attributions made 
to low and high neurotic composite faces respectively. 
Composites M 95% CI M 95% CI 
 Happy Emotionally Stable 
Female faces 85%**  .79 to .92 73%** .65 to .81 
Male faces 78%** .71 to .86 78%** .70 to .85 
 Unhappy Anxious 
Female faces 80%** .73 to .87 72%** .64 to .79 
Male faces 82%** .75 to .88 84%** .77 to .90 
Note. Reported mean accuracy in percentage, ** p < .001; CI, Confidence Interval 
   
Figure 4.1. Accuracies for the positive and negative attributions made to low and high neurotic face 
composites respectively with error bars showing 1+/- se. * p < .05 
We did similar analysis for the subjective perceptions of femininity, 
masculinity, attractiveness and unattractiveness. We were interested in exploring how 
these attributions mapped on to the high neurotic composite face. One sample t-tests 
against the test value of 0.5 (corrected for multiple comparisons), showed 
significantly less than chance for high neurotic traits to be perceived as attractive from 
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female, t(129) = -5.186, p < .001 and male, t(129) = -5.662, p < .001, faces. 
Consistently, the analysis also showed significantly better than chance for high 
neurotic traits be perceived as unattractive from female, t(129) = 2.505, p = .001, and 
male, t(129) = 5.186, p < .001, faces. Thus, we show that high neurotic traits were not 
perceived as attractive from either female or male faces, but were systematically 
perceived as unattractive. This consistency was also reflected in the results of paired 
sample t-test that did not show any significant stimuli-sex difference relating to these 
perceptions. 
    In contrast to the results so far, we found differential perceptions of 
femininity and masculinity from female and male neurotic faces. One sample t-test 
against the test value of 0.5 (corrected for multiple comparisons), showed 
significantly better than chance for high neurotic traits to be perceived as feminine 
only from female faces, t(129) = 2.318, p = .001. Despite the non-significant (n.s.) 
difference (shown by paired sample t-test) in perceptions of femininity from female 
and male faces, the perception from male faces was only at chance level (Figure 4.2). 
Furthermore, high neurotic traits were perceived as masculine from male faces non-
significantly above chance, but at less than chance level from female faces. This 
differential perception of masculinity from male and female faces was statistically 
significantly different, t(129) = 2.595, p = .001. These results demonstrate that sex-
typical perception of facial cues of high neuroticism was evident from female face, 
and at a chance level from male face; however, neither of these perceptions appear to 
be driven by attractiveness in this study. The group mean scores (Figure 4.2) and 95% 
confidence interval for femininity, masculinity, attractiveness and unattractiveness for 
female and male high neurotic faces are given in Table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2. Mean frequency of attributions (M) and 95% CI for attractiveness and 
unattractiveness, and femininity and masculinity from male and female high neurotic 
composite faces. 
Composites M 95% CI M 95% CI 
 Attractive Unattractive 
Female 29%** .21 to .37 61%* .52 to .69 
Male 27%** .20 to .35 71%** .63 to .79 
 Feminine Masculine 
Female 60%* .51 to .69 42% .34 to .51 
Male 51% .48 to .59 58% .49 to .66 
Note. Reported mean accuracy in percentage, ** p < .001, * p < .05; CI, Confidence Interval 
   
Figure 4.2. The frequency of attributing attractiveness, unattractiveness, femininity, and masculinity to 
high neurotic face composites with error bars showing 1+/- se. * p < .05 
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4.3.2 Study 2 
I will now focus on the second study of this chapter in which we investigated 
whether fear-related characteristics are associated with neurotic traits. A total number 
of 34 participants with age M = 28.03, SD = 12.76 and range (18 - 57) completed this 
study. The participants completed a two-alternative forced choice experiment to 
identify fear-related characteristics from facial cues of neuroticism. 
Using one sample t test (corrected for multiple comparisons) we observed that 
fear-related characteristics were identified from female face with an accuracy of 
64.71% that was significantly better than chance, t(33) = 3.644, p < .001, 95% 
CI(0.56, 0.73). Similarly, fear-related characteristics were identified from male face 
with an accuracy of 79.04% that was also significantly better than chance, t(33) = 
9.771, p < .001, 95% CI(0.73, 0.85). The results are shown in Figure 4.3. A paired 
sample t test showed statistically significant stimuli-sex difference, t(33) = -2.862, p = 
.002, 95% CI(-0.24, -0.04), which was driven by greater accuracy for male face 
compared to female face. Thus, the neurotic trait signals were systematically 
identified as fear-related characteristics from both male and female high neurotic 
composite faces. 
   
Figure 4.3. Accuracy for identifying fear from male and female high neurotic composite faces with 
error bars showing 1+/- se. 
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4.4 Discussion 
The two studies in this chapter examined a variety of attributions made to 
neurotic face composites, the results of which have implications on later studies in 
this thesis. Firstly, we demonstrated that attributes of happy or emotionally stable and 
unhappy or anxious were systematically identified with facial cues of emotionally 
stable and high neuroticism respectively, across sexes. Results most consistent with 
ours come from a study by Scott et al. (2013), reporting how depressive cues were 
identified as less socially desirable. In our study, facial cues of high neuroticism were 
attributed as negative and this will not only confirm the quality of our composites but 
also inform future attribution studies that use the neurotic face scale developed using 
these composites. We propose that our neurotic face scale will also elicit similar 
positive and negative biases. 
Secondly, high trait neuroticism was associated with sex-typicality rather than 
a simple femininity or masculinity shift. That is, high neuroticism in female faces was 
perceived as feminine, which concurs with previous research (Little et al., 2008). 
High neuroticism from male face was perceived as masculine at non-significantly 
better than chance level while perception of femininity was only at chance level, the 
reason for which is unclear, but we could query whether it is related to perceived 
attractiveness. Enhanced dimorphism is often associated with attractiveness (Rhodes, 
2006), although this is more robustly seen with women's than men's faces (Perrett et 
al., 1998). In the current study, however, high neuroticism was systematically 
perceived as unattractive, and it is unclear how the same might elicit sex-typical 
perceptions of femininity and masculinity.  
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Attractiveness has been associated with face symmetry. Prior studies reported 
that faces of individuals with high neuroticism traits were observed to be asymmetric, 
and therefore unattractive (Noor & Evans, 2003; Shackelford & Larsen, 1997; Shuler, 
2012). Unlike the previous studies, we used composites that are averages of individual 
faces and the composite method eliminates or greatly reduces fluctuating asymmetry. 
Thus, the main varying factor in the composites is the facial cues of neuroticism, 
which appears to be driving sex-typical perceptions of femininity from female faces 
and masculinity from male faces (n.s.). 
The overall evidence demonstrates that facial cues of high neuroticism appear 
to be driving systematic negative perceptions of anxiety, unhappiness, and 
unattractiveness, whereas facial appearance of emotional stability appears to be 
driving systematic perceptions of positive characteristics such as emotional stability, 
happy mood state, and attractiveness. The results so far, support the quality of the 
composites as well as the questions that attain systematic responses and therefore the 
questions relating to positive and negative perceptions will be used in future 
attribution studies.  
Finally, we demonstrated fear-related characteristics being consistently 
identified with neurotic traits. Our literature search did not find similar studies 
investigating attribution of fear from neurotic face composites and therefore this study 
provides new evidence of fear-related characteristics associated with face signals of 
high neuroticism. Previous studies reported reduced accuracy for facial emotion of 
fear with TD (Harmer et al., 2003b; Merens et al., 2008), while our previous TD study 
(Ward, Sreenivas & Rogers, 2016) showed similar reduced accuracy for neurotic face 
composites, following depletion. TD is used to investigate the behavioural and neural 
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effects of acute neurobiological changes relating to depression. Therefore the neurotic 
face composites could be used for future studies involving individuals experiencing 
depression, not only because the neurotic traits are closely linked with depression but 
also because of its overlap with fear-related characteristics. Fear is one of the basic 
emotions (Ekman et al., 1992), and the perception of related characteristics from faces 
displaying neurotic traits may be the reason why it was easier for participants to 
attribute generic positive and negative social meaning to these composite pairs, as 
demonstrated in Study 1 of this chapter.  
4.5 Conclusion 
Study 1 demonstrated systematic association of facial cues of high neuroticism 
with negative attributions and emotional stability with positive attributions. We 
further observed sex-typical perceptions of facial cues of high neuroticism, that is, 
femininity from female neurotic face and masculinity from male neurotic face (n.s), 
despite evidence of systematic perceptions of unattractiveness relating to high 
neuroticism observed in this study. Thus, it appears that cues, other than 
attractiveness, are driving sex-typical perceptions.    
Based on the evidence from Study 2, we conclude that fear was accurately 
identified from the neurotic face composites. This was systematically perceived from 
female and male faces. Thus, the overlap of fear-related characteristics and neurotic 
signals in the composites make them uniquely adaptable for studies involving clinical 
populations of depression and anxiety. 
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PART C – Individual differences in attributions of facial appearance 
In the next three experimental studies, I will be discussing methods and results 
from an attribution task based on facial appearance. In this section, I will give a "big 
picture" view of the different attribution tasks, what they are measuring, and how they 
are related. 
In the previous chapters, I discussed the process of developing and piloting the 
stimuli for the attribution task using face images. As a first step, the composite faces 
of three personality traits were created (neuroticism, agreeableness, and depression). 
The scales based on the three traits were compared for their accuracy and consistency 
across sexes (stimuli and observers), and we found that participants were more 
accurate and consistent in their response on the neuroticism scale. Further to this 
evidence of the quality of the Neurotic Face Scale, there is also evidence of neurotic 
traits being closely related to depression. That is, the Neurotic Face Scale illustrates 
progressive change in the visual appearance of low and high neuroticism, and for 
those at low and high risk of depression. In this light, it is interesting to investigate 
how individuals experiencing depression would make attributions on the Neurotic 
Face Scale. Using this scale for the attribution tasks, we will investigate self, social, 
and observer’s attributions, and discuss the results in three different chapters in this 
section. Below I discuss these different, but related, attribution tasks.  
Attribution, with regard to the studies discussed here, refers to attributions 
made to facial appearance, either one's own appearance or other peoples'. The facial 
attribution task I use extends previous work on self and social attributions. Attribution 
generally refers to the explanation for behaviours, such as inferences (e.g., reason for 
behaviours) or ascriptions (e.g., blame to a person) (Malle, 2011). When these are 
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self-directed, it accounts to self-attributions, and when directed at others, it refers to 
social attributions (Harvey, Madison, Martinko, Crook, & Crook, 2014; Weiner, 
1985). Individuals are therefore making inferences or giving meaning to behaviours, 
because they do not have complete access to their (or other’s) internal states such as 
attitudes, beliefs, emotions, motives and traits (Heider, 1958; Niemiec, 2007). 
Inferring attributes from the observations of own behaviours and the situational 
contexts in which they occurred, rely on mental representation of self (Markus & 
Wurf, 1987). 
Markus and Wurf (1987) discussed different types of self-representations such 
as the ‘ideal self’ (Rosenberg, 1989), the ‘actual self’ (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 
1985), and concepts of ‘positive self’ and ‘negative self’ (Andersen, Tuskeviciute, 
Przybylinski, Ahn, & Xu, 2015; Decker, 1985; Sullivan, 1953). The different types of 
selves are essentially how individuals perceive themselves, and therefore relate to 
their subjective mental representations of self (Bodenhausen & Morales, 2013). The 
subjective role of these representations of self is illustrated by the fact that they are 
modulated by attention bias, inferences and cognitive distortions (Bodenhausen & 
Morales, 2013). Markus and Wurf (1987) proposed that conflicting self-
representations or a discrepancy between representations of self can induce a state of 
discomfort, and different kinds of discrepancies produce different types of discomfort 
relating to different mental health disorders. Various self-discrepancies were found to 
be associated with body dissatisfaction (Strauman, Vookles, Berenstein, Chaiken, & 
Higgins, 1991), depression and anxiety disorders (Phillips & Silvia, 2010a; Roelofs et 
al., 2007). 
 
   
 Page 69 
C.1 The Attribution Tasks  
In the attribution tasks, I will be using observers’ selection from a continuum 
of face variation, a face that best matched a predefined attribution. As indicated 
earlier, the Neurotic Face Scale was used in all the attribution tasks reported here. In 
these tasks, a single face was morphed between two specific anchor images, reflecting 
high emotional stability at one end and high neuroticism at the other. The original 
face was referenced with value 0, images of increasing emotional stability were 
increasing negative values (-9 minimum), and images of increasing neuroticism were 
increasing positive values (+9 maximum). This is illustrated in Figure C.1. In the self-
attribution task, the face being morphed on the Neurotic Face Scale was the observer's 
own face. For attributions to others, the faces used were those of unfamiliar men and 
women. In all cases, observers were given a question to apply, such as "most 
attractive", and move back and forth through the images one at a time until they were 
satisfied that they have found the image best matching the question. Observers were 
not told about the nature of the scale, that it is a neurotic appearance scale that varies 
from emotional stability to neuroticism, or about the numerical rating associated with 
their image choice. In this way, very similar procedures were used for self- and other-
attribution tasks, the main differences being the kinds of questions we can sensibly 
ask about self and others.  
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 Our aim was to look at the full range of attributions relating to self and others. 
We can refer to the individuals of most interest as "actors" when comparing self and 
others’ attributions. We examined the attributions the actors made to themselves (self-
attributions) in Chapter 5, the attributions the actors made to others (social 
attributions) in Chapter 6, and the attributions others made to the actors (observer 
attributions) in Chapter 7. The three attributions are illustrated in Figure C.2. In 
Chapter 7, we further triangulated these three attributions. By measuring and 
triangulating these attributions, we can understand the relationship between them. For 
instance, this paradigm will enable us to study how an actor’s self-attributions are 
similar or dissimilar to their attributions to others (social attributions), as well as the 
attributions others’ make to the actor (observer attributions). This is an invaluable 
means to investigate the dynamics between the three attributions, which are made 
solely on the subtle information gathered from the neurotic appearance of the faces.  
     
 Figure C.2. Illustration of the three different perspectives that were investigated in the three 
attribution studies. Attributions of actors on their self-image were self-attributions. Attributions of 
actors on the images of unfamiliar others were social attributions. Attributions of unfamiliar observers 
on the image of actors were observer attributions. 
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C.2 Self-attribution 
Our self-attribution task used the framework of the previous work on self-
attributions, and provided four basic self-attribution measures based on facial 
appearance: actual self, ideal self, positive self and negative self. These are called 
basic measures because actors made ratings directly related to them. Discrepancies 
between these basic measures were also expected to be informative, as in previous 
research on self-attribution (Markus & Wurf, 1987), and could be associated with 
inherent traits and transient states. For example, a person experiencing depressive 
symptoms exhibits greater self-negativity (Beck, 2008), and might therefore make less 
distinction when choosing actual self and negative self. In contrast, a person with 
greater self-esteem exhibits greater self-positivity (Watson, Dritschel, Obonsawin, & 
Jentzsch, 2007), and therefore might make less distinction when choosing actual self 
and positive self. Thus, we measured actor’s self-discrepancies as the magnitude of 
separation between their basic self-attributions on the Neurotic Face Scale. When the 
two images identified as actual and negative selves are less separated, there is less 
distinction between those two mental representations of self, as illustrated in Figure 
C.3. In this instance, it could be explained as the actor having greater self-negativity. 
On the contrary, if there were greater separation between the two images identified for 
actual and negative selves, as illustrated in Figure C.3, it would indicate lesser self-
negativity.  
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Figure C.3. The figure illustrates the magnitude of separation between the attributions of actual self 
and negative self on the Neurotic Face Scale. a) Shows greater separation between the two attributions, 
and refers to lesser self-negativity. b) Shows lesser separation between the two attributions, and refers 
to greater self-negativity. This illustration explains how the measures of magnitude of separation 
(separation index) between the attributions can reflect on actor’s self-discrepancies. 
Each discrepancy measure is reported here as a separation index (SI), 
calculated as the square root of the square of the difference between two attribution 
scores. For example, SI between perceived actual and negative selves was calculated 
as, 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 !. SI refers to the magnitude of separation between the 
respective attributions on the 19-point neurotic face scale, as illustrated in Figure C.3. 
Three measures of discrepancies were computed as the separation indices (SIs). The 
SI of actual-ideal pair referred to the classic self-discrepancy (ie, the discrepancy 
between perceived actual and ideal self), the actual-negative pair referred to self-
negativity, and actual-positive pair referred to self-positivity. Greater SI therefore 
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indicates greater distinction between the respective perceptions. On this basis, greater 
SI scores mean greater separation between the two basic self-attributions, and 
therefore refer to reducing self-negativity, and self-positivity, but increasing self-
discrepancy. It means that two of the three SIs are inverse scales. To ensure 
consistency of increasing scores referring to increasing self-negativity and self-
positivity, in the same way as self-discrepancy, the inverse scales were reverse scored. 
The self-attribution task thus provided a total of seven scores: four basic self-
attribution scores and three SIs. In this task, actors responded on the Neurotic Face 
Scale in response to instructions relating to images of their own face. The self-
attribution task was developed with the intention to explore individual differences in 
self-attribution, and the possibility of monitoring subtle behaviour changes. I argue 
that it has two useful qualities in this regard. First, the nature of the scale allows for 
significant individual variation in the basic and SI measures. This might not be the 
case for example, if we directly followed the work of Scott et al. (2013) in which an 
individual face is morphed to create just two images displaying "high depression" and 
"low depression" self, and then participants picked their most preferred self or most 
positive self. Second, participants are not told that face images vary in appearance of 
emotional stability to neuroticism. That is, judgements relating to facial neuroticism 
are entirely implicit, as participants simply see unlabelled continuous variation of 
facial appearance. Therefore, the self-attributions will be less likely to be 
contaminated by explicit biases about the social value of emotional stability or 
neuroticism. Existing literature supports that with ambiguous or limited information 
individuals depend on self-inference, whilst making attributions (Mitchell, Banaji, & 
Neil Macrae, 2005). In light of these, I propose that these qualities make our 
attribution paradigm more sensitive to actor’s mood and wellbeing state. 
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C.3 Social attribution 
The attribution task was adapted to measure social attribution in a way similar 
to self-attribution, by using photographs of other individuals to create the Neurotic 
Face Scale. Having the actors from the self-attribution task rate other people's faces, 
allows us to see whether any biases in self-attribution carry over into attribution of 
others. As in the self-attribution task discussed above, the participants were instructed 
to scroll through the image sequences to make the presented face look positive 
(happy, calm and most attractive) and negative (unhappy, anxious and least 
attractive). Theory of Mind postulates that, when making social attributions with 
limited information, individuals tend to make inference to self in order to understand 
or give meaning to other’s behaviours (Mitchell et al., 2005). Inference to self, 
inadvertently relates to individual’s basic traits and mood state, but tapping into these 
processes requires paradigms that allow more automatic processing. Previous research 
supports automatic processing of face stimuli (Axelrod et al., 2015; Winston, Strange, 
O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2002), and our social attribution paradigm using faces of 
unfamiliar individuals, promises sensitive measures that depend on self-inference. 
Another study reported exaggerated perception of dynamic facial expression in 
clinical population (Sato, Uono, & Toichi, 2013; Trautmann-Lengsfeld, Domínguez-
Borràs, Escera, Herrmann, & Fehr, 2013), suggesting aberrant perception of facial 
cues. These studies support our proposition that the measures from the social 
attribution task could show the effect of actor’s inherent traits and transient states on 
their social attributions. Unlike the self-attribution task, however, the social 
attribution task provided only two basic attribution scores highlighting one of their 
key differences.  
   
 Page 76 
The difference between the social and self-attribution tasks relates to the 
questions that can be sensibly asked. In the social attribution task, the actors saw a 
number of men's and women's faces, and were instructed to make the presented face 
look most positive and most negative. That is, unlike the self-attribution task, actors 
did not indicate an "actual" or "ideal" appearance. Another important factor of the 
social attribution task is that, we endeavoured to control for the mood state of the 
observed others in order to control for the related variations in the face signals as 
observed by the actors. To ensure this consistency, the faces were selected from an 
existing database, on the basis of low depression scores. Lower depression score 
shows that individuals are experiencing milder depression. As explained in Chapter 1, 
it would indicate that the individuals are experiencing fewer or milder depressive 
symptoms. This was important to ensure we are measuring the actor’s mental 
representation relating to their mood state and trait, and not a complex interaction of 
these with the mood state of others’, who are being observed. For example, if the 
observed others’ face displayed their low mood state then it would be further 
exaggerated on the Neurotic Face Scale. Furthermore, we endeavoured to control for 
the unknown factors that may affect attributions, by ensuring the social attribution 
task was completed in the same session as the self-attribution task. 
C.4 Observer’s attribution 
The observer’s attributions were measured using the same paradigm as the 
social attribution task. For the observer attribution task, the faces were those of the 
actors from the self-attribution task, and measured two basic attributions (i.e., positive 
and negative). This task allows us to assess whether the actors' self-attributions agree 
with the judgements made by external observers of the actors' faces. Unlike for the 
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social attribution task, we did not control for the observed actor’s mood state because 
this study focused on investigating how observer’s attribution related to actor’s mood 
and wellbeing state. This line of thinking reflects on the social stigma or prejudice 
towards individuals experiencing problems relating to their mental health and 
wellbeing. By comparing and triangulating self, social and observer’s attributions, we 
can get an overview of how actor’s mood, wellbeing and trait may modulate not just 
their self-attributions and attributions of others, but also the attributions of the actors 
made by unfamiliar observers. 
Actors and observers in all the three studies, in this section, completed a trait-
identifying task, which is explained in Chapter 5. This task was to ensure that 
observers were able to accurately differentiate the high-low neurotic facial cues, from 
the composite faces, that were used as the anchor points for creating the Neurotic 
Face Scale. 
C.5 Analysis plan 
Using the attribution task in self, social and observer contexts, we measured a 
range of attributions. The attributions of ideal and actual self were made only in the 
context of self-attribution, whereas the positive and negative attributions were made 
in all the three contexts (i.e. self, social, and observer). The three responses for 
positive and negative attributes were averaged respectively, for scoring positive and 
negative attributions. Initially, all the individual responses were examined for their 
distribution, as well as the correlations between the individual responses for the 
respective positive and negative attributions. On the basis of these correlations, 
individual responses were averaged to score the positive and negative attributions. 
   
 Page 78 
 We further explored how actor’s mood, wellbeing, personality and 
attributional style, related to their self and social attributions as well as observer’s 
attributions. The associations were explored using raw correlations, with the intention 
to portray the consistent picture emerging from all the significant correlations. I 
acknowledge the correlations do not equate to causation, and multiple correlations 
could bring false positives. However, using a simple method of putting together 
meaningful correlations to understand the bigger picture would be more suitable to 
gauge the quality of our new task. The non-significant correlations that contributed to 
the bigger picture were also reported in the results appropriately. The correlations of 
self and social attributions with the actor’s mood, wellbeing, personality and 
attributional style helped to build a picture of the attribution task measuring the 
related subtle behavioural changes. More specifically, the results displayed the 
underlying link of attribution with mood, wellbeing and neuroticism. This is 
interesting because in Chapter 2, we reported wellbeing and neuroticism as predictors 
of depression. When the correlations provided a consistent picture of attributions 
relating to the aforementioned measures of trait and state, it substantiated the 
multifaceted quality of the new attribution task. The following self, social and 
observer attribution studies explore these relations, and are discussed in three separate 
chapters within this section. Since self-attribution is of key interest, its association 
with trait and state measures will be discussed in greater detail. 
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CHAPTER 5 – Looking in the mirror: Self-attributions 
Abstract  
Cognitions are affected by the mental representations of self and social cues. 
These can be negatively biased with depression and related traits, indicating 
misattributions and dysfunctions. We measured self-attributions of facial appearance 
using the novel self-attribution task. We propose that depression, wellbeing and 
neuroticism will relate to misattributions of self. The results consistently showed that 
participants with increasing severity of depression, low hedonic wellbeing and high 
neuroticism identified more neurotic images as their actual self, indicating an 
exaggerated negative perception of self. They also chose more neurotic images as 
their positive self, indicating increased misperceptions. Mental representations of self-
negativity increased with increasing depression and neuroticism, and decreasing 
hedonic wellbeing, while self-discrepancy decreased with increasing wellbeing. The 
misperceptions relating to depressogenic states and trait are consistent with the 
existing literature, and substantiate the self-attributions measured using our self-
attribution task. We quantify self-negativity, self-positivity and self-discrepancy in 
visual modality, which are sensitive to emotional dysregulations.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Self-attribution refers to the process by which individuals determine the 
antecedents and consequences of their own behaviours (Niemiec, 2007). They have 
previously been investigated using positive and negative words or adjectives 
(Munevar et al., 2014), scenarios (Ball, McGuffin, & Farmer, 2008) and affective 
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pictures (Ochsner, Ray et al., 2004). Our most personal and individualising attribute, 
however, is likely to be our facial appearance. Self-face paradigms have been used to 
investigate self-recognition (Devue et al., 2007; Kircher et al., 2001), self-
enhancement (Epley & Whitchurch, 2008; Felisberti & Musholt, 2014), and 
differentiation of self and other (Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Fink, & Piefke, 2007). 
This evidence suggests that self-face stimuli activate self-referential processing with 
distinct neural underpinnings, and is useful to investigate emotional and cognitive 
processes relating to self (Keenan et al., 2000; Kircher et al., 2001). Important to this 
study, such self-referential processes are affected in those individuals experiencing 
depression (Christoff, Cosmelli, Legrand, & Thompson, 2011; Keenan et al., 2000).  
More recently, a study used face-morphing technique to morph self-face in 
gradual gradients towards stranger-faces and famous-faces to create images that were 
presented in a two alternative forced choice paradigm (Liu et al., 2014). They reported 
self-face bias during face processing in patients with major depressive disorder, which 
was interpreted as impaired self-processing and self-recognition. Other studies have 
reported exaggerated perceptions of self (Uono, Sato, & Toichi, 2015) and negative 
bias during face processing (Anderson et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2016) in individuals 
experiencing mental health problems, indicating misattributions. Christoff et al., 
(2011) explained these observed misattributions on the basis of reduced connectivity 
within the self-processing neural networks in individuals with mental health disorders. 
These studies put together a picture of the unseen complimentary roles of neural 
mechanisms and attribution. From the observer’s vantage, only the behavioural 
aspects are obvious, and these misattributions can detrimentally affect individual’s 
social functioning leading to social isolation (Seivewright, Tyrer, & Johnson, 2004; 
Steger & Kashdan, 2009; Weightman, Air, & Baune, 2014), and further mediating 
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depressive symptoms such as feelings of worthlessness and loneliness (Seligman et 
al., 1979). 
5.1.1 Attributions, depressive symptoms, and neuroticism 
Cognitive styles have been investigated as vulnerability factors of depression  
(Bentall, Kinderman, & Kaney, 1994), besides the underlying neural mechanisms. 
These factors affect emotional regulation (Beauregard, Paquette, & Le`vesque, 2006; 
van Rossum, Dominguez, Lieb, Wittchen, & van Os, 2011) and reality distortion  
(Dobson & Shaw, 1981), driving the vicious cycle of distorted self and social 
attributions (Golin, Sweeney, & Shaeffer, 1981; Murphy & Bates, 1997; Pearson et 
al., 2015) leading to dysfunction. Most studies investigating attribution and 
depression used various self-esteem measures and the Attributional Style 
Questionnaire (ASQ) (Peterson et al., 1982), and found low self-esteem and 
depressive attributional style in individuals predisposed to depression (Bush, Ballard, 
& Fremouw, 1995; Seligman et al., 1979). Using the ASQ, it was found that those 
vulnerable to depression regard negative events as being caused by self (Ball et al., 
2008), indicating a negative self-concept. Other studies have used stimuli of positive 
and negative words or adjectives (Munevar et al., 2014), and affective pictures 
(Ochsner, Knierim et al., 2004), which helped to understand that individuals 
experiencing depressive symptoms chose negative attributes to describe themselves. 
These studies substantiate the model of negative self-concept and misattributions 
disrupting social behaviours (Beck, 2008; Joiner, 2000). The above paradigms may be 
effective in measuring attributional style and negative self-concepts relating to 
depressive symptoms, but are limited in measuring visual self-attributions. 
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Measuring self-attributions of visual stimuli would benefit from paradigms 
using self-face. Kircher et al. (2001) found that self-face stimuli uniquely activated 
self-referential processing with distinct neural underpinnings. Medial prefrontal 
cortex (MPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) activations were identified with 
processes of self-referencing and recognising self-face (Keenan et al., 2000; Northoff 
et al., 2006; Qin & Northoff, 2011; Schneider et al., 2008), which are also closely 
linked to mood disorders (Lemogne et al., 2010; Lemogne, Delaveau, Freton, 
Guionnet, & Fossati, 2012). This link between behaviour and brain, could explain 
some of the behavioural symptoms of mood disorder. A major symptom of depression 
is negativity of self, which may be coupled with grandiosity of self in manic 
depression. The disruptions in the self-referential neural networks could explain such 
distorted self-perceptions in the bipolar spectrum. MPFC being an active link in the 
fronto-parietal attention network (Amodio & Frith, 2006) may also explain other 
mood disorder symptoms such as attention bias and inability to concentrate. 
Tryptophan depletion studies have shown the effect of neuromodulators in these 
networks, whilst processing face signals (Daly et al., 2010). Tryptophan is the 
precursor of serotonin, the depletion of which temporarily mimics a depressive 
neurobiology (Marsh et al., 2006; Young, 2013). Depleted tryptophan levels were 
associated with reduced accuracy for facial emotions such as fear (Harmer et al., 
2003b; Hornboll et al., 2013) and trait signals of neuroticism (Ward, Sreenivas & 
Rogers, 2016). 
Prior studies have reported the strong association of neuroticism with mental 
health (Cheng & Furnham, 2003; Lahey, 2009), especially mood and anxiety 
disorders (McConville & Cooper, 1998; McCrae & Terracciano, 2005; McWilliams, 
2003). In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I discussed the predictive role of neuroticism for the 
   
 Page 83 
severity of depressive symptoms, which is further substantiated by neurobiological 
studies that reported the link between neuroticism and serotonin transporter binding 
(Hong et al., 2011; Stewart, Deary, & Ebmeier, 2002; Takano et al., 2007) . There is 
evidence of greater neural activation whilst processing negative facial emotions, in 
those with greater neuroticism (Canli, 2004).  
The studies discussed so far overwhelmingly support our proposition of 
misperceptions in general and specifically towards self, in relation to depressive mood 
and neuroticism. We propose to measure self-attributions, using our visual self-
attribution task. Reflecting on the existing evidence, we propose that increasing 
depression and neuroticism will relate to increasing self-negativity, demonstrating 
misattributions. Such misattributions of self could perpetuate depression, disrupt 
social behaviours, and diminish wellbeing. 
5.1.2 Attributions and wellbeing 
Wellbeing is strongly associated with mental health and social functioning 
(Ryan & Deci, 2001; Seligman et al., 1979; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Wellbeing, 
commonly described as subjective wellbeing, consists of three interrelated 
components: life satisfaction, pleasant affect, and unpleasant affect (Diener & Lucas, 
1999). Affect refers to pleasant and unpleasant moods and emotions (hedonic), 
whereas life satisfaction refers to a cognitive sense of satisfaction with life 
(eudemonic) (Diener et al., 2010). Essentially, subjective wellbeing accounts for both 
eudemonic and hedonic wellbeing, along with mood state. The hedonic perspective 
suggests that maximizing one’s pleasurable moments is the pathway to happiness, 
whilst eudemonic perspective advocates that living a life of virtue, and actualizing 
one’s inherent potentials improve wellbeing (Delle Fave et al., 2011). Previous studies 
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support the association of individual’s mental health and wellbeing with their 
concepts of self, such as self-image and self-esteem (Cheng & Furnham, 2003; 
Corning, 2002; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Rathbone, Holmes, Murphy, & Ellis, 
2015), which also affect their casual attributions of success and failure (Farid, Akhtar, 
& Qamar, 2014). We propose that our self-attribution measures will be associated 
with individual’s wellbeing. 
Self-attribution, in the context of our study, refers to attributions of self-facial 
appearance. The process of making attributions to self-facial appearance, involves 
multiple processes, such as recognition of self-image, processing facial cues, and self-
referential processes. Face processing, especially self-face, involves more automatic 
processing, and therefore may be reliant on non-conscious processes (Axelrod et al., 
2015). Our self-attribution paradigm would, therefore, provide sensitive measures of 
subtle behaviours elicited by mood, wellbeing, and other internal processes. 
In this study, we measure self-attribution using our novel self-attribution task 
to investigate the association of individual’s self-attributions with their depressive 
state, neuroticism trait and wellbeing state. We propose that depression, neuroticism 
and wellbeing will relate to self-attributions. Specifically, we propose that increasing 
severity of depressive symptoms, neuroticism and decreasing wellbeing will relate to 
increasing self-negativity. 
5.2 Methods 
We recruited 100 (69 females) participants with a mean age 20.41±4.72 from 
the 1st and 2nd year undergraduate student population at Bangor University, who gave 
informed consent prior to participation and were compensated for their time in 
compliance with School of Psychology and Bangor University research ethics and 
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regulations. After participation students were debriefed and provided with information 
regarding available psychological support. They completed questionnaires including: 
Inventory of Depressive Symptomology – self rated (IDS) (Rush et al., 1986; Rush et 
al., 1996) to measure depressive mood state, Flourishing Scale (FS) (Diener et al., 
2010) and Scale of Positive and Negative Experiences (SPANE) (Diener et al., 2010) 
to measure eudemonic and hedonic wellbeing respectively, Mini International 
Personality Item Pool (MIPIP) (Donnellan et al., 2006) to measure personality, and 
ASQ (Peterson et al., 1982) to measure attributional style. All the above measures, 
except ASQ, have been described in Chapter 2.  
Briefly, FS is an eight-item scale that provided a single measure of 
psychosocial flourishing relating to eudemonic wellbeing. The SPANE is a 12-item 
scale that measured three different scores for hedonic wellbeing (positive experience, 
negative experience and balanced experience). The positive and negative experience 
scores refer to the frequency of positive and negative experiences respectively, in the 
past four weeks. The balanced experience is computed as the difference between the 
positive and negative experiences scores. A greater balanced score indicate better 
wellbeing, with more positive than negative experiences; therefore used as the 
hedonic wellbeing measure. MIPIP provided the big five personality scores. ASQ has 
12 different hypothetical events; six good and six bad events. These events also have 
additional quality of half being interpersonal or affiliative, and the other half being 
achievement related. Following each event are parallel questions. First step was to 
"write down the one major cause" of the event, and then to rate the cause along the 
three attributional dimensions, such as internal, stable and global. Finally, importance 
of the situation described was rated on a 7-point scale. By collapsing across the 
achievement-affiliation distinction, ASQ provides six sub scores, (internal, stable, 
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global) * (positive, negative), and two aggregate scores (composite style for good 
events and composite style for bad events). 
Participants then completed the self-attribution task, in which they selected 
images of themselves they felt best matched the respective instructions. They also 
completed the trait-identifying task. Both the tasks were explained below. 
5.2.1 Self-attribution task 
The self-attribution task was set up using the participant’s own photograph at 
the time of data collection. The data collection procedures for setting up the task 
included taking photograph of the participant, creating the image sequences and 
setting up the task. All the procedures were completed in a single session. 
Photograph: A front facing portrait of each participant was taken using a 
Nikon D3000 camera, Nikon DX (AF-S Nikkor) 18-55 mm (1:3.5-5.6 G) lens, and 
Nikon SB-400 flash. The camera was placed on a tripod at an approximate height of 
90 cm and participants seated approximately 215 cm away. The flash was turned 45o 
upwards facing the white ceiling, to provide soft/diffused lighting by bouncing light 
on to the subject. All other lightings were controlled. A full-face portrait taken, devoid 
of any make up or face tattoos and with a neutral expression (no expression), was 
used to set up the task. 
Stimuli creation: The portraits taken in the first phase of the study were used 
to set up the self-attribution task. The portraits were cropped and rotated to present the 
correct pupil alignment along the transverse plane, to minimise differences due to 
posture or angle of the head. Portraits were cropped using Microsoft Photo Editor. 
Head rotation correction was done by aligning the midpoint of the eyes (iris) to the 
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same temporal plane at 0o angle. These were then warped towards a pair of sex-
congruent composite faces with high neuroticism and emotionally stable traits, 
respectively. Warping is a process of gradual change of the internal reference points 
of an individual face towards the respective reference points on the composite faces, 
as explained later. The composite face pairs of neuroticism were adopted from the 
study detailed in Chapter 4. The composites had accuracy of 69% for female pair and 
77% for male pair, which was significantly better than chance.  
Warping participant’s photograph towards sex-congruent composite face pairs 
created the image sequences for the task. This was done using JPsychomorph (J. Chen 
& Tiddeman, 2010). In this process, 139 landmarks were identified on each 
photograph and then warped 100% towards the emotionally stable and the neurotic 
face composites, also accounting for their shape, colour and texture, to create 19 
images. In the resultant Neurotic Face Scale, the original face was the mid-point of 
the scale and gradually changed with increasing emotionally stable facial appearance 
towards one end and neurotic facial appearance towards the other. The scores on the 
19-point scale were from -9 (least neurotic) through 0 (original face) to +9 (most 
neurotic). Figure C.1 shows the graphical illustration of the warping process and the 
image sequences on the 19-point neurotic face scale. This is an implicit task because 
the participants were not aware of the underlying neurotic appearance of the scale. 
Presentation: In the self-attribution task, the participant’s own face images 
were presented using Matlab. The task presented with eight blocks (questions: ideal, 
actual, happy, emotionally stable, attractive, unhappy, anxious and least attractive) x 1 
trial (self face) x 19 images (face warps). The blocks (questions) were randomly 
selected per presentation. The order of images (19 face warps) in the trial was 
   
 Page 88 
randomly selected in each block. The 19 images (self-face warps) were presented 
(500x500 pixels) one at a time in the middle of a computer screen with instructions at 
the top, as shown in Figure 5.1. The images were presented one at a time in order of 
the sequence of the 19-point face scale and looped back and forth through the 
sequence to provide seamless increase and decrease of neurotic traits.  
The instructions were to choose their actual (‘Choose your actual face’), ideal 
(‘Choose your ideal face’), positive self and negative self. There were three positive 
and negative self-attributions. The instructions for positive-self were, ‘Make the face 
look most happy and content’, ‘Make the face look calm, stable and well-balanced’ 
and ‘Make the face look most attractive’. The instructions for negative-self were, 
‘Make the face look unhappy and least content’, ‘Make the face look anxious and 
emotionally unstable’ and ‘Make the face look least attractive’.  
The first image per presentation was randomly selected from the 19 images. 
When participants pressed either the right or left arrow keys, the images changed 
through a looped sequence in their order on the implicit neurotic face scale. This gave 
the impression of the presented face changing, as controlled by the participant. The 
presentation of looped sequence of images made it difficult for the observer to 
understand the lateral representation of the scale, and therefore its end points. 
Participants selected one image for each instruction by pressing spacebar. This task 
was not timed. 
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Figure 5.1. An illustration of a trial from the self and social attribution task as presented on a computer 
screen and viewed by the participants. When they press either the right or left arrow keys the presented 
face will appear to be changing. By continued pressing of either of the keys, will present the 19 images 
in a continuous looped sequence. Without a lateral representation, the end points of the scale were not 
obvious to the participants. 
5.2.2 Trait identifying task 
This task was used in all the attribution studies. The composites (male and 
female) of high neuroticism and emotionally stable traits, used as anchor points to 
create the sequence of images for the attribution tasks, were used in the trait-
identifying task (two-alternative forced choice paradigm). The task had four 
presentations with 2 (questions) x 2 (sex-congruent neurotic face pair). The high-low 
neurotic pair that was also sex-congruent was presented at the same time with an 
instruction. The instructions read ‘Who is more neurotic?’ and ‘Who is less 
neurotic?’. Descriptions for neuroticism such as ‘experiencing frequent mood 
swings’, ‘getting upset easily’, ‘frequently tensed’, ‘feeling blue’, as per Mini 
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International Personality Item Pool (Donnellan et al., 2006), were also provided. The 
results from this task confirmed the accuracy in identifying the neurotic traits from 
neutral looking composite faces. 
5.3 Data Analysis 
The primary outcome measures were the basic self-attributions (actual self, 
ideal self, positive self, and negative self) and the SIs. The positive self and negative 
self were computed as the average of three respective individual responses. The inter-
correlations between the three individual responses are reported. We further report the 
correlations between the four basic self-attributions. The three SIs measured in this 
study include the SI of perceived actual self and perceived negative self (SIan) 
measured self-negativity, the SI of perceived actual self and perceived positive self 
(SIap) measured self-positivity and the SI of perceived actual self and perceived ideal 
self (SIai) measured self-discrepancy. As explained previously, the inverse scales were 
reverse scored as required to ensure that increasing SIan, SIap and SIai indicated 
increasing self-negativity, self-positivity and self-discrepancy respectively. 
The secondary outcome measures were scores from IDS, FS, SPANE, ASQ 
and MIPIP. We use correlation analysis to identify associations between the primary 
and secondary measures. Reflecting on the predictors of depression discussed in 
Chapter 2, we will report and discuss the significant correlations of depression score, 
neuroticism and balanced wellbeing with the self-attribution measures. This will 
demonstrate the consistent picture of self-attribution in relation to mood state, trait 
and wellbeing. Self-attributions did not show significant correlations with FS, and 
showed differential associations with ASQ and the personality traits. The correlations 
that contribute towards demonstrating the quality of the self-attribution measures are 
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briefly discussed in this chapter. We used trait-identifying task to measure 
participant’s accuracy for the male and female composite faces. One sample t-test 
against the test value of 0.5 (50%) will identify better than chance accuracy in 
identifying traits from these composite faces, to confirm participant’s accuracy. The 
bigger picture that emerges from all these results will be discussed. 
5.4 Results 
A total of 100 (69 female) participants with a mean age M = 20.41, SD = 
4.725 and range = 18 – 56, participated in this study. The group had mean depression 
score M = 18.75, SD = 8.177, mean hedonic wellbeing score M = 9.320, SD = 7.768, 
and mean neuroticism score M = 2.822, SD = .885. 
5.4.1 Trait identifying task 
The one sample t-test against the test value 0.5 found significantly better than 
chance accuracy in identifying neurotic traits for female; 58%, t(99) = 2.264, p = .026, 
95% CI(.009, .150) and male; 73%, t (99) = 7.697, p < .001, 95% CI(.174, .295) 
composite faces. This confirms participants’ accuracy in judging neurotic traits from 
the composite faces. That is, the participants demonstrated an understanding of the 
neuroticism scale used to create the images, and accurately identified that one anchor 
appeared more neurotic than the other. 
5.4.2 Exploring basic self-attributions  
These are new measures of self-attribution and therefore we will explore the 
inter-reliability of the different measures. There are four basic self-attributions: actual 
self, ideal self, negative self and positive self. A score of zero indicates the 
participant's actual picture. Positive scores indicate the choice for the self-attribution 
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(e.g. actual self) was more neurotic in appearance; negative scores indicate the 
attribution was less neurotic in appearance.  
5.4.2.1 Individual responses for positive and negative self-attributions: The 
positive self-attribution is an average of the responses for happy self, emotionally 
stable self and most attractive self. There were significant positive correlations 
between these three responses. Happy self correlated positively with emotionally 
stable self, r(100) = .400, p < .001 and attractive self, r(100) = .403, p < .001. 
Emotionally stable self also correlated positively with attractive self, r(100) = .528, p 
< .001. These correlations demonstrate consistency in participant’s responses for the 
individual positive attributions. 
The negative self-attribution was an average of the responses for unhappy self, 
anxious self and least attractive self. Again, there were significant positive 
correlations between the three responses. Unhappy self correlated positively with 
anxious self, r(100) = .228, p = .023 and least attractive self, r(100) = .236, p = .018. 
Anxious self also correlated positively with least attractive self, r(100) = .228, p = 
.023. Similar to the three correlations between the individual positive attributions, we 
demonstrate consistency in participant’s responses for the individual negative 
attributions as well. These significant positive correlations between the respective 
individual responses substantiate the rationale for aggregating them to compute the 
positive and negative self-attributions.  
5.4.2.2 Four basic self-attributions: Actual self correlated positively with ideal self, 
r(100) = .353, p < .001 and positive self, r(100) = .297, p = .003. This indicates that 
participant’s perceived actual self concurred with their perceived ideal self and 
positive self. Ideal self correlated positively with positive self, r(100) = .695, p < .001 
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and negatively with negative self, r(100) = -.453, p < .001. A positive correlation 
indicates that those participants who identified more neurotic image as their positive 
self, also made similar attributions for their ideal self. Whereas, a negative correlation 
indicates that participants who identified more neurotic image as their negative self, 
attributed less neurotic images to their ideal self. These results show that perceived 
ideal self concurred with participant’s perceived positive self and contrasted with their 
perceived negative self.  
Positive self correlated negatively with negative self, r(100) = -.537, p < .001. 
This indicates participants who identified more neurotic images as their negative self, 
identified less neurotic images as their positive self. Here we see that ‘perceived’ 
positive and negative were distinctly differentiated in this task. We propose that 
‘perceived’ positive and negative have influenced participants’ attributions of their 
actual self in this study and relate to implicit distortions.  
Table 5.1. Correlations between the basic self-attributions.  
	  
Perceived	  actual	  self	   Perceived	  ideal	  self	   Perceived	  positive	  self	   Perceived	  negative	  self	  Perceived	  actual	  self	   	   .353**	   .297*	   -­‐.084	  Perceived	  ideal	  self	   	   	   .695**	   -­‐.453**	  Perceived	  positive	  self	   	   	   	   -­‐.537**	  Perceived	  negative	  self	  	   	   	   	  
Note. Correlations are reported as Pearson’s r, * p < .05, ** p < .001 
One sample t-test against the test value of zero provided evidence for these 
influencing perceptions that were observed as basic positive and negative bias on the 
19 point face scale. The mean positive self-attribution of -1.07 with SD of 3.64 was 
significantly more emotionally stable than original self-face, t(99) = 2.94, p = .004, 
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95% CI(-1.79, -0.35) and the mean negative self-attribution of 3.23 with SD of 4.43 
was significantly neurotic than original self-face, t(99) =  7.29, p < .001, 95% CI(2.35, 
4.11). These results suggest that on average there was positive bias for emotionally 
stable appearance and negative bias for neurotic appearance, which was consistent 
with the results discussed in Chapter 4. The interesting fact is, that despite having 19-
point scale that allowed greater variance in responses, on average, such basic biases 
were maintained.   
Overall, the results demonstrate that the basic self-attributions are correlated in 
the expected manner, and demonstrate basic biases. It also confirms participants' 
understanding of the task, and ability to use the scales in a consistent pattern of 
responding. Now we proceed to examine how participant’s mood, wellbeing and 
neuroticism could affect their individualistic self-attributions more than their average 
positive and negative biases.   
5.4.3 Self-attributions, depression, hedonic wellbeing and neuroticism 
 We examine whether self-attributions are revealing in the sense of being 
correlated with individual differences in traits related to depression, neuroticism and 
wellbeing. Neuroticism and hedonic wellbeing were significant predictors for 
depression, as reported in Chapter 2, and therefore we focus on their correlations with 
our measures of self-attributions (Table 5.2). Eudemonic wellbeing had non-
significant correlations with self-attributions (see Table App.1 in the Appendix) and 
showed trends consistent with hedonic wellbeing. The correlations reported here 
demonstrate the consistent relation of the self-attribution measures with depression, 
wellbeing and neuroticism.  
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Table 5.2. Correlations of self-attributions, including basic and discrepancies, with 
depression, wellbeing and neuroticism.  
	   Depression	   Hedonic	  wellbeing	   Neuroticism	  
Basic	  self-­‐attributions	  
Perceived	  actual	  self	   .219*	   -­‐.140	   .200*	  
Perceived	  ideal	  self	   .182	   -­‐.011	   .232*	  
Perceived	  positive	  self	   .253*	   -­‐.124	   .277**	  
Perceived	  negative	  self	   -­‐.138	   .136	   -­‐.108	  
Separation	  Indices	  (mental	  self-­‐representations)	  
Self-­‐discrepancy	  (SIai)	   .153	   -­‐.253*	   .094	  
Self-­‐positivity	  (SIap)	   -­‐.055	   .171	   -­‐.014	  
Self-­‐negativity	  (SIan)	   .263**	   -­‐.233*	   .243*	  
Note. Correlations are reported as Pearson’s r, * p < .05, ** p < .001 
5.4.3.1 Depression 
Depression, as measured using IDS, correlated significantly with actual self, r 
= .219, p = .029 and positive self, r = .253, p = .011 and non-significantly with ideal 
self, r = .182, p = .070. This means participants with increasing severity of depressive 
symptoms, identified more neurotic images as their actual, positive and ideal selves. 
These associations demonstrate misattributions of self-facial appearance by 
individuals, with increasing depression scores. Figure 5.1 shows the two significant 
correlations of basic self-attributions of facial appearance with depression scores. The 
misattributions modulated by the severity of depressive state, were further explored 
using the SIs, which references two self-attributions providing an understanding of 
how different (separated) or similar (close) the two attributions were on the Neurotic 
Face Scale. 
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Figure 5.1. The graphs show the significant (only when including outliers) correlations of depression 
score with the basic self-attributions of a) perceived actual self and b) perceived positive-self. Neurotic 
images were identified as actual self and positive self with increasing severity of depression.  
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IDS score correlated with SIan, r = .263, p = .008, as shown in Figure 5.2, 
indicating increasing self-negativity with increasing severity of depressive symptoms. 
This supports the misperception of self-facial appearance relating to depression, 
supporting classic self-negativity when experiencing depression. Here we have an 
explicit measure of visual self-negativity that is sensitive to mood state. 
 
Figure 5.2. The graph shows the significant correlation of depression score with self-negativity, that is 
increasing depression relates to increasing self-negativity. 
The graphs in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 shows two depression scores greater than 40, 
i.e. ‘severely depressed’. Despite the two scores being closer to the median of IDS 
scores that range from 0 to 84, the two participants could be termed as outliers within 
this sample. After excluding these outliers, depression correlated non-significantly 
with actual self, r = .187, p = .06, positive self, r = .152, p = .13 and self-discrepancy 
(SIai), r = -.189, p = .06, but significantly with self-negativity (SIan), r = .241, p = .02. 
Since the focus of this thesis is on individual differences and later analyses do not 
show the same outliers, no exclusions are imposed on later analyses.  
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5.4.3.2 Hedonic wellbeing  
Balanced experience score is a robust measure of hedonic wellbeing, 
accounting for the frequency of both positive and negative experiences. Although 
hedonic wellbeing did not correlate significantly with the basic self-attributions, they 
correlated significantly with SIan, r = -.233, p = .020 and SIai, r = -.253, p = .011. 
These correlations build a picture of decreasing hedonic wellbeing affecting 
increasing self-negativity and self-discrepancy respectively. These correlations are 
shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3. The graphs show the significant correlations of hedonic wellbeing (balanced experience). 
With decreasing balanced (more negative and less positive) experience there was increasing a) self-
negativity (SIan) and b) self-discrepancy (SIai). 
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 Balanced experience had a non-significant correlation with SIap, r = .171, p = 
.089, suggesting increasing self-positivity with increasing hedonic wellbeing. These 
results show that greater balanced (more positive and fewer negative) experience 
related to decreasing self-negativity, self-discrepancy and enhancing self-positivity. 
The importance of participant’s hedonic wellbeing in improving their adaptive 
behaviours is evident from these results. 
5.4.3.3 Neuroticism 
Neuroticism correlated positively with perceived positive self, r = .277, p = .005, 
perceived ideal self, r = .232, p = .020, and perceived actual self, r = .200, p = .046. 
Consistent with depression, neurotic traits of participants also related to misattribution 
of neurotic images as their positive, ideal and actual self as shown in Figure 5.4. Thus 
the misattributions to self-facial appearance are related to inherent neurotic trait as well. 
  
 Figure 5.4. The graph shows the significant correlation of neuroticism with positive self. The graphs 
continued in the next page.  
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Figure 5.4. The graphs show the significant correlations of neuroticism with self-attributions; positive, 
ideal and actual self. The 19-point neurotic face scale ranged +9 (most neurotic image), 0 (original 
face), -9 (least neurotic image). With increasing neuroticism, participants chose more neurotic images 
for positive, ideal and actual self. 
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The SI explained the quality of misattributions relating to neuroticism. 
Neuroticism correlated with SIan, r = .243, p = .015, indicating increasing neuroticism 
relating to increasing self-negativity, as shown in Figure 5.5. This is consistent with 
the existing literature that reports increased internalising of negativity with increasing 
neuroticism trait (Griffith et al., 2009; Lahey, 2009). This further qualifies our self-
attribution task and SIs to be sensitive to underlying traits that mediates internalising 
disorders including depressive disorders, anxiety disorders, and PTSD.  
 
Figure 5.5. The graph shows the significant correlation of neuroticism with self-negativity (SIan). SI 
scale ranged from 0 (no separation) to 19 (most separation). The graph shows increasing self-negativity 
with increasing neuroticism. 
 All the significant correlations reported thus far, indicate small to moderate 
effect size (i.e. 0.1 – 0.3), which is what we can expect to find with a sample size of 
100 (i.e. N >= 85) participants (Cohen, 1988). While we cannot take such 
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prescriptions too literally, our results demonstrate the correlations between 
participant’s self-attributions and their depression, neuroticism and wellbeing scores, 
and quantify the degree of effect. From these correlations, we have an emerging 
picture that displays the consistencies and the dynamics of participant’s self-
attributions with their mood state, wellbeing state and inherent neuroticism trait. 
These demonstrate the overall quality of our self-attribution measures, especially the 
SIs (self-negativity, self-positivity and self-discrepancy) with its sensitivity and 
consistent relation to participant’s transient state and inherent trait. 
5.4.4 SIs distinguish maladaptive-adaptive behaviours relating to inherent traits 
Previously we reported that neuroticism correlated positively with perceived 
positive self. Interestingly, agreeableness also correlated positively with perceived 
positive self, r = .246, p = .014 and perceived ideal self, r = .197, p = .049. This 
shows that similar to participants with increasing neuroticism, participants with 
increasing agreeableness also identified neurotic images as their positive self and 
ideal self. Despite the similar basic self-attributions, the SIs distinguished the trait 
related behaviours. Agreeableness correlated with SIap, r = .243, p = .015 and SIai, r = 
-.206, p = .039 (see Figure 5.6). This shows that agreeableness relates to increasing 
self-positivity and decreasing self-discrepancy, both of which indicate adaptive 
behaviours. Thus, the SIs distinguish the increasing self-negativity relating to 
neuroticism indicating maladaptive behaviour, from increasing self-positivity and 
decreasing self-discrepancy relating to agreeableness indicating adaptive behaviour. 
This specifically highlights the sensitive quality of SIs compared to the basic 
attributions, which helps to better understand our self-attribution measures. 
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Figure 5.6. The graphs show the significant correlations of agreeableness with a) self-positivity and b) 
self-discrepancy. SI scale, 0 (no separation), 19 (most separation), shows that increasing self-positivity 
and decreasing self-discrepancy seen with increasing agreeableness. 
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5.5 Discussion 
We investigated the influence of individual’s depression, neuroticism and 
hedonic wellbeing on their self-attributions. Using our new self-attribution task that 
has an implicit Neurotic Face Scale, we measured self-attributions of facial 
appearance. The basic self-attributions included perceived actual, ideal, positive and 
negative selves and the SIs included self-negativity, self-positivity and self-
discrepancy. Accuracy in identifying neurotic traits from faces was a pre-requisite for 
this investigation, which is confirmed by the significantly better than chance accuracy 
reported using the trait identifying task. Despite this accuracy, we observed 
misattributions of self-face, which could be due to the sensitivity of our 19-point scale 
that measure individual differences in attributions, compared to the two alternative 
forced choice paradigms. Furthermore, self-face processing appears to be modulated 
by mood state, neuroticism trait, and hedonic wellbeing. Prior studies reported that 
self-reference and internal inference impacts how individuals process face stimuli  
(Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010), which was demonstrated in our study. 
Associations between the basic self-attributions in this study suggest that 
neurotic trait signals from face, in conjunction with perceived positive and negative, 
modulated individual’s responses. Perceived negative self contrasted with the rest of 
the three self-attributions, whilst the triad (actual, ideal, positive attributions) showed 
concurrence between each other. This confirmed that participants generally identified 
and differentiated the trait signals along the implicit neurotic face scale used in this 
study. One sample t-test confirmed that, on average, participants were displaying an 
underlying positive bias towards emotionally stable appearance and negative bias 
towards neurotic appearance on the Neurotic Face Scale; corroborating previous 
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results reported in Chapter 4. Scott et al. (2013) also reported similar negative bias 
towards facial cues of depression. Such biases were observed even without factoring 
for participant’s mood state or personality traits. Results from the current study, 
provide further evidence of how transient mood, wellbeing state and neuroticism 
personality modulate individual’s attributions of self-facial appearance. 
Self-attributions of positive self correlated with depression and neuroticism, 
while actual self correlated only with depression. It has to be noted that the 
correlations between depression and the basic self-attributions after excluding the two 
outliers were non-significant, however the positive correlation trend was maintained. 
Although the group mean depression score of the study sample does not fully 
represent the full range of severity of depression as by the IDS scale, it is clear that 
neurotic images were perceived as actual self, with increasing depression score. 
Although the original face of depressed individuals would have signalled their current 
mood state, they chose a more neurotic image as their self. Similarly, neurotic images 
were identified for positive self-attribution with increasing depression and 
neuroticism. This indicates exaggeration or negativity in their self-perception with 
increasing severity of depression, substantiating negative self-concept (Markus & 
Wurf, 1987; Markus, 1990) and negative bias (Beck, 2008; Gollan et al., 2008). 
Although, the positive correlation between the basic self-attributions of actual and 
positive selves indicate that in reality individuals chose the images they perceived as 
positive for their actual self. This indicates that the ‘perceived’ positive seems to be 
modulating perceptions of actual self.  This similarity between positive and actual 
self-attributions could have been driven by individuals with greater agreeableness 
trait, as reported in the results. Whereas the shift in ‘perceived’ positive, i.e., 
perceiving more neurotic image as positive, could be directly related to distortions 
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due to depression. The SIs clarified such ambiguities relating to the basic self-
attributions, to a greater extent. 
Depression related self-negativity was substantiated by SIan, a measure of self-
negativity of facial appearance, which increased with increasing depression and 
neuroticism, and decreasing hedonic wellbeing. It is exciting that the self-attribution 
measures consistently demonstrate the relation between depression and its predictors 
such as neuroticism and wellbeing. In previous studies, neuroticism was linked with 
self-negativity relating to low self-esteem (Robins, Tracy, Trzesniewski, Potter, & 
Gosling, 2001) and depressive symptoms (Frokjaer et al., 2010); substantiating the 
self-negativity found in our study. Studies on attributional style also reported greater 
self-negativity with depression (Ball et al., 2008; Seligman et al., 1979). Attributional 
style, by virtue of the measure, looks at attributions of conceptual scenarios, whereas 
this study reported negativity in visual perception of self. We found differential 
association between our self-attributions and ASQ measures (see Table App.1 in the 
Appendix). These could potentially be because they are targeting mental processes at 
different levels. It could be that the ASQ measures explicit attributions while our self-
attribution task could be measuring more implicit processes because of the self-face 
stimuli and the implicit neurotic face scale. Both these approaches could, therefore, 
provide a holistic picture of depression related negativity. Other studies have also 
reported depression related negative bias and misreading signals from other-faces 
(LeMoult et al., 2009; Linden et al., 2011) and distorted reality (van Rossum et al., 
2011).  
Cohen and Sherman (2014) discussed the possibility of distortions being self-
created by construing a situation in a manner that it renders less threatening to self-
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integrity. This refers to reducing cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Stone & 
Cooper, 2001) through self-affirmation (Cohen & Sherman, 2014; Steele, 1988a) or 
self-consistency (Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992). Cognitive dissonance is explained as 
the psychological discomfort due to conflicting self-perceptions (Festinger, 1957). In 
this study, it would mean that depressed individual’s perception of neurotic or 
negative image as actual self was used defensively to affirm self-consistency. For this 
to be true, we have to assume that individuals have a negative self-image and 
therefore chose a neurotic or negative image as their actual self. To support this, the 
perceived actual and negative selves should display a positive correlation showing 
concurrence. Similarly, the perceived actual and positive selves should display a 
negative correlation showing opposing perceptions. The results, however, show that 
the perceived actual self is not correlated with perceived negative self but is positively 
correlated with perceived positive self. This suggests that distortions are not self-
created in this study, although it modulates individual’s perception of actual self. Our 
study paradigm, using faces and an implicit neurotic face scale, may have relied on 
non-conscious processing of face signals (Axelrod et al., 2015) and therefore very 
unlikely that these distortions were consciously created. Imaging and ERP studies 
have reported the processing of emotionally salient facial appearance (Bryant et al., 
2008; Faivre, Charron, Roux, Lehéricy, & Kouider, 2012; Thomas et al., 2014) and 
self-face (Laureys, Perrin, & Brédart, 2007; Pannese & Hirsch, 2011; Pannese & 
Hirsch, 2013), involves non-conscious neural processing. This implicates a process of 
non-conscious or implicit cognitive dissonance relating to distortions in depression 
but unrelated to explicit processes of self-affirmation or self-consistency. 
Implicit cognitive dissonance could have new implications on existing theories 
of social withdrawal (Caldwell, Rudolph, Troop-Gordon, & Kim, 2004; Girard et al., 
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2014; Rubin, Coplan, & Bowker, 2009) and helplessness (Klien, Fencil-Morse, & 
Seligman, 1976; Landgraf, Long, Der-Avakian, Streets, & Welsh, 2015; Maier & 
Watkins, 2005) with depression, which are currently explained as self-propagated. 
Previous research has demonstrated implicit cognitive dissonance using animal 
models (rats), when rats placed grater value on outcome for which they had to work 
harder (Lydall, Gilmour & Dwyer, 2010). We propose that if the self-attribution 
measures reflect non-conscious distortion of self-perceptions relating to depression, it 
explains individual’s behaviour and resultant social dysfunction as unintentional 
rather than as individual’s latent urge for withdrawal. This new insight could be fed 
into adapting related behavioural interventions to target and correct implicit 
misperceptions, with the aim of improving personal and social functioning. 
Self-discrepancy theory posits that discrepancy of actual and ideal selves are 
associated to depression (Higgins et al., 1985; Higgins, 1989; Higgins, Vookles, & 
Tykocinski, 1992; Markus & Wurf, 1987), which we did not find in our study. We 
did, however, demonstrate significant decrease in self-discrepancy with increasing 
hedonic wellbeing, which is a predictor of depression as reported in Chapter 2. 
Increasing hedonic wellbeing (increasing positive and decreasing negative 
experiences) is often referred as increasing happiness (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryan et 
al., 2008). The results provide evidence that increasing happiness can reduce self-
negativity and self-discrepancy. Increasing happiness closely relate to improved 
mood, which understandably reduce self-negativity. Self-discrepancy theory proposes 
that actual-ideal self-discrepancies predict dejection and depression (Higgins et al., 
1985; Higgins, 1989), which could explain the reverse pattern of reduced self-
discrepancy with increasing happiness, found in our study. We are, however, unclear 
as to why depression itself was not related to self-discrepancy in this study. 
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Ideal self has been strongly linked with self-esteem (Andrews, 1998; Bosson, 
Brown, Zeigler-Hill, & Swann, 2003; Moretti & Higgins, 1990), potentially affecting 
the perceptions of ideal self observed in our study. We, however, did not measure 
self-esteem or use diagnostic criteria to confirm depression, which are limitations of 
this study. The IDS measures the core symptoms of depression as discussed in the 
introduction, along with associated symptoms such as, anxiety and psychosomatic 
symptoms. By using diagnostic criteria to confirm clinical depression, we could have 
ensured that we are looking at the main influence of depressive state on self-
attributions. Additionally, using a self-esteem measure would have provided greater 
understanding of its association with the measures of ideal and positive selves, 
allowing more meaningful interpretation of our results.  
Some previous studies have investigated depression related positive self-
schemata, with the co-existence of high implicit self-esteem and low explicit self-
esteem (Creemers, Scholte, Engels, Prinstein, & Wiers, 2012; De Raedt, Schacht, 
Franck, & De Houwer, 2006; Dunn, Stefanovitch, Buchan, Lawrence, & Dalgleish, 
2009; van Tuijl, de Jong, Sportel, de Hullu, & Nauta, 2014), however, the majority of 
studies on depression focused on the negative self-schemata (Beck, 2008; Bradley & 
Mathews, 1983; Evans, Heron, Lewis, Araya, & Wolke, 2005). In our study, self-
negativity and not self-positivity was related to depression. We think self-positivity 
might increase when self-negativity decreases in relation to improving mood. This 
could be investigated in future studies by monitoring improvements in mood 
longitudinally.  
Besides measuring attributions relating to mood and wellbeing state, the SIs 
distinguished behaviours relating to traits. These are unique measures of mental self-
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representations that are comparable to the subjective mental representations proposed 
by Markus and Wurf (1988), and are closely related to subjective mental health. In 
our study, individuals with high agreeableness trait chose more neurotic images as 
their positive and ideal selves, which was similar to the attributions made by 
individuals with high neuroticism trait. We could assign this similarity of 
misattributions to the underlying neurobiology relating to serotonin mechanisms that 
are closely related to neuroticism as well as agreeableness (Moskowitz, Pinard, 
Zuroff, Annable, & Young, 2001; Young, 2013). The measures of SIs, however, 
differentiated the behaviours relating to these two traits, despite the similarity in the 
basic self-attributions. Self-positivity increased with agreeableness in contrast to 
increasing self-negativity relating to neuroticism. Thus, the SIs uniquely distinguishes 
the self-attributions relating to the underlying maladaptive or adaptive traits that are 
more stable, whilst maintaining sensitivity to mood and wellbeing state that are more 
transient. 
The self-attribution task developed in this study, provides a useful paradigm in 
measuring perception of ‘self’ in visual modality. This method provides perception of 
‘actual self’ and referential perceptions of positive and negative selves. The measure 
of self-negativity is unique since it references ‘current or actual self’ to perceived 
negative self. ‘Current self’ by nature, should be transient with time, mood and 
hedonic wellbeing state; hence potentially a dynamic measure. Increasing self-
negativity could be the early perceptual changes that are affected in depression and 
therefore a potential tracker for behaviour changes with remission. Prior studies have 
proposed implicit cognitions to represent the origin of depression (Chen et al., 2006; 
Haeffel et al., 2007), as well as a reliable predictor for past, present and future 
depressive episodes (Chang et al., 2011; Philippi & Koenigs, 2014; Phillips & Silvia, 
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2010b). The self-attribution task, especially with its measure of self-negativity, seems 
a promising tool to measure and monitor longitudinal behaviour changes in clinical 
population. 
5.6 Conclusion 
We conclude that depression, neuroticism and hedonic wellbeing affect 
attributions of self-facial appearance. Although participants were able to accurately 
discriminate the emotionally stable and neurotic "anchor" images used to create the 
image sequences, attributions to increasingly stable and neurotic self-appearances 
depended upon the individual's traits related to depression. In this study we quantified 
self-negativity, self-positivity and self-discrepancy in visual modality. We found that 
the severity of depression and neuroticism relates to greater self-negativity, while 
increasing hedonic wellbeing relates to decreasing self-negativity and self-
discrepancy. Unlike the basic self-attributions, the SIs distinguishes maladaptive and 
adaptive behaviours relating to underlying traits. Self-negativity increased with 
neuroticism whilst self-positivity increased with agreeableness. This was identifiable 
due to the sensitivity of SIs to mood, wellbeing and traits, which validates their 
importance. The SI of self-negativity identified in this study, is promising a measure 
for future longitudinal studies on depressive disorder. 
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CHAPTER 6 – Looking through dark glasses: Social attributions 
 Abstract 
Social attributions relates to making inferences of other individual’s 
behaviours, which can be impaired due to psychological and psychiatric disorders. 
Social attribution of facial cues has been widely researched using emotional faces. We 
used our social attribution task, with an implicit neurotic face scale, that provided 
measures of social attributions that were comparable to the self-attribution measures. 
We propose that depression, wellbeing and neuroticism will relate to misattributions 
in social context, consistent with social projection. Increasing severity of depression 
and decreasing wellbeing were related to misattribution of more neurotic images as 
positive, consistent with the self-attributions. Unlike self-attributions, social 
attributions did not relate with neuroticism, suggesting social attributions are 
modulated by transient mood state rather than stable traits. We demonstrate social 
projection whilst making attributions to other-faces. The misattributions could also be 
related to common underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms that are impaired 
with depression.  
 
6.1 Introduction 
Social attributions refer to the processes of perception or inference of causal 
explanation for events or behaviours of others (Heider, 1958; Kelley & Michela, 
1980). Kelley and Michela (1980) proposed a general model of the process of 
attribution that starts with antecedents (information, beliefs, motivation), leading to 
attributions (perceived causes) and ending with consequences (behaviour, affect, 
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expectancy). When there is limited information about an individual or stimulus or 
situation, attributors make inferences to make sense of the ambiguous situation  
(Bradford, Jentzsch, & Gomez, 2015; Kelley & Michela, 1980) and make social 
projections. Social projection is explained as the process or set of processes by which 
people come to expect others to be similar to themselves (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). 
By inferring on self whilst making social attributions, individuals could be triggering 
automatic self-referential processes (Cho & Knowles, 2013; Krueger & Stanke, 2001; 
Mitchell et al., 2005) that are modulated by individual’s current and past experiences  
(Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). In this manner, self-referential processes relate to 
a host of factors inherent to the person making the attribution, including mental and 
physical health, social and cultural background, and belief system (Markus & Wurf, 
1987). Our self-attribution study (Chapter 5) demonstrated misattributions of self in 
relation to increasing depression, decreasing hedonic wellbeing, and greater 
neuroticism trait. Such maladaptive perceptions cause misinterpretation during social 
interactions (Park et al., 2016; Park, Lee, Kwak, Cha, & Jeong, 2013), thereby leading 
to social dysfunction (Markus & Wurf, 1987).  
Social functioning is dependant on effective social communication, which 
includes accurate display and reading of social cues (Addington, Saeedi, & 
Addington, 2006; Corrigan, 2000). Facial cues form the basic and natural means of 
communication in a social context (Kramer & Ward, 2010). Prior studies have 
investigated impaired processing of facial emotions with psychiatric disorders 
(Anderson et al., 2011; Archer et al., 1992; Linden et al., 2011) and attributions of 
more subtle facial cues (Scott et al., 2013), using two alternative forced choice 
paradigms. In this chapter, I will discuss the next study in which the social attribution 
paradigm uses faces of unfamiliar individuals on the 19-point neurotic face scale to 
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obtain more individualised social attributions similar to the self-attributions. This 
allows measurement of positive (happy, emotionally stable, attractive) and negative 
(unhappy, anxious, least attractive) social attributions of male and female faces that 
are comparable to the respective self-attributions measured in our self-attribution 
study (Chapter 5). 
In Chapter 5, I discussed increasing misattributions of self-facial appearance 
with increasing depression, decreasing hedonic wellbeing, and increasing neuroticism. 
It would be interesting to investigate if such misattributions of facial-appearance are 
limited to self-face or are they indicative of a global misattribution as influenced by 
transient states, and stable traits. Misattributions of self-face extending into 
misattributions of other-faces will substantiate the social projection theory. In this 
study, we investigate whether participant’s depressive and wellbeing states, and 
neuroticism trait will affect participant’s attributions of other people’s facial 
appearance. Reflecting on the social projection theory and inferring on the results of 
the self-attribution study, we propose that with increasing severity of depressive 
symptoms, individuals will identify more neurotic image of other-face for positive 
social attributions. That is, the positive attributions made to neurotic self-appearance 
will carry over to the neurotic appearance of others. If such misattributions reflect on 
the social projection theory, we would expect to see the attributions to be consistent 
across female and male faces. On this basis, we further propose that the positive and 
negative attributions of female and male faces will be consistent respectively. 
6.2 Methods 
All the participants from the self-attribution study participated in this study 
and the data was collected on the same day. This was essential to control for the 
   
 Page 116 
participant’s over all experience on that day, which could affect their perceptions of 
self and other. We used the social attribution task, which followed the same paradigm 
as the self-attribution task. A key difference was that the participants made 
attributions to faces of unfamiliar men and women. These faces were selected from an 
existing database.  
The photographs in this database were taken at annual photo-shoot events 
conducted by the lab group at Bangor University. Although the event was open to all, 
the majority of the participants were Bangor University students. The photographs at 
the events were taken using Canon EOS 1100D DSLR camera with 18-55 mm lens, 
and diffused lighting. The criteria for the photographs were consistent with the self-
attribution study. The social attribution task could be adapted depending on the study 
and its specific aims, by tailoring the selection criteria for the photographs. Since the 
focus of this study was to measure social attribution in relation to changes in 
individual’s mood and wellbeing state, we endeavoured to control for observed 
individuals’ depressive state. The selection criteria for this study therefore included 
individuals with IDS score less than 14, which is categorised as ‘not depressed’. A 
total of 20 photographs were selected; 10 male and 10 female faces. General criteria 
of neutral facial expression, front facing, without make up, facial tattoos, facial 
piercing and facial hair applied. The procedures for creating stimuli for the underlying 
Neurotic Face Scale and the related scores were similar to self-attribution task, as 
explained in Chapter 5 and graphically shown in Figure C.1. Briefly, the selected 
faces were warped towards sex-congruent composite face pairs that displayed signals 
of neurotic and emotionally stable traits, to create 19 image sequences per face. These 
image sequences were presented as explained below.  
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Presentation: In the social attribution task, faces of unfamiliar men and 
women were presented using Matlab. The task presented with six blocks (questions: 
happy, emotionally stable, attractive, unhappy, anxious and least attractive) x 20 trials 
(identity: 10 male and 10 female faces) x 19 images (face warps). The blocks 
(questions) were randomly selected per presentation. The order of the trials (faces) 
was randomly selected in the first block, but maintained through rest of the blocks in 
the presentation. The first image of each trial (19 face warps) was presented 
randomly, but followed the order of sequence on the 19-point scale. The 19 images of 
each face (identity) were presented (500x500 pixels) one at a time in the middle of a 
computer screen, with instructions at the top. The images were presented one at a time 
in order of the sequence of the 19-point face scale and looped back and forth through 
the sequence to provide seamless increase and decrease of neurotic traits. This 
presentation was similar to self-attribution task, as explained in section 5.2.1 and 
shown in Figure 5.1, in Chapter 5. A key difference in the instructions related to the 
questions that can be sensibly asked. The instructions for social attribution task were 
limited to making the presented face look most positive and most negative. The 
instructions for most positive included, ‘Make the face look most happy and content’, 
‘Make the face look calm stable and well-balanced’, and ‘Make the face look most 
attractive’. The instructions for most negative included, ‘Make the face look unhappy 
and least content’, ‘Make the face look anxious and emotionally unstable’, and ‘Make 
the face look least attractive’. The selected faces were presented in six blocks, with 
one instruction per block. The order of faces was random per block and maintained 
across all presentations in the respective block. The first image per presentation was 
randomly selected from the 19 image sequences. When participants pressed either the 
right or left arrow keys, the images changed through a looped sequence in their order 
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on the implicit neurotic face scale. This gave the impression of the presented face 
changing, as controlled by the participant. The presentation of looped sequence of 
images made it difficult for the participants to understand the lateral representation of 
the scale and therefore its end points. Participants selected one image for each 
instruction by pressing the spacebar. This task was not timed. 
Consistent to the method of scoring positive and negative self-attributions, we 
averaged the three respective scores to create the positive and negative attributions of 
male and female faces. Thus, we had four attribution measures; positive and negative 
attributions of female faces, positive and negative attributions of male faces. We 
report the correlations between the respective attributions on male and female faces 
and average them to score positive and negative social attributions, which are 
therefore comparable to the respective self-attributions. 
  As explained in the self-attribution study, we used IDS to measure depression, 
FS to measure eudemonic wellbeing and SPANE to measure hedonic wellbeing, 
MIPIP to measure personality traits and ASQ to measure attributional style. We will 
maintain our focus here on the measures of depression, hedonic wellbeing and 
neuroticism in order to be consistent with the self-attribution study. This will help to 
explain the concept of social projection, whilst making social attributions in visual 
modality. Similar to the self-attributions, social attributions were differentially 
correlated with personality and attributional style. 
6.3 Results 
All the 100 participants from the self-attribution study completed the social 
attribution task. Both studies were completed in one session on the same day. 
   
 Page 119 
Therefore, the demographics and group mean of mood and trait measures are the same 
as in the self-attribution study.  
6.3.1 Inter-correlations of social attributions of male and female faces 
The participants made 12 attributions: three positive (happy, emotionally 
stable, attractive) and three negative (unhappy, anxious, least attractive) attributions to 
male and female faces. The three positive and negative measures were averaged to 
obtain respective attributions of female and male faces. In the first instance, we 
checked whether the attributions made of female and male faces were consistent, 
which would support our proposal that the attributions are driven by the implicit 
neurotic face scale rather then the faces being observed. 
We found that the four social attribution measures significantly correlated with 
each other, as expected. The attributions of female and male faces correlated 
positively for positive, r = .524, p < .001 and negative, r = .376, p < .001 categories 
respectively. Positive attributions of female faces correlated negatively with negative 
attributions of female, r = -.694, p < .001 and male, r = -.249, p = .012 faces. Positive 
attributions of male faces correlated negatively with negative attributions of female, r 
= -.393, p < .001 and male, r = -.588, p < .001 faces. 
These results, further confirm consistency in participant’s attributions of male 
and female faces for both positive and negative categories, which shows that 
participants made attributions to male and female faces in a similar way. On this 
basis, the attributions made to male and female faces were averaged to obtain positive 
and negative social attribution scores, which were comparable to the self-attributions. 
Positive social attribution negatively correlated with negative social attribution, r = -
.664, p < .001. Similar to reading signals from self-face, the positive and negative 
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signals from other-faces were also differentiated by the participants and on average 
could project similar positive and negative biases.  
One sample t-test against a test value of zero provides evidence for positive 
and negative biases, in social context. The mean positive social attribution of -0.82 
with SD of 1.85, was significantly different from the original other-face, t(99) = -4.42, 
p < .001, 95% CI(-1.19, -0.45). The mean negative social attribution of 2.73 with SD 
of 2.10, was significantly different from the original other-face, t(99) = 12.97, p < 
.001, 95% CI(2.13, 3.15). These results indicate that on average, participants 
demonstrated positive bias towards emotionally stable appearance of others as well as 
negative bias towards neurotic appearance of others. This is similar to the average 
positive and negative bias of participants to self-appearance and therefore indicative 
of projection of bias.  
We now have positive and negative social attributions that are comparable to 
self-attributions, which lead to our next question, whether the social attributions are 
affected by participant’s depressive state, wellbeing state, and neuroticism in a way 
similar to self-attributions. The following results will focus on these measures in order 
to answer this question. 
6.3.2 Depression and social attributions 
Depression correlated positively with positive social attribution, r = .239, p  = 
.017, as shown in Figure 6.1. A score of zero indicates the original image of other-
faces. Positive scores indicate that the image chosen was more neurotic in appearance 
and negative scores indicate emotionally stable image was chosen. The result, here, 
indicates that participants with increasing depression chose a more neurotic image for 
positive social attribution. This is similar to the correlation between positive self-
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attribution and depression scores, in the self-attribution study. In this study we 
provide evidence for participant’s misattribution of others being modulated by 
participant’s depressive symptoms, which is similar to misattributions of self, and 
therefore provide evidence for classic social projection. The significant correlation 
between depression and positive social attribution was not maintained when excluding 
the two outliers. 
 
Figure 6.1. The graph shows the significant correlation of depression score with positive social 
attribution. The Neurotic Face Scale is from +9 (more neurotic) to -9 (less neurotic) and midpoint 0 
(original other-face). Increasing scores indicate more neurotic images were chosen for positive social 
attribution with increasing depression. 
Participant’s negative social attribution did not correlate with their depression 
score, which is also similar to the results from self-attribution study. Thus, it is the 
positive attributions that are affected when experiencing depression, and the related 
misattributions of self are extended to social contexts, demonstrating classic social 
projection relating to mood state. Previously, we discussed with sufficient evidence 
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the close association between depression and wellbeing, so the next analysis will look 
at the association between wellbeing and social attributions.  
6.3.3 Wellbeing and social attributions 
The balanced experiences (hedonic wellbeing) correlated negatively with 
positive social attribution, r = -.199, p = .047, as shown in Figure 6.2. This shows 
individuals with decreasing balanced experiences, chose a more neurotic image for 
positive social attribution and vice versa. Decreasing balanced experience score 
account for more negative experiences and fewer positive experiences, which related 
to decreasing hedonic wellbeing. Eudemonic wellbeing also had a non-significant 
association with positive social attribution, r = -.169, p = .093, indicating similarly 
increasing misattribution with decreasing eudemonic wellbeing.  
  
Figure 6.2. The graph shows the significant correlation of hedonic wellbeing (balanced experience) 
correlated with positive social attribution. The Neurotic Face Scale is from +9 (more neurotic) to -9 
(less neurotic) and midpoint 0 (original other-face). With decreasing hedonic wellbeing participants 
misattributed more neurotic images as positive and with increasing hedonic wellbeing they correctly 
attributed less neurotic images a positive. 
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In the self-attribution study, discussed in Chapter 5, it was observed that 
hedonic or eudemonic wellbeing had only weak negative correlation trends with the 
basic positive self-attribution (see Table App.1 in the Appendix). The associations of 
wellbeing with positive social-attributions, albeit weak, potentially highlight their 
greater importance towards social functioning. Wellbeing is closely associated with 
socialising, contact with family and friends, and community involvements (Dolan, 
Peasgood, & White, 2008; Taylor & Brown, 1988). This social quality of wellbeing 
might be highlighted through the attributions made in our study, thereby providing 
evidence of social projection relating to wellbeing state. The negative social 
attribution did not correlate with the wellbeing scores, which is consistent with 
negative self-attribution. So far, we have observed a consistent picture of greater 
misattributions relating to increasing depression and decreasing wellbeing in self and 
social contexts.  
Third and final measure, that was relevant to depression as well as self-
attribution, was neuroticism.  There were, however, no significant correlations of 
social attributions with neuroticism, which deviates from the pattern of self-
attributions. Neuroticism is strongly related to internalizing disorders including mood 
and anxiety disorders (Eysenck, 1991; Griffith et al., 2009), however, unlike mood 
state, it did not affect social attributions in this study. The social attribution measures 
might be differentiating the negative biases and internalizing qualities triggered by a 
transient mood state relating to depression, from those triggered by an inherent 
personality trait of neuroticism. 
We propose, that these results display the sensitivity of our attribution tasks to 
self and social contexts, whilst also differentiating the stable traits of internalizing 
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negativity from the transient states of generalized negativity or global bias towards 
negativity. In other words, individuals with stable neuroticism personality traits have 
a consistent internalizing feature of negativity towards self, which might be 
maintained or exaggerated with depression, whereas, individuals with transient 
depressive state might be displaying global negativity (i.e., self, others and generally 
to everything in life). Our self and social attribution tasks seem to be unpicking these 
differentiating characteristics of neuroticism traits, from what otherwise appears 
indistinguishable from depressed mood state.  
The results so far provide an interesting picture of similar misattributions in 
self and social contexts, whilst differentiating those misattributions unique to self. 
This raises the next question, of how similar or dissimilar were the attributions the 
individuals made in self and social contexts, without accounting of their states and 
traits. The following analyses will focus on the same. 
6.3.4 Correlations between self and social attributions 
There is a specific difference between the self and social attribution measures. 
Unlike the self-attribution scores that are responses to a single face (self-face), the 
social attribution scores are an average of responses to 20 other faces. The following 
results, however, highlight their similarities. 
Positive self-attribution correlated positively with positive social-attributions, 
r = .274, p = .006 whilst negative self-attribution correlated positively with negative 
social attributions, r = .244, p = .014, as shown in Figure 6.3. Both these associations 
confirm that similar cues from self and other faces were identified for positive and 
negative attributions respectively. In other words, individuals who chose less neurotic 
self-images for positive self-attribution also chose less neurotic other-face-images 
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similarly for positive social attribution. Likewise, similar choices were made for 
negative self and social attributions. Thus, when individuals had accurate perception 
of emotionally stable and neurotic facial cues as positive and negative respectively, it 
was observed consistently in both self and social contexts. Here we demonstrate 
remnants of classic social projection, specifically whilst making attributions to facial 
appearance of self and others. 
   
   
Figure 6.3. The graphs show the significant correlations of positive self-attribution with positive social 
attribution and negative self-attribution correlates with negative social attribution. The Neurotic Face 
Scale is from +9 (more neurotic) to -9 (less neurotic) and midpoint 0 (original other-face). This shows 
consistency of positive and negative attributions of self and others supporting social projection theory. 
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From the evidence so far, it appears that individual’s state of mood and 
wellbeing, and neuroticism traits, affect their perception of positive and negative 
facial cues. Our evidence also shows that mood and wellbeing affects global 
misperception, while neuroticism related misperceptions are limited to self. 
6.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, we investigated the relation of social attribution with 
individual’s mood, wellbeing, and neuroticism trait. Consistent to the positive and 
negative self-attributions, we computed the positive and negative attributions for 
female and male faces. Based on the correlations between these four measures, the 
measures were averaged across sexes to obtain two basic social attributions, i.e. 
positive and negative. Similar to the self-attribution measures, the social attributions 
also have the 19-point neurotic face scale from +9 (most neurotic) to -9 (least 
neurotic) and midpoint 0 (original other-face). Increasing positive social attribution 
would mean that a more neurotic image was chosen as positive. 
This study had results similar to that from the self-attribution study.  We 
reported a positive association between positive social attribution and depression 
score, indicating that individuals with increasing depression identified more neurotic 
facial appearance as positive. The significant correlation was not maintained when 
excluding the two outliers with severe depression, a pattern that was also seen with 
self-attribution. This shows that individuals’ mood state was mediating 
misattributions in the social context, in a way similar to the misattributions of self.  
This substantiates our proposition of social projection whilst making attributions of 
facial appearances. Misattribution has previously been identified as a cognitive 
vulnerability for depression (Beck et al., 1979; Beevers, 2005; Elliott, Zahn, Deakin, 
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& Anderson, 2011; Fennell & Campbell, 1984), although it is not clear whether 
misattribution is a product of depression or the cause.  
Our self and social attribution measures, appear to be differentiating 
misattributions driven by inherent traits and transient traits. We found depression 
related misattribution to self and others whilst neuroticism related misattribution was 
only observed to self. On this basis, our attribution task might be differentiating 
negativity at a global level from negativity limited to self. This clearly demonstrates 
cognitive vulnerability relating to depression and neuroticism, however, we cannot 
untangle whether misattribution to self precedes or follows misattribution to others or 
vice versa. As discussed earlier in the results section, the misattributions might be 
modulated by inaccurate perception of facial cues. Leppanen et al. (2004) reported 
that depressed patients were less accurate in identifying neutral faces than sad or 
happy faces. Additionally to this inaccuracy in perception, there is also evidence of 
exaggerated or caricatured perception relating to mood state. Patients made more 
misattribution errors of neutral and low arousal facial expressions in the direction of 
high arousal emotions (Csukly et al., 2009). Csukly et al. (2009) concluded that the 
inability to accurately recognize non-emotional or emotional facial expressions, along 
with the tendency for attributing towards the high arousal emotions, could represent 
two basic contributing factors to social dysfunction in patients experiencing 
depression.  
In addition to misperceptions and exaggerated attributions relating to state and 
traits, there is also evidence for related negative bias and increased attention to 
negativity. One study identified deficiency in inhibiting attention to negative stimuli 
in depressed patients, that renders them unable to disengage from negative 
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information (Feng et al., 2009). This could explain the negative perception or bias that 
causes the maintenance and development of depression (Feng et al., 2009). This could 
be one of the underlying mechanisms leading to misattributions. This study used 
neutral looking face stimuli, which in reality displayed neurotic traits. These subtle 
negative facial cues might be triggering similar mechanisms, whilst making 
attributions and therefore we were seeing misattributions in individuals with 
depressive symptoms. Such misattribution of self and others can lead to social 
dysfunction and reduce individuals’ wellbeing. 
We reported the association of participant’s hedonic wellbeing with their 
positive social attribution. We found that, with increasing wellbeing individuals more 
accurately chose emotionally stable faces for positive attributions, where as with 
decreasing wellbeing more neurotic images were misattributed as positive. Consistent 
to this result, Taylor and Brown (1988) discussed how individuals’ wellbeing affects 
perceptions of self, the world and their future. Reduced wellbeing is, however, closely 
associated with depression (Grant et al., 2013; Santos et al., 2013), making it difficult 
to disentangle the effects of depression and wellbeing on individual’s behaviours. The 
key findings from the current study are consistent with the theory of social projection 
and depression related misattributions leading to social dysfunctions; the evidence for 
which was obtained by comparing attributions in self and social contexts. 
6.5 Conclusion 
We conclude that participant’s social attributions were similar to their self-
attributions. We found that individuals with increasing severity of depressive 
symptoms and decreasing wellbeing chose more neurotic images of other-faces whilst 
making positive social attribution. This echoed participant’s self-attributions and 
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substantiated social projection, whilst making attributions to facial appearances. 
Besides our social attribution measures might be differentiating misattributions driven 
by global negativity in relation to transient depressive state, from those 
misattributions driven by negativity focused on self in relation to neuroticism.   
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CHAPTER 7 – Triangulation of self, social, and observer attributions 
 Abstract 
Attribution is the process of giving meaning to situations or behaviours, which 
could differ across individuals and contexts. Prior studies have found that positive 
attributions were made as dispositional (inherent) by actors, while observers saw it as 
situational (external) and the reverse for negative attributions. We investigated the 
association of observer’s attributions of actors with actor’s self-attribution, and actor’s 
mood and wellbeing states, and neuroticism trait. In this study, we selected 70 actor’s 
face image sequences from the self-attribution study, and 50 independent observers 
made attributions to each of these target faces. Actor’s mood was associated with their 
positive attribution of self but dissociated with observer’s attribution of the actors. 
The similarity between actors and observers was that they consistently displayed 
underlying positive and negative biases towards emotionally stable and neurotic 
appearances respectively. On average, this bias was maintained irrelevant of actor’s 
transient mood or wellbeing state or inherent traits but appears to be affected in those 
experiencing depression, leading to their misattribution of neurotic appearance as 
positive. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Attribution theories focus on the causal explanations that individuals construct 
for their own behaviour and the actions of others (Monson & Snyder, 1977). In the 
literature, the observed ‘others’ are generally referred to as ‘actors’. The actor-
observer literature predicts asymmetry between the attributions made by actors and 
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observers because of informational differences (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). This 
differential access to information leads to the apparent dichotomy of dispositional and 
situational attributions (Monson & Snyder, 1977). Dispositional attribution refers to 
causality being internal factors where as situational attribution refers to causality 
being external or situational (Jones & Davis, 1965; Ross, 1977). By the complexity of 
social behaviours, these two types of attributions may sometimes lose the distinctive 
dichotomous classification and simply coexist as a combination of both external and 
internal factors (Monson & Snyder, 1977).  
Jones and Nisbett (1972) suggested that an actor would optimize by 
constructing situational self-attributions and dispositional social attributions, although 
the counter argument suggests the interchangeable role of situational and dispositional 
factors. Situational attribution reflects on the impression that the situation is in control 
of the individual, whereas dispositional attribution of inherent traits, attitudes and 
desires could mean that the individual is in control (Monson & Snyder, 1977). In the 
opposing view of the latter, the individual could be perceived as being controlled by 
their traits and impulses (Monson & Snyder, 1977). The type of attribution would 
therefore depend on the intentions of the actors and the observers.  
Attribution theorists posit that actors might alter self-attributions to protect or 
enhance their self-esteem (Heider, 1958; Kelley & Michela, 1980). Our previous 
results suggested no evidence of self-enhancing attributions. Instead, we found 
harsher self-attribution in relation to increasing severity of depression (Chapter 5). It 
has been previously proposed that people who are most generous in self-attributions 
(e.g., non-depressed actors in our self-attribution study) may be the harshest judges of 
others, while the harshest self-judges (e.g., depressed actors in our self-attribution 
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study) may be the most generous in social-attributions (Anderson, 1985). Anderson 
(1985) however reported positive correlation between actor-observer attributions, 
which contradicted his own proposal. Our results from the previous studies reported 
similar positive correlation of self and social attributions (Chapter 6). The natural 
progression of our attribution studies would be to investigate the association of actor’s 
self-attributions with attributions of actors made by unfamiliar observers. In other 
words, is there a difference in how we perceive ourselves from how other individuals 
perceive us. Another aspect of observer’s attribution of actors is its association or 
disassociation with actor’s transient mood and wellbeing state, and more inherent 
personality traits, which relates to stigma. 
Previous research reported that observers perceived people experiencing 
depression as more dangerous than people without mental health disorder, people 
experiencing nonclinical stress, and people with eating disorders (Crisp, Gelder, Rix, 
Meltzer, & Rowlands, 2000; Link, Phelan, Bresnahan, Stueve, & Pescosolido, 1999; 
Phelan & Basow, 2007). This is classic evidence of observer’s perception of actors, as 
well as social stigma towards mental health. Another study reported difference in 
attributions of depressed and not-depressed people, especially with more negative 
attributions towards depressed people (Sacco & Dunn, 1990). We utilise self and 
observer attribution studies to examine whether actor’s mood state or inherent traits 
affect observer’s attribution of them. Some of the participants who completed the self 
and social attribution study were selected to be observed and are referred to as ‘actors’ 
in this chapter. Whilst the self and social attributions of an individual provided a first-
person’s perspective that could be modulated by their mood state and traits, the 
observer’s attribution provided a third-person’s perspective as illustrated in Figure 
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C.2. Therefore, providing a unique opportunity to explore the consensus and contrasts 
in attributions relating to the different perspectives.  
In this study, we investigate the association of observer’s attributions with 
actor’s depression, wellbeing, and neuroticism. We propose that actor’s traits and 
states may not affect observer’s basic attributions because of the lack of information 
available to observer’s regarding the actors. The consistency or inconsistency of self-
observer attributions will provide evidence of how first person’s perspective relates to 
unfamiliar third person’s perspectives. In addition, we triangulate the results from 
Chapter 5 and 6 to discuss the consistencies and disparities of the attributions 
measured in self, social, and independent observer contexts.     
7.2 Methods 
A total of 70 actors from the self-attribution study gave their full informed 
consent for their photographs to be used in future studies and to be observed by other 
future participants. These 70 faces were grouped into two groups of 20 and one group 
of 30, and used in three separate observer attributions tasks between a total of 150 
independent observers. This was done in order to reduce the issues of fatigue and 
boredom that could compromise observer’s attributions. Thus, 50 independent 
observers viewed each of the actors.  
Participants were undergraduate students from Bangor University and the 
study adhered to School of Psychology and Bangor University research and ethics 
guidelines. After participation students were debriefed and provided with information 
regarding available psychological support. 
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7.2.1 Observer attribution task 
The observer’s attribution was measured by adapting the social attribution task 
using the photographs of the actors who completed the self and social attribution 
tasks. The sequence of 19 images relating to each of the 70 actors, which was used in 
the self-attribution study, was used to set up the observer attribution task. This 
ensured consistency of the images viewed, that is, the observers in this study viewed 
the same images viewed by the actors in the self-attribution study.  
The presentation and the instructions were similar to the social attribution task 
and are described in Chapter 6. The independent observers made positive (happy, 
calm, most attractive) and negative (sad, anxious, least attractive) attributions of the 
actors’ facial appearance on the Neurotic Face Scale. The observer’s positive and 
negative attributions thus measured were comparable to the measures of actor’s self-
attributions.  
7.3 Results  
 A total of 70 (45 female) actors were selected, with age, M = 20.51, SD = 
5.32, and range = 18 -56; IDS, M = 19.07, SD = 8.089; FS, M = 44.63, SD = 6.43; 
balanced experience, M = 10.01, SD = 6.98; neuroticism, M = 2.74, SD = 0.86. 
The basic measures of observer’s positive and negative attributions were 
negatively correlated, r = -.545, p < .001, indicating that the observers differentiated 
the contrasting facial cues. This also confirms that observers differentiated the 
positive and negative appearance on the implicit neurotic face scale, suggestive of 
bias in observer’s attributions that is similar to actor’s underlying bias irrespective of 
their mood state. 
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One sample t-test against a test value of zero provided evidence for observer’s 
positive and negative bias. The mean observer’s positive attribution of -1.88 with SD 
of 1.09 was significantly more emotionally stable than actor’s original face, t(69) = -
14.3, p < .001, 95% CI(-2.14, -1.61). Similarly, the mean observer’s negative 
attribution of 3.88 with SD of 0.87 was significantly more neurotic than actor’s 
original face, t(69) = 37.53, p < .001, 95% CI(3.68, 4.09). These results suggest that, 
on average, observers demonstrate positive bias towards emotionally stable 
appearance of actors and negative bias towards neurotic appearance of actors. This is 
consistent with the average bias of actors found in self and social contexts.  
The consistent picture of positive and negative biases demonstrated in all the 
three contexts of self, social, and observer suggests that even without factoring for 
individual’s transient state or inherent traits, there are basic underlying concepts of 
positive and negative attributes. Our study in Chapter 4, demonstrated such biases by 
using a two alternative choice paradigm that allows only dichotomous response. Such 
biases are maintained even when using a scale that allows greater variance in 
response. This evidence supports the underlying positive-negative bias towards 
emotionally stable-neurotic appearance respectively, which is largely suggestive of 
social concepts such as stereotyping and social stigma relating to facial appearances. 
The results discussed in Part C, corroborate the evidence from previous studies 
demonstrating social stigma relating to facial appearances of depression (Scott et al., 
2013), physical and mental health (Kramer & Ward, 2010). Now that we have 
established an underlying bias in observer’s attributions, it is intriguing whether this 
bias will be modulated by actor’s transient state or stable traits.  
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7.3.1 Attributions relating to actor’s mood, wellbeing, neuroticism 
7.3.1.1 Actor’s Depression  
We firstly confirm that the subset of 70 actors, taken from the self-attribution 
study, showed the same pattern of correlation of depression with positive self- (r = 
.236, p = .049) and social- (r = .145, n.s.) attributions. This meant that, from among 
the actors being rated by observers in this experiment, those with greater depressive 
experience chose a more neurotic image as their positive self and that of others, 
suggesting mood modulated misattributions.  
The main focus in this study was to investigate whether observer’s attributions 
could be modulated by actor’s transient state or inherent traits. The results 
demonstrate that observers’ positive attribution of actors was dissociated from actor’s 
depression score, r = -056, p = .654 (see Figure 7.1), unlike actor’s positive self-
attribution. This means that on average, the preferences of external observers were not 
influenced by the actors' depressive state. The appearance preferences seen in the self-
attributions, therefore, do not reflect the preferences of the larger group. The 
dissociations are observed despite the underlying bias in observer’s positive and 
negative attributions reported earlier. 
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Figure 7.1. The graph shows the dissociation of observers’ positive attributions of actors’ facial 
appearance with the actors’ depression scores.  
 Visually analysing the graph it is clear that actor’s mood is not modulating 
observer’s attributions, however, it is also clear that on average observer’s chose a 
less neurotic image of actors whilst making positive attributions of the actors. The 
Neurotic Face Scale ranges from -9 (emotionally stable) to +9 (neurotic) with the 
original face as the midpoint represented as zero. This reinstates bias of the observers 
in identifying emotional stability as a positive attribute. Similar results were reported 
in Chapter 4 and discussed earlier. These results demonstrated observer’s preference 
for emotionally stable composite faces as positive and neurotic composite faces as 
negative. Scott et al. (2013) used faces warped towards varying degrees of depressive 
facial cues, to force a choice by presenting two faces. Their results demonstrated a 
bias for milder depressive facial cues as positive. In our current study, we demonstrate 
similar bias despite using a 19-point scale that allows greater variation in responses 
and therefore provides stronger evidence for this positive bias. This bias of observers 
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is in stark contrast with the bias of actors making self-attributions. The actors 
demonstrated mood modulated negative bias of choosing a more neurotic face for 
positive self-attributions.  
7.3.1.2 Actor’s Wellbeing  
We did not find significant correlations of actors’ hedonic and eudemonic 
wellbeing with observers’ positive or negative attributions, which is similar to the 
above results. In the social attribution study in Chapter 6, hedonic wellbeing 
correlated negatively with positive social attribution, suggesting increased 
misattribution of others with decreasing wellbeing. This subset from self-social 
attribution study, did not show significant correlation of actor’s self and social 
attribution with their wellbeing. By pulling together the results of self and social 
attributions from the previous two studies (Chapter 5 and 6), the result here reiterates 
those reported earlier in this study that unlike actor’s self and social attributions, 
observer’s attribution of actors was not modulated by actor’s wellbeing.  
7.3.1.3 Actor’s Neuroticism 
Neuroticism was positively correlated with positive self-attribution, r = .279, p 
= .019, maintaining the results from the self-attribution study. This means that actors 
with greater neuroticism chose a more neurotic image for positive self-attribution. 
However, observers’ positive and negative attributions of actors did not correlate 
significantly with actors’ neuroticism showing a pattern similar to the results reported 
here previously. 
The results so far provide a consistent picture, that observer’s attributions were 
not modulated by actor’s transient mood state or inherent neuroticism trait. It 
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therefore appears that observers’ attributions were driven by their own underlying 
biases. Similar underlying bias was observed for actors as well. This naturally leads to 
the question of how similar or dissimilar are observer’s attributions of actors to 
actor’s self-attributions, without accounting for actor’s mood state? Our next analysis 
provides evidence towards this actor-observer consistency or inconsistency. 
7.3.2 Basic attributions in self and observer’s context 
The actors’ positive self-attribution correlated significantly with observers’ 
positive attribution, r = .297, p = .012, but not the negative attributions (see Figure 
7.2). The significant positive correlation demonstrates that when not accounting for 
actor’s mood state, there is some consistency between actor’s positive self-attribution 
and observer’s positive attribution of the actors. A different picture emerges, however, 
when visually analysing the graphs in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2. The graphs show a positive correlation of observer’s positive attribution with actor’s 
positive self-attribution but a similar correlation was not observed for negative attributions. The 
underlying bias of observer’s positive attribution towards emotionally stable appearance and negative 
attribution towards neurotic appearance is obvious here. Similar underlying bias of actors is observed 
mainly for negative attribution towards neurotic appearance. Otherwise, actor’s attributions are 
dispersed along the emotionally stable-neurotic scale indicative of state- and trait-modulated 
misattributions. 
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 Despite the consistency of actor-observer positive attributions suggested by 
the positive correlation, the differentiating biases are apparent. The observers’ 
attributions are clearly driven by their positive bias towards emotionally stable facial 
appearance, because their responses on the graph are gathered more towards the 
emotionally stable part of the scale, with scores ranging between 2 and -4. In contrast, 
the actors display varying attribution biases with their responses scattered across the 
full scale between scores of 8 and -9. There are clearly some actors who demonstrate 
positive bias towards emotionally stable cues similar to the observers; however, there 
are some actors who exhibit negative bias. Reflecting on the result from the self-
attribution study in Chapter 5, we can say that the actors with increasing depression 
demonstrated the misattributions relating to negative bias of self-exaggeration 
towards more neurotic appearance. Actors with increasing depression would have 
displayed facial cues of neuroticism or depression on their original image; however, 
they chose an image that displayed more neurotic appearance than their original 
image. Previous studies have reported exaggerated perception of self in individuals 
with depression (Chen et al., 2006; Kohler, Hoffman, Eastman, Healey, & Moberg, 
2011; Liu et al., 2012) and other psychotic disorders (Uono et al., 2015). In addition 
to self-exaggeration, the results also indicate distorted perception  (Bilderbeck et al., 
2011; Blackwood et al., 2003) relating to negative bias with depression.  
 Observer’s negative attribution of actors was not significantly correlated with 
actor’s negative self-attribution. When visually analysing the graph however, it is 
clear that observer’s demonstrated a negative bias for neurotic facial appearance 
because their responses were gathered towards the neurotic part of the scale between 
the scores of 2 and 6. Majority of actors displayed similar negative bias but some 
actors again displayed varying attribution biases. 
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 By comparing actor-observer attributions, we have gained insight into their 
complex relationship. Despite appearing to have consistency between positive 
attributions of actors and observers, there are obvious inconsistencies. While actor’s 
depressed mood state modulated their positive self-attribution, it was emotionally 
stable – neurotic appearance on the Neurotic Face Scale that modulated the observer’s 
attribution of actors. In Chapter 6, we reported the consistency between actor’s 
positive attributions of self and others, which was also modulated by actor’s 
depressed mood state. By triangulating self, social, and observer attributions provides 
a better picture of mood, affecting self and social attributions but not observers’ 
attribution of actors.  
7.4 Discussion 
In this chapter, I discuss the association of observers’ attribution with actors’ 
mood, wellbeing, and neuroticism as well as actors’ self and social attributions. A 
total of 50 independent observers rated each of the 70 selected actors. Observers’ 
individual responses for positive and negative attributions were averaged to obtain 
attributions that were comparable with respective self and social attributions. 
Observers’ positive attributions were negatively associated with their negative 
attribution indicating contrasting facial cues of high and low neuroticism were well 
differentiated.  
The main question in this study was whether actor’s mood state, wellbeing 
state, and neuroticism trait would modulate observer’s attribution of the actors. 
Previous evidence supports observer’s attributions being influenced by actor’s mood 
state (Crisp et al., 2000; Link et al., 1999). Our results show that unlike self and social 
attributions, observer’s attributions were not modulated by actor’s mood state, 
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wellbeing state, or neuroticism trait. It therefore appeared that observers did not 
stigmatize actors on the basis of their depression; however, observer’s attributions 
were, in actuality, modulated by the neurotic appearance of actor’s face. The results 
demonstrated observer’s positive bias of emotionally stable appearance and negative 
bias of neurotic appearance on the Neurotic Face Scale, which suggests stigma 
associated with mental health as previously reported (Link et al., 1999; Phelan & 
Basow, 2007; Scott et al., 2013). 
As with any cognitive processes, stigma exists at implicit and explicit levels  
(Monteith & Pettit, 2011). Existing evidence highlights the importance of using 
explicit and implicit paradigms to measure observer’s attributions, because they can 
tap into the different mechanisms (Monteith & Pettit, 2011). Monteith and Pettit 
(2011) reported more negative attitudes about depression compared to physical illness 
on implicit but not explicit measures. Our measures demonstrate implicit signs of 
stigma associated with neurotic facial appearance, although we did not measure 
explicit stigma.  
The correlations between the attributions across the three contexts highlighted 
interesting findings. We found that actors’ positive self-attribution was positively 
correlated with their positive social attribution as well as observers’ positive 
attribution of actors. From visually analysing the graph, however, it was clear that 
unlike actors, observers chose less neurotic images for positive attribution for 
majority of the actors demonstrating positive bias for emotionally stable appearance. 
Whilst making positive attributions some actors, especially those experiencing 
depression, chose more neurotic image of self and others for positive attribution, of 
whom observers made positive attributions by choosing the image closer to the actor’s 
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original face. It therefore appears that actor’s facial appearance on the Neurotic Face 
Scale does affect observer’s attributions to some extent. The results here imply that 
despite the positive correlation between actor-observer positive attributions, the 
observers did not show the misattribution shown by those actors experiencing 
depression. From the self and social attribution studies, we have provided evidence 
that actors with greater depressive symptoms displayed greater misattributions of self 
and other’s facial cues indicating negative bias. Prior research reported that 
individuals with current or past depressive experiences needed greater intensities of 
expression to recognise happy emotion accurately, which indicated negative attention 
bias relating to depression (LeMoult et al., 2009). The results from the first two 
attribution studies corroborate this evidence because we demonstrated depression-
modulated misattributions mainly affecting positive attributions. The positive cues 
from a neutral looking face may be more ambiguous than the negative cues relating to 
high neuroticism. 
Prior studies have reported dissociation of observer-actor attributions on the 
basis of the available information and differential salience between the actors and the 
observers (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Jones, Worchel, Goethals, & Grumet, 1971). Jones 
and Nisbett (1972) proposed that actors tend to make situational attribution to their 
behaviour, while observers attribute it to stable behaviours of the actors. This study 
did not investigate situational or dispositional attributions, instead we focused on 
understanding the dynamics of attributions in self, social and observer context. We 
found observers’ and actors’ positive and negative attributions were differentially 
correlated, with significant positive correlation only for positive attributions. This 
differential correlation could be related to a lack of information available whilst 
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making attribution of unfamiliar individuals as reported in previous studies (Jones & 
Nisbett, 1972).  
We could also explain the differential correlation on the basis that actors’ 
positive attribution in self and social contexts had greater variance along the Neurotic 
Face Scale, a moderation of which was also seen in observers’ attributions. The 
negative attribution of actors and observers, however, were similarly biased towards 
neurotic facial appearance. Each observer’s attribution is in actuality an average of 50 
responses and therefore on average they represent a generally accepted bias. On this 
basis, actor-observer consistency for negative bias provides evidence for actors’ 
negative attributions to be more consistent with the generally observed negative bias 
than their positive attributions. This further supports the evidence that misattributions 
displayed by actors experiencing depression were specifically for positive attributions, 
whilst maintaining negative attributions consistent with observers. It appears that 
underlying bias and self-inference modulate positive attributions, and hence 
dependant on state or trait of the observing individuals, whilst negative attributions 
are more consistent because they are modulated largely by the underlying bias. In 
other words, actors experiencing depression were accurate for negative cues in self 
and social contexts indicating negative attention bias and misattribution of positive 
cues indicating misperceptions, which is consistent with existing evidence (Platt, 
Murphy, & Lau, 2015). Our attribution tasks were sensitive enough to measure these 
negative biases and misattributions relating to depressive disorder, corroborating 
previous evidence (Bourke, Douglas, & Porter, 2010; LeMoult et al., 2009; Maniglio 
et al., 2014; Webb & Ayers, 2015). 
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So far, our studies provide specific evidence of the negative facial cues of self 
and others being misconstrued as positive with increasing depression. The 
misperceptions observed in this study, may be limited to neurotic appearance of face 
but this perforates into social interactions and malign social functioning. Park et al. 
(2016) reported how mood modulated misperceptions affected the perceived quality 
of social communications on social media, which is a snap shot of how 
misperceptions translate into dysfunctions in real life. On this basis, we propose that 
developing interventions to target re-training, correcting or realigning positive 
perceptions, would be greatly beneficial to individuals exhibiting negative bias.  
7.5 Conclusion 
We conclude that actors’ mood, wellbeing and neuroticism were associated 
with their self and social attributions but were dissociated with observers’ attributions. 
With increasing depression, actors chose neurotic facial cues as positive in self and 
social contexts, but actor’s depression did not affect observers’ attributions. Both 
actors and observers, however, showed consistent underlying positive and negative 
bias towards emotionally stable and neurotic facial appearance respectively. The 
results also support that with increasing depression actors’ negative attributions were 
more consistent with the observer’s negative attributions, unlike actor’s positive 
attributions with greater variance demonstrating misattribution. Future interventions 
could target to re-train and reduce the overly negative perception affecting 
misattributions and to increase positive perception. 
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PART D – The clinical application of self-attributions of facial appearance 
In Chapter 1, I discussed the neurocognitive model of depression that 
explained the series of neurobiological and behavioural changes that precede the 
experience of depressive mood state. This provided the rationale for developing a new 
attribution task to target implicit cognitive processes in order to measure the subtle 
behaviour changes that could be early predictors of change in depression. In Part B 
and Part C of this thesis, I discussed the development of our attribution task using face 
stimuli, and how it was adapted to measure self, social and observer attributions. I 
further discussed the relation of self, social, and observer attributions with severity of 
actor’s depressive state, wellbeing and neuroticism.  
Having demonstrated, in particular, the sensitivity of self-attribution to 
depressive state in a non-clinical sample, I want to extend my investigation with a 
clinical population. A longitudinal study can assess the dynamic relation between self-
attribution and depression. I will discuss this clinical study, its results and its future 
implications in Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 8 – Self-attributions of facial appearance: An early predictor and 
monitor of reducing depression 
Abstract 
 Neurocognitive model of depression suggests that neurobiological changes can 
produce behavioural changes in individuals, before they experience a mood change. 
On this basis, we propose that subtle behavioural changes could predict intervention 
response. Using the self-attribution task, we investigate the behavioural changes that 
could be early predictors of mood change. Individuals with current experience of 
depressive symptoms, but without manic or psychotic symptoms, participated in this 
study. In this longitudinal study, with five time points across 11 weeks, we found 
gradual changes in self-negativity, self-positivity and self-discrepancy. In addition, 
decrease in self-negativity and increase in self- positivity in the first week, were 
significant predictors of depression score at Week 11, indicating early behavioural 
predictors of intervention response.  
 
8.1 Introduction 
Neurocognitive model of depression explain how changes in neurobiology 
affects changes in cognitive abilities. Tryptophan depletion paradigms are based on 
this model and provide evidence of changes in tryptophan levels affecting imminent 
changes in cognitive abilities, even before individuals experience any changes in 
mood (Ward, Sreenivas & Rogers, 2016; (Harmer & Cowen, 2013; Hornboll et al., 
2013; Passamonti et al., 2012). This evidence indicates potential behavioural 
predictors of mood change that could be harnessed to predict intervention response for 
depression.  Such predictors can help to identify effective interventions faster and 
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reduce the trial and error period. The trial and error period is consequential because 
there is no single medication or treatment for depression that is effective for all; hence 
having to go through a period of trials to identify the intervention that works for each 
individual. 
Clinical trials such as Texas Medication Algorithm Project and STAR*D tried 
to identify processes to reduce this trial and error period. The resultant advice from 
these trials included, bi-weekly monitoring using Quick Inventory for Depressive 
Symptomology – self report or Patient Health Questionnaire – 9 (PHQ-9) and 
reviewing treatment plan, if PHQ-9 scores were greater than or equal to nine at the 
start of week four (Thase, Entsuah, & Rudolph, 2001; Thase, 2014). These reports 
suggest at least three weeks to confirm treatment response for depression. It also 
shows that, the traditional methods of interviews and self-reports are effective in 
confirming symptoms of depression and remission, but limited in identifying early 
behavioural changes or making early prognosis.  
Patient reported data from STAR*D, were later used to gather the variables 
that were most predictive of antidepressants-treatment outcomes. Through a machine 
learning approach, this study identified a model with 25 variables. This model was, 
however, limited to predicting outcomes of citalopram after two weeks of treatment  
(Chekroud et al., 2016). Another study investigating leukocyte mRNA expression 
levels of genes belonging to glucocorticoid receptor, reported to have identified a 
biomarker for antidepressant response (Cattaneo et al., 2012). Screening for such a 
marker could be an important pre-emptive measure for improving treatment plans and 
thereby reducing the trial and error period for antidepressants, but leaves the gap in 
identifying response to other interventions. The PReDICT randomised controlled trial 
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proposed, in their study protocol, to explore an array of potential predictors of 
remission, including demographics, personality, functional neuro-connectivity, 
neuroendocrine function, immune markers and DNA. These would be entered into 
complex algorithms to identify predictors of treatment(s) and recurrence or remission 
(Dunlop et al., 2012). Their results are yet to be published. Evidently, there is a lack 
of understanding regarding early predictors and how we might measure them.  
Neural imaging studies provide evidence of early behavioural changes relating 
to changes in neurobiology (Hornboll et al., 2013; Passamonti et al., 2012). 
Tryptophan depletion studies demonstrate increased emotional bias (Hornboll et al., 
2013) and reduced accuracy for face signals of emotion (Harmer et al., 2003b) and 
traits (Ward, Sreenivas & Rogers, 2016), prior to experiencing change in mood. Such 
biases seem to be modulated by wider neural networks involved in attention (parietal 
cortex, visual cortex, fusiform gyrus), self-referential processing (medial PFC, 
precuneus) and memory (hippocampus) (Harmer & Cowen, 2013; Lemogne et al., 
2010; Lemogne et al., 2012). Even though the neurobiological bases of depression 
appear to be very broad, some evidence converges on the prefrontal functions.  
Changes in prefrontal signals, after one week of antidepressant treatments, 
were consistently related to response and remission in depression (Cook, Espinoza, & 
Leuchter, 2014; Harmer, 2014; Leuchter et al., 2010). Similarly, changes in prefrontal 
activations were associated with improvements in mood following psychological 
therapies including cognitive behaviour therapy (Roiser et al., 2012; Yoshimura et al., 
2014). The fronto-limbic networks were also consistently associated with changes in 
cognitive and emotional biases following improvements in mood (Elliott et al., 2011; 
Fossati, 2008; Tahmasian et al., 2013). It would, therefore, be useful to target those 
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behaviours that rely on prefrontal networks, in order to measure the changes 
following wider range of medical and psychosocial interventions. Evidence supports 
the prefrontal activations being linked to self-referential processes (Keenan et al., 
2000; Nejad, Fossati, & Lemogne, 2013; Tahmasian et al., 2013).  By targeting 
changes in the self-referential processing, we might be able to measure the early 
changes in the prefrontal networks: providing an early behavioural marker.  
The self-attribution task is an ideal candidate to measure subtle self-referential 
processing. Using this task, we previously measured individual differences in self-
attributions that were sensitive to subjective mood, wellbeing and traits (Chapter 5). 
Furthermore, we measured participant’s own mental self-representations, which were 
referred to as separation indices (SIs). The SIs were measured as the magnitude of 
discrepancy between two basic self-attributions, details of which are explained in the 
self-attribution study (Chapter 5). These measures were sensitive to mood and 
wellbeing, and even differentiated behaviour patterns relating to neuroticism and 
agreeableness.  
In our self-attribution study (Chapter 5), we measured SIs relating to self-
negativity, self- positivity and self-discrepancy. We demonstrated that self-negativity 
increased with increasing severity of depression. Self-negativity is a measure of 
individual’s distinction between perceived actual self and perceived negative self.  
The ‘current self’ and negative self, has the potential to change over time because 
mood and perception about self might change over time. From the self-attribution 
study, we found the pattern of increasing self-negativity and self-discrepancy with 
increasing depression and decreasing wellbeing. We were also able to identify greater 
self-positivity as an adaptive behaviour relating to increasing hedonic wellbeing and 
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agreeableness. Such changes in biases towards self could have a predictive quality. 
Evidence suggests early increase in positive bias could predict the ultimate 
improvement in depressive symptoms (Gollan et al., 2015; Gollan et al., 2016; 
Warren et al., 2015). Thus, the SIs might be the ideal measures to tap into the self-
referential processes as well as the shifting biases towards self, in relation to mood 
change.  
In this study, we investigate self-attributions of individuals with depression 
and its dynamics over time. We focus on individual’s mental representations of self- 
facial appearance, that is, SIs referring to self-negativity, self-positivity and self- 
discrepancy. We hypothesis that decreasing self-negativity and self-discrepancy, as 
well as increasing self-positivity, will overlap decreasing severity of depressive 
symptoms, over the study period. We further investigate, whether a change in these 
behavioural measures in the first week can predict reduced depression score at the 
final time-point. That is, changes in self-representation will precede and predict mood 
changes. On the basis of the neurocognitive theory, we propose an early reduction in 
self-negativity and increase in self-positivity would predict mood. Reduced 
depression at the final follow up will be taken as the proxy measure for intervention 
response.  
8.2 Methods  
We recruited 29 individuals who were experiencing depression through self-
referrals and referrals from General Practitioners (GPs) and mental health 
professionals, of which 17 (11 females) participants completed the study with mean 
age 27.94±14.59. This study was approved by the Ethics Committee at School of 
Psychology, Bangor University and the North Wales Research Ethics Committee and 
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the Research & Development Office, Betsi Cadwaldr University Health Board [IRAS 
ref. 115281, MREC ref. 13/WA/0197].  
All potential participants were provided with Participant Information Sheet, 
and those who gave informed consent were screened before entering into the study. 
After the first session, the participants were provided with information regarding 
medical and psychological support available in North Wales. In case of any risk 
during the study, the risk protocol prepared for the study was to be followed. 
Depending on the imminence of risk, the support would be available from the G.P., or 
a Consultant Psychiatrist or the emergency services. All participants were debriefed at 
the end of the study. 
8.2.1 Inclusion criteria: Individuals currently experiencing depression were 
included in the study. We did not provide or control for the interventions received for 
depression; details of which are provided later. Participant’s ability to see faces and 
read from a computer screen was confirmed. The measures and behavioural task used 
in this study were presented only in English, and therefore participant’s consent to 
communicate in English was also confirmed.  
8.2.2 Exclusion criteria: Individuals experiencing manic-depressive 
symptoms and symptoms of psychotic disorder were excluded from the study. 
Participants were initially screened for both inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
The semi-structured interview using Structured Clinical Interview for DSM VI 
(SCID) for Axis I disorders (First et al., 2002), confirmed both inclusion (current 
depression) and exclusion (manic-depression and psychotic disorders) criteria.  
   
 Page 154 
8.2.3 Study design: This was a longitudinal study over 11-12 weeks period, with five 
time-points. Once confirmed eligible and entered in the study, the participants were 
seen at baseline and four follow-ups (Week 1, Week 3, Week 5-6 and Week 11-12). 
An extensive SCID interview was conducted only at baseline for confirming 
diagnosis, but Module A of SCID that focus on mood disorder was repeated at the last 
two time-points. The 14-Item Resilience Scale (RS-14) (Damásio, Borsa, & da Silva, 
2011) and a demographic questionnaire were used only at baseline. 
RS-14 contains five items referring to “self-reliance”, three items referring to 
“meaningfulness”, two items referring to “equanimity”, two items referring to 
“perseverance”, and two items referring to “existential aloneness”. The response scale 
was from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The sum of the responses gave 
the total score that ranged from 14 to 98 with low resilience scoring 73 or below and 
high resilience scoring 91 or above.  
Patient Health Questionnaire – 9 items (PHQ-9) (Kroenke, Spitzer, & 
Williams, 2001), Hamilton Depression Rating Scale -17(HDRS) (Hamilton, 1960), 
EQ visual analogue scale (EQ VAS) (Oppe, Devlin, & Szende, 2007; Rabin & 
Charro, 2001), IDS (Zimmerman, Sheeran, & Young, 2004), FS, SPANE (Diener et 
al., 2010), and the self and social attribution tasks, were repeated at all time-points. 
Three different measures of depression were used to investigate the sensitivity of the 
self-attributions to depression, measured by different inventories.  
The IDS was used for continuity from our previous studies. The HDRS was 
rated by the interviewer and provided a proxy measure of depression. It has 17 items 
relating to depressive symptoms with responses from 0 (none) to 4 (maximum 
symptom) for nine items; 0 (none) to 3 (maximum symptom) for two items related to 
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weight gain or loss, of which only one should be answered; and 0 (none) to 2 
(maximum symptoms) for seven items. A sum of these responses provided the total 
score that ranged from 0 to 52. Depression severity was rated as follows; 0-7 as None, 
8-16 as Mild, 17-23 as Moderate, and 24-52 as Severe (Hamilton, 1960; Zimmerman 
et al., 2004).  
The PHQ-9 was recommended for routine monitoring to aid treatment plan 
review (Thase et al., 2001; Thase, 2014). In the UK, the GPs commonly use PHQ-9  
(Cameron, Crawford, Lawton, & Reid, 2007) and therefore our investigation focused 
on the association of the SIs with this self-rated measure. In addition, PHQ-9 focuses 
on the key depressive symptoms providing depression specific scores, unlike the IDS 
and the HDRS that include associated anxiety and somatic symptoms as well. The 
PHQ-9 has nine items relating to occurrence of depressive symptoms in the seven 
days prior to the assessment; with responses from zero (Not at all) to three (Nearly 
every day). The sum of the responses gave the total score that ranged from 0 to 27. 
Depression severity was assessed accordingly; 0-4 as None, 5-9 as Mild, 10-14 as 
Moderate, 15-19 as Moderately severe, 20-27 as Severe (Kroenke et al., 2001).  
The EQ VAS measured participant’s self-rated health on a vertical, visual 
analogue scale with endpoints of 100 labelled as ‘Best imaginable health state’ and 0 
as ‘Worst imaginable health state’. This measure helped to understand the 
participant’s own feeling about their overall health, at each time-point.  
The self-attribution task is explained in Chapter 5, in Part C. To explain 
briefly, the self-attribution task was set up using individual’s own photograph. A 
series of 19 images created using their photographs, changed in gradual increments 
from emotionally stable face to high neurotic face. The images were presented one at 
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a time, in the middle of a computer screen. When participants pressed either the right 
or left arrow keys, the images changed through a looped sequence, back and forth, in 
their order on the implicit neurotic face scale. This gave the impression of the 
presented face changing, as controlled by the participant. The presentation of looped 
sequence of images made it difficult for the observer to understand the lateral 
representation of the scale. Participants selected one image for each instruction by 
pressing the spacebar.  
The instructions were to choose their actual (‘Choose your actual face’), ideal 
(‘Choose your ideal face’), positive self and negative self. The instructions for 
positive self were, ‘Make the face look most happy and content’, ‘Make the face look 
calm stable and well-balanced’, and ‘Make the face look most attractive’. The 
instructions for negative self were, ‘Make the face look unhappy and least content’, 
‘Make the face look anxious and emotionally unstable’, and ‘Make the face look least 
attractive’.  
The social attribution task is adopted from the social attribution study; the 
procedures and presentation is explained in Chapter 6. To briefly explain, faces of 
unfamiliar ‘others’ were used to set up the task and the instructions were limited to 
those appropriate whilst making attributions of others. Hence, the instructions were 
limited to basic positive (happy, calm, attractive) and negative (unhappy, anxious, 
least attractive) attributions. 
8.3 Data Analysis  
The method for measuring SIs is explained in the self-attribution study 
(Chapter 5). We measured self-negativity (SIan), self-positivity (SIap), and self-
discrepancy (SIai). Self-negativity referenced perceived actual self against perceived 
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negative self, self-positivity referenced perceived actual self against perceived 
positive self, and self-discrepancy referenced perceived actual self against perceived 
ideal self. All the measures except self-discrepancy had inverse scales, that is, greater 
scores of SIan, SIap, indicated lesser negativity and positivity respectively. These 
inverse scales were reverse scored to reflect increasing scores relating to increasing 
self-negativity, self-positivity and self-discrepancy. We explored the longitudinal 
dynamics of the SIs using graphs. The SIs with increasing or decreasing linear trends 
was further analysed.  
In further analysis, the changes of SIs in the first week were computed as the 
difference (subtraction) of the respective SIs at baseline and Week 1. The scores 
ranged between -20 and 20. Since this was a measure of difference (baseline – Week 
1), a score of zero meant no difference in the individual’s mental representation in the 
first week. A negative score meant lesser self-negativity, self-positivity and self-
discrepancy at Week 1 compared to baseline. While a positive score meant greater 
self-negativity, self-positivity and self-discrepancy at Week 1 compared to baseline. 
Thus, they reflected the quality of change in the first week; for example, decrease or 
increase in self-negativity at Week 1 compared to baseline. Correlations of these 
behavioural changes in the first week with depression score at final time point were 
assessed, to identify potential early behavioural predictors. Finally using regression 
analysis, we identified the changes in SIs in the first week that predicted the PHQ-9 
score at Week 11 and the change in the PHQ-9 score from baseline to Week 11. 
The basic positive and negative social attributions were also explored visually, 
to understand the longitudinal changes. This provides evidence of changes in 
attribution in the social context that overlaps with changes in self-attribution.  
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8.4 Results  
A total number of 45 participants had telephone discussions about the study, 
of which 29 completed the initial screening. A total of 21 participants entered the 
study. Three participants were excluded after completing the SCID because of 
meeting exclusion criteria. One participant withdrew at Week 5 due to ill health. A 
total of 17 (11 female) participants completed the study. One participant missed the 
third follow up, but completed the final follow up which was delayed by two weeks. 
The group had mean age, M = 27.94, SD = 14.59, age range = 19 – 63, and mean 
resilience, M = 52.35, SD = 12.46. The group mean scores of the rest of the measures, 
changed over the five time points and are given in Table 8.1. The mean scores at each 
time point indicate gradually decreasing depression, improving wellbeing and 
perceived physical health. Importantly, the severity of depression measured using 
PHQ-9 decreased across the five time points, as shown in Figure 8.1. This was despite 
participants receiving some or no interventions.  
8.4.1 Interventions  
All the participants who completed the study were experiencing depression 
(for the past 2 weeks). At the beginning of the study, 11 participants received 
antidepressants (two participants started their treatment more than one week prior to 
the baseline), one participant received therapy and five participants received no 
interventions. Through the 11 weeks, three participants receiving antidepressants also 
received therapy, and from those with no intervention, one participant received 
antidepressants and two participants received therapy.  
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Table 8.1. Mean and standard deviation of all the measures across the five time-
points.  
 Baseline Week1  Week 3 Week 5-6 Week 11-12 
IDS 42.82 (11.41) 36.24 (14.73) 29.65 (15.74) 29.75 (17.96) 22.59 (15.97) 
PHQ-9 18.18 (5.31) 14.59 (5.36) 11.71 (5.84) 11.62 (6.41) 8.59 (6.54) 
HDRS 21.82 (7.99) 18.24 (9.39) 11.41 (7.68) 12.31 (8.32) 6.94 (5.33) 
EQ VAS 46.35 (16.14) 45.41 (19.95) 50.00 (21.83) 49.06 (21.68) 64.65 (20.81) 
FS 28.35 (7.95) 28.53 (8.66) 30.65 (10.06) 31.69 (11.54) 36.18 (10.45) 
SPANE 
Positive 12.82 (2.86) 14.35 (4.11) 14.82 (5.13) 15.50 (5.56) 18.18 (5.81) 
Negative 22.65 (3.62) 20.41 (4.70) 20.53 (4.90) 18.19 (5.17) 17.41 (4.50) 
Balanced -9.82 (5.39) -6.06 (8.26) -5.71 (9.65) -3.69 (10.00) 0.76 (9.80) 
Note. Descriptive statistics are reported as mean (standard deviation). IDS, Inventory of Depressive 
Symptomology; PHQ-9, Patient Health Questionnaire-9; HDRS, Hamilton Depression Rating Scale; 
EQ VAS, EuroQol Visual Analogue Scale; FS, Flourishing Scale; SPANE, Scale of Positive and 
Negative Experiences 
 
Figure 8.1. The graph shows the group mean depression scores decreasing across the five time points. 
PHQ-9, Patient Health Questionnaire - 9 
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8.4.2 Dynamics of SIs (self-attribution) over time  
The group means of the SIs were used graphically, to visualise the trends 
across the five time points. The three graphs are shown in Figure 8.2, and they 
demonstrate the gradual changes in self-negativity, self-positivity and self-
discrepancy. To be more precise, the group had decreasing self-negativity and self-
discrepancy, as well as increasing self-positivity across the five time points. In Figure 
8.1, we have already demonstrated an overlapping decrease in the group’s depression 
score over the same period. Together, these results demonstrate decreasing depression 
related to decreasing self-negativity and self-discrepancy, as well as increasing self-
positivity. This further validates the self-attribution task and its relationship to 
depression, within a small longitudinal study.  
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Figure 8.2. The graphs show a) Decrease in SIan, b) Increase in SIap, and c) Decrease in SIai, across the 
five time-points in 11 weeks. The group had decreasing self-negativity, increasing self-positivity and 
decreasing self-discrepancy that overlapped with decreasing depression scores (Figure 8.1). 
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8.4.3 Correlations of the change in SIs in the first week 
We next sought to see whether changes in self-attribution measures might 
predict future changes in depression. For this, changes in the three SIs during the first 
week, were computed as a difference of the respective scores at Week 1 and baseline. 
A score of zero meant no change in the individuals’ mental self-representation, in the 
first week. A negative score meant lesser self-negativity, self-positivity, and self-
discrepancy at Week 1 compared to baseline; while a positive score meant greater 
self-negativity, self-positivity, and self-discrepancy at Week 1 compared to baseline.  
Change in self-negativity in the first week was negatively correlated with 
changes in self-positivity in the first week, r = -.553, p = .02. This shows that in the 
first week a decrease in self-negativity was related to increase in self-positivity, 
displaying an inverse relationship between the two self-attributions. 
The key results showed that changes in self-negativity during Week 1, related 
to participants’ mental state at Week 11. Decreases in self-negativity in the first week 
were correlated with PHQ-9 (depression) at Week 11, r = .551, p = .02 and FS 
(eudemonic wellbeing) at Week 11, r = -.491, p = .04. Decrease in self-negativity in 
the first week also had a non-significant correlation with balanced experience 
(hedonic wellbeing) at Week 11, r = -.419, p = .094. Consistent with these results, 
changes in self-positivity during Week 1 were associated with the participants’ mental 
state at Week 11. Increases in self-positivity in the first week were significantly 
correlated with depression, r = -.520, p = .03, and eudemonic, r = .542, p = .02 and 
hedonic, r = .541, p = .02 wellbeing at Week 11. Changes in self-discrepancy during 
Week 1, however, did not correlate significantly with depression (r = .246, p = .34) or 
wellbeing (eudemonic, r = -.398, p = .11; hedonic, r = -.248, p = .34) at Week 11.  
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A partial correlation analysis controlling for change in depression in the first 
week (computed as the difference in depression score between baseline and Week 1) 
showed changes in self-negativity in the first week maintained the significant 
correlation with depression at Week 11, r = .650, p = .009 and eudemonic wellbeing 
at Week 11, r = -.615, p = .01. Similarly, changes in self-positivity in the first week 
maintained the significant correlations with eudemonic wellbeing at Week 11, r = 
.571, p = .03 and hedonic wellbeing at Week 11, r = .523, p = .04. These results 
suggest that changes in self-attributions in the first week were significantly associated 
with mood and wellbeing state of individuals at Week 11, even after controlling for 
the change in mood in the first week. 
Besides the above correlations, the changes in self-attribution in the first week 
correlated with changes in depression and hedonic wellbeing across the study period; 
computed as the difference between scores at baseline and Week 11. Changes in self-
negativity in the first week was positively correlated with changes in depression, r = 
.506, p = .046, whereas changes in self-positivity in the first week was correlated with 
changes in hedonic wellbeing, r = .507, p = .038. These correlations show that 
decrease in self-negativity in the first week related to decrease in depression over 11 
weeks, and increase in self-positivity in the first week related to increase in hedonic 
wellbeing over 11 weeks.  
No other significant correlations were found between changes in self-
attribution and changes in depression or wellbeing within the first week. Interestingly, 
even the change in depression in the first week did not correlate significantly with 
change in depression over 11 weeks, r = .383, p = .143, highlighting the potential 
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sensitivity of early changes in self-attributions over early changes in depression or 
wellbeing as predictors of mood. 
Beyond mood and wellbeing, we found other measures that correlate with the 
early changes in self-attribution. Increasing age was correlated with decreases in self-
negativity, r = -.526, p = .03 and positively with increases in self-positivity, r = .474, 
p = .05 (non-significantly) in the first week. Similar trends were observed for 
resilience; decreases in self-negativity, r = -.481, p = .05, and increases in self-
positivity, r = .418, p = .09. No other significant correlations were found.  
8.4.4 Change in SIs in the first week as predictors of mood 
In the next analysis, the changes in self-negativity and self-positivity in the 
first week were used in regression models, to predict PHQ-9 at Week 11. In the linear 
regression analyses, PHQ-9 at Week 11 was the dependent variable. The independent 
predictor variable in Model 1 was change in self-negativity and in Model 2 was 
change in self-positivity. Both models were significant predictors of PHQ-9 at Week 
11: self- negativity, R2 = .304, F(1, 15) = 6.55, p = .02, and self-positivity, R2 = .270, 
F(1, 15) = 5.56, p = .03. This meant that changes in self-negativity and self-positivity 
in the first week could independently predict depression at Week 11. The results show 
that, decreasing self-negativity, β = .551, t(16) = 2.56, p = .02, or increasing self- 
positivity, β = -.520, t(16) = -2.36, p = .03, in the first week predicted depression at 
Week 11 (see Figure 8.3).  
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Figure 8.3. The graphs show the change self-negativity (SIan) and self-positivity (SIap) in the first week 
as predictors of Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ-9) in the final follow up at week 11. The score 
below 0 on the y-axis indicate decrease in self-negativity and self-positivity in the first week and scores 
below 9 on the x-axis indicate mild to not depressed state. 
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Additional regression analysis followed the significant positive correlation 
between change in self-negativity in the first week and change in depression across 
the study period. Change in self-negativity in the first week was a significant predictor 
of change in depression across the study (difference between baseline and Week 11), 
R2 = .256, F(1, 15) = 4.81, p = .046. The result shows that a decrease in self-
negativity in the first week, β = .506, t(16) = 2.19, p = .046, predicted decrease in 
depression over 11 weeks. However, change in self-negativity in the first week did 
not predict change in depression during the first week, r = .330, p = .196, suggesting 
that changes in self-attribution could be preceding changes in mood. 
The group mean depression scores at the five time-points could be explored to 
understand the extent of the change. Although there is a significant difference in the 
group mean depression in the first week, t(16) = 3.34, p = .004, the mean score of 
14.59 at Week 1 range between ‘moderate’ to ‘moderately severe’ depression 
according to PHQ-9 classification of depression severity. This shows that the 
significant decrease in mean depression in the first week does not actually account to 
improved mood-state, which would otherwise be classified as ‘not depressed’ or 
‘mildly depressed’. Only the group mean depression of 8.59 at Week 11 meets the 
classification of ‘mildly depressed’. All the results so far suggest that changes in self-
attributions in the first week might be more sensitive to intervention response and 
hence a better predictor of mood change. 
This is interesting because the study was not controlled for interventions. 
Some participants received mono or combination treatments of antidepressants and 
psychological therapies, while some received no treatments at all. Those who did not 
receive any treatments were also among the participants who showed increased self-
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positivity and decreased self-negativity in the first week. The early changes in 
attribution could therefore be related to other protective factors, which predict 
decreasing depressive experience at Week 11. These protective factors could include 
resilience and changing cognitive and emotional biases relating to self. 
8.4.5 Change in SIs in the first week as predictors of wellbeing 
The models used in the previous analyses to predict depression at Week 11, 
were also used to predict wellbeing at Week 11. As might be expected, we saw 
similar patterns of results. Change in self-negativity, R2 = .241, F(1, 15) = 4.77, p = 
.04, and self-positivity, R2 = .294, F(1, 15) = 6.24, p = .02, in the first week were 
significant predictors of eudemonic wellbeing at Week 11. The results showed that 
decreasing self-negativity, β = -.491, t(15) = -2.18, p = .04, and increasing self-
positivity, β = .542, t(15) = 2.49, p = .02, in the first week, predicted improved 
eudemonic wellbeing at Week 11. Hedonic wellbeing was, however, related only with 
self-positivity. Change in self-positivity, R2 = .292, F(1, 15) = 6.19, p = .02, in the 
first week was a significant predictor of hedonic wellbeing at Week 11. Consistent 
with the pattern so far, increasing self-positivity in the first week (β = .541, t(15) = 
2.49, p = .02), predicted hedonic wellbeing at Week 11. Therefore, changes in self-
attribution predict wellbeing as well as depression at a later time. 
Change in self-positivity, R2 = .257, F(1, 15) = 5.19, p = .038, in the first week 
was a significant predictor of change in hedonic wellbeing over 11 weeks. This result 
shows that increasing self-positivity in the first week (β = .507, t(15) = 2.28, p = .038) 
predicted increasing hedonic wellbeing over 11 weeks.    
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8.4.6 Changes in social attribution over 11 weeks  
 Participant’s positive and negative basic social attributions were also observed 
to change over the 11 weeks, as illustrated in Figure 8.4. As explained previously, the 
neurotic face scale ranged from -9 (emotionally stable) through 0 (original face) to +9 
(neurotic). The graph shows decreasing scores for positive attribution, indicating that 
more emotionally stable images were being identified as positive, over the 11 weeks. 
Similarly, increasing scores for negative attribution indicates that more neurotic 
images are being identified as negative, over the 11 weeks. The results here indicate, 
increasing alignment of positive and negative biases with emotionally stable traits and 
neurotic traits respectively, which is consistent with the results in Chapter 4. We 
could therefore explain, that with improving mood and wellbeing, participants’ 
attributions align more accurately with the respective traits. Further analysis, 
however, showed that changes in positive or negative social attributions did not 
predict depression at Week 11. 
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Figure 8.4. The graphs show a) Decrease in positive social attribution, and b) Increase in negative 
social attribution across the five time-points in 11 weeks. On average the group had increasingly 
positive bias for emotionally stable traits and negative bias for neurotic traits over 11 weeks. 
8.4.6 Supplementary information  
All participants reported having a white ethnic background. Of the 17 
participants, two were married (one going through marriage break up), two were 
divorced (one living with partner), one participant was living with partner and the rest 
were single. Three participants had dependent children. Five participants were 
employed; two participants were on benefits and the rest were on student loan. Four 
participants were educated at postgraduate level, two at diploma level and the rest 
   
 Page 170 
were current degree students, four of whom were mature students returning after a 
period of employment. Eight participants spoke more than one language.  
Seven participants experienced childhood trauma from infancy (earliest 
memories) to 15 years; this relating to issues of physical, mental, sexual and financial 
nature. One participant experienced homelessness in the past. Fourteen participants 
experienced comorbidities along with current depression, which between them 
included anxiety, social phobia, panic attacks, self-harm, alcohol misuse, compulsive 
disorder, body-dismorphia and post traumatic stress disorder. Two participants had 
multiple past depressive episodes, which one described as ‘too many to count’ and the 
other as ‘since the age of 29’. Other’s experience varied from a single episode to 
maximum of five episodes. The age of first onset of depression ranged from seven to 
28 years, with an early onset for the majority. Four participants had onset before they 
were aged 10, seven had onset before they were aged 16, four had onset before they 
were aged 19.  
All participants reported experiencing reduced severity of depression, 
improved wellbeing and health state, at the final time point of the study. Some 
participants had PHQ-9 scores below 10 at Week 11, indicating they were either ‘not 
depressed’ or ‘mildly depressed’, regardless of their intervention types. Majority in 
this group did not express improved mood at an early time point, although two 
participants expressed ‘feeling better’ by the third time point. All participants reported 
having positive experience with the study and some even suggested this making a 
difference in their experience of depression. The extensive SCID interview conducted 
at baseline was especially appreciated. We could explain this positive experience of 
participants, as a factor for reducing depression during the study period, which was 
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observed even in those who were not receiving any intervention. The in-depth 
interview and longitudinal monitoring could have emulated a feeling of being cared 
about, however, we do acknowledge this is only anecdotal evidence.   
8.5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this longitudinal study running over a period of 11 weeks, we used our self-
attribution task to investigate the changes in self-perceptions of individuals who were 
clinically depressed. This was the first study to use the self and social attribution tasks 
in a longitudinal study with clinical population. The focus here is on the separation 
indices (SIs) of self-attributions. The SIs referred to the magnitude of separation 
between two basic self-attributions, on the Neurotic Face Scale and relates to the 
participant’s mental representation of self-facial appearance. 
The three SIs, i.e. self-negativity, self-positivity and self-discrepancy, changed 
across the 11 weeks. During this period, self-negativity and self-discrepancy 
decreased while self-positivity increased. These changes in SIs overlapped with 
decreasing severity of depression and increasing wellbeing. This substantiates our 
hypothesis for changes in mental representations of self-facial appearance, in response 
to changes in depressive symptoms. 
So far, we have consistently demonstrated the association between self-
negativity and severity of depression. In the self-attribution study (Chapter 5), we 
discussed depressive symptoms correlating with negative self-representation at a 
single time point. The current study, demonstrates similar relation between depressive 
symptoms and self-representation over multiple time points. Such consistency 
emphasises the quality of the Neurotic Face Scale. 
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The longitudinal changes in self-representation, in the current study, include 
increasing self-positivity and decreasing self-negativity, which overlapped with 
decreasing depressive symptoms. These changes highlight the shift in positive and 
negative perceptions relating to improving mood state. This is consistent with 
previous reports of increased positive bias and decreased negative bias, following 
antidepressant treatment for depression (Capitão, Murphy, Browning, Cowen, & 
Harmer, 2015; Chen et al., 2014; Warren et al., 2015). Imaging studies have 
previously, provided evidence for the underlying neural networks associated with 
such changes in perception. Fronto-limbic networks were shown to have increased 
activation whilst processing positive information and decreased activation whilst 
processing negative information, post treatment (Jaworska, Yang, Knott, & 
MacQueen, 2015; Ma et al., 2014; Outhred et al., 2014).  
It has been proposed that early increase in positive and decrease in negative 
biases have predictive value for ultimate improvement in depressive symptoms 
(Anderson et al., 2011; Gollan et al., 2015; LeMoult et al., 2009; LeMoult, Ordaz, 
Kircanski, Singh, & Gotlib, 2015; Münkler et al., 2015; Roiser, Elliott, & Sahakian, 
2011a; Warren et al., 2015). Corroborating such propositions, in the current study we 
demonstrated that decrease in self-negativity and increase in self-positivity in the first 
week predicted reduced depression at Week 11. These predictive values were 
observed, despite controlling for the change in depression in the first week. 
Furthermore, decrease in self-negativity in the first week was a significant predictor 
of the change in depression across the eleven weeks. These results highlight the 
sensitivity of the changes in self-attribution as an early predictor of mood. 
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It should be noted that, this predictive quality exists even when not controlling 
for the interventions received by our participants or ensuring their consistent 
commencement. This could be considered as a limitation of this study or interpreted 
as the sensitivity of the SIs in monitoring behavioural changes regardless of the 
intervention. The key point however, is the change in individual’s perception 
preceded their subjective experience of improved mood state, i.e. mean depression 
score was not in the ‘not depressed or mildly depressed’ range. This is consistent with 
previous results, showing tryptophan depletion affecting changes in perception prior 
to experiencing changes in mood (Ward, Sreenivas & Rogers, 2016; Harmer et al., 
2003b; Harmer et al., 2003). Thus, confirming the sensitivity of the self-attribution 
task to early behavioural changes, as described by the neurobiological model of 
depression.  
Consistent with previous studies, our results also showed gradual changes in 
social attributions: with increasing positive bias towards emotionally stable images 
and negative bias towards neurotic images. This result suggests appropriate realigning 
of biases with improving mood, and gives a glimpse of how these changes might 
improve social interactions (Taylor & Brown, 1994; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Unlike 
self-attributions, however, the changes in social attributions did not predict depression 
at Week 11. We could therefore be looking at the time series of behavioural changes 
in response to mood change. The first change occurring in self-perceptions that 
gradually seeps into social attributions and therefore improving social functioning in 
due course. This concurs with the cognitive model of depression and relates to how 
changes in cognitive bias could transfer between self and social contexts (Beck et al., 
1979; Beck, 2008; Beck & Bredemeier, 2016). This concept shows the therapeutic 
potential for cognitive modification trainings (Adams, Penton-Voak, Harmer, Holmes, 
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& Munafo, 2013; Blackwell et al., 2015; Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010; 
Browning, Holmes, Charles, Cowen, & Harmer, 2012; Dunlop et al., 2012; Heeren, 
De Raedt, Koster, & Philippot, 2013; Murphy et al., 2015). 
The key limitation of this study is the small sample size. The results based on 
a small sample risks loosing validity and reliability, although our longitudinal data 
does replicate similar associations at different time-points and those observed in the 
self-attribution study (Chapter 5). However, they do demonstrate the potential for 
applications in real world, if it can be replicated with bigger samples. Another aspect 
of the study is that, we only controlled for comorbidities of manic-depression and 
psychotic symptoms. This could be considered as a limitation, or as a demonstration 
of the sensitivity of the self-attribution task. The consistent results of changes in 
attribution relating to changes in depressive symptoms were demonstrated, despite the 
comorbidities.  
To conclude, we demonstrated that early increases in self-positivity and 
decreases in self-negativity were predictors of reducing depression and improving 
wellbeing. This predictive quality of the self-attribution measures could have useful 
implications. Early predictors would be useful tools to identify effective interventions, 
which currently is identified through trial and error.  By identifying early response to 
interventions, we can reduce the prolonged trial and error period, and improve quality 
of life faster. Finally, from a cost effective perspective, this can reduce the cost of 
treating depression as well as the total disease burden of depression on the National 
Health Service and society at large.  
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CHAPTER 9 – General discussion 
In this section, I discuss the interesting outcomes from the previous 
experimental chapters, and their underpinnings on the wider theoretical frameworks. I 
further discuss some of the potential behavioural and clinical applications of self-
attribution of facial appearance for future research. 
 The overarching focus of my thesis was to investigate attributions of facial 
appearance, how these are affected when experiencing depression and how changes in 
attribution could be used to predict improvements in mood. The idea of using subtle 
behaviours to predict mood change was driven by the neurocognitive model of 
depression, which suggests that neurobiology can effect early behavioural/cognitive 
changes prior to experiencing a change in mood. 
9.1 Attributions of facial appearance with neurobiological change 
 Tryptophan depletion (TD) studies, including our previous study (Ward, 
Sreenivas & Rogers, 2016), provided evidence for early behaviour change following 
TD; supporting the neurocognitive model of depression. Previous TD studies have 
demonstrated reduced accuracy for facial expressions of emotions as evidence of 
early behavioural change (Harmer et al., 2009; Merens et al., 2008). Interestingly, the 
most consistent effect of TD occurred on reduced accuracy for facial expression of 
fear (Harmer et al., 2003b; Merens et al., 2008). We, however, used composite faces 
of personality traits and showed reduced accuracy only for neurotic facial cues 
following TD, which indicates overlapping face signals of fear like characteristics 
with traits of neuroticism.   
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9.2 Attributions of neurotic traits as fearful characteristics 
 The second study discussed in Chapter 4 (Part B) confirms the overlapping 
face signals of fear-related characteristics with neuroticism trait. The neurotic face 
composites used in this study were different to the pair used in our previous TD study 
(Ward, Sreenivas & Rogers, 2016). However, the systematic perception of neurotic 
traits as fear-related characteristics support our proposal of some overlapping face 
signals. It is natural to query why neurotic facial cues might be perceived as fear-
related characteristics. We could relate this to the strong association of neuroticism 
trait with depressive and anxiety disorders  (Eysenck, 1991; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, 
& Arntz, 2008), the facial cues of which would also be displayed on the composite 
faces. Depressive mood is consistently comorbid with anxiety (Arborelius, Owens, 
Plotsky, & Nemeroff, 1999; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998), which is strongly 
linked to the ‘fear of fear’ relating to physical sensations associated with anxious 
arousal in all anxiety disorders and anxiety about the experience of sadness in 
depressive disorders (Liverant, Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 2008; S. Taylor & 
Rachman, 1991; Taylor, 2014; Williams, Chambless, & Ahrens, 1997). Consistent 
with this account, the high neurotic composite face created from a number of faces 
selected on the basis of self-reported neuroticism displayed facial cues of fear-related 
characteristics as well, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. It is likely that this perception of 
fear-related characteristics on high neurotic face composites could also have mediated 
the consistent negative (anxious, unhappy and unattractive) attributions made to them, 
as observed in the first study discussed in Chapter 4. These negative attributions of 
the high neurotic cues were maintained in the neurotic face scale, as confirmed by the 
results of the pilot study discussed in Chapter 3, and further demonstrated in the key 
   
 Page 177 
experimental studies investigating self, social and observer’s attributions as discussed 
in Chapter 4, 5, and 6 in Part C of this thesis. 
9.3 Attributions on the neurotic face scale trigger systematic biases relating to 
depression  
 In Part C, we found systematic misattribution of neurotic images as positive 
by individuals (actors) experiencing depression. Such misattribution by actors was 
observed for self (Chapter 5) and others (Chapter 6), confirming depression driven 
misattribution and classic social projection respectively. Moreover, such 
misattributions were not found when others observed the actors, suggesting that the 
misattributions displayed by depressed actors were mood driven and not an artefact of 
the neurotic face scale. These results are interesting on two accounts. Firstly, we 
measure attributions made by an individual to self (self-attribution), others (social-
attribution) and the attributions others make to this individual. This provides evidence 
of individual differences in attributions made to self, others, as well as when 
perceived by others. The respective three studies were designed to allow the 
triangulation of these three perspectives (self, social and observer) for each individual 
participant. Secondly, the self and social attributions were sensitive to the mood- and 
wellbeing- state of each participant, thus further demonstrating individual differences. 
The quality of our neurotic face scale could be related to the display of a neutral 
expression with the undertones of neurotic traits and fear-related characteristics. 
 I propose that the misattributions of self-facial appearance could be related to 
cognitive dissonance at an implicit level. Cognitive dissonance is explained as the 
psychological discomfort due to conflicting self-perceptions (Festinger, 1957; Steele, 
1988a; Stone & Cooper, 2001). The results from the self-attribution study showed that 
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perceived actual-self and perceived positive-self were positively correlated, indicating 
processes of self-affirmation and self-preservation (Cohen & Sherman, 2014) at an 
implicit level. That is, this is my actual image and it is similar to my perceived 
positive self. It therefore appears that individuals experiencing depression perceive 
themselves as neurotic but attribute their actual self as positive, potentially because 
they have a positive self-perception at an implicit level. Such positive perceptions at 
an implicit level could be associated with implicit high self-esteem. Using our 
separation index (SI) of self-positivity, we could also be measuring the implicit high 
self-esteem because self-positivity shows the similarity or dissimilarity between 
perceived actual self and perceived positive self. Positive self-esteem, however, is 
seen as a protective factor that contributes to better health and positive social 
behaviour through its role as a buffer against the impact of negative influences  
(Mann, Hosman, Schaalma, & de Vries, 2004; Mikulincer, 1995; Murphy et al., 2015; 
Papakostas & Fava, 2008). So how can individuals experiencing depression display 
positive self-esteem, albeit at an implicit level? 
 Cognitive-experiential self-theory and such other dual-process models 
integrate the cognitive and the experiential systems by assuming the existence of two 
parallel, yet interacting modes of information processing (Akinci & Sadler‐Smith, 
2013; Epstein, 1994; Epstein, 1998; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Wilson, Lindsey, & 
Schooler, 2000). Explicit self-esteem is largely a product of the cognitive system, 
which is based to some extent on logical analyses of self-relevant feedback and 
information, whereas implicit self-esteem has its origins in the experiential system, 
and be derived primarily from the overlearned and holistic processing of affective 
experiences (Bosson et al., 2003; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Zeigler‐
Hill, 2006a). This suggests that even though individuals experience the self as unitary, 
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it is possible that multiple sub-systems are operating simultaneously (Epstein, 1994; 
Epstein & Morling, 1995; Kuhl, 2011; Martin & Tesser, 2013; Martin et al., 1986; 
Zeigler‐Hill, 2006b). Implicit high self-esteem when co-existing with explicit low 
self-esteem, is known to mediate depressive experience (Creemers et al., 2012; 
Franck, De Raedt, Dereu, & Van den Abbeele, 2007) and predict its recurrence  
(Franck, Raedt, & Houwer, 2007; Leeuwis, Koot, Creemers, & van Lier, 2015). Thus, 
the misattribution of neurotic images as positive, by those individuals experiencing 
depression in the self-attribution study, could be due to their implicit high self-esteem. 
Future research could investigate implicit and explicit self-esteem in relation to self-
attribution of facial appearance. 
 Another interesting point is that the systematic misattribution of neurotic facial 
cues as positive, as observed in our studies (Chapter 4 & 5), could potentially explain 
the reduced accuracy for low intensity facial cues when experiencing depression or 
following TD. Studies have shown reduced accuracy for neutral or ambiguous 
emotion expressions when experiencing depression (Beevers, Wells, Ellis, & Fischer, 
2009; Bouhuys, Bloem, & Groothuis, 1995; Harmer et al., 2002). Consistent with this 
pattern, studies have shown that when experiencing depression or following TD, an 
exaggerated or high intensity emotional expressions, including fear, had greater 
accuracy (Anderson et al., 2011; Harmer et al., 2003b; Merens et al., 2008; 
Stuhrmann et al., 2011). Our neurotic face scale display subtle cues of neuroticism 
gradually increasing from one end of the scale to the other, and therefore making 
attributions of them would have been difficult for those experiencing depression. We 
could equate the low intensity fearful expression to the more neurotic facial cues in 
our study, however, positive attributions of low intensity fearful expression would be 
inconsistent with an explicit task for fear recognition, and highlights the limitation of 
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such tasks being sensitive to mood-state. Thus the results discussed in Parts C and D 
of this thesis, provide evidence that the self-attribution task trigger responses that are 
more sensitive to a depressive mood-state compared to the emotional face tasks used 
in previous studies.  
9.4 Clinical application of the self-attribution task 
Following the results of the self-attribution study, showing greater sensitivity 
of the SIs (self-negativity, self-positivity, & classic self-discrepancy) to depression, 
we used them to assess longitudinal changes when experiencing clinical depression. 
As demonstrated in Chapter 8, self-negativity decreased and self-positivity increased 
with decreasing depression over an 11-week period; such changes were previously 
proposed as potential effects of antidepressants (Dunn et al., 2009; Harmer, 2014; 
Roiser et al., 2012). This longitudinal change in self-attribution could be reflecting the 
improvement in implicit high self-esteem, as well as the realignment of implicit and 
explicit self-esteem with improving mood.  
Prior studies have reported reduced negative bias relating to reduction of 
depressive symptoms (Anderson et al., 2011; LeMoult et al., 2009; Münkler et al., 
2015; Roiser, Elliott, & Sahakian, 2011b), and proposed their predictive value. 
Further evidence suggested the predictive quality of early increase in positive bias and 
decrease in negative bias (Gollan et al., 2015; LeMoult et al., 2009; Pringle, 
Browning, Cowen, & Harmer, 2011; Warren et al., 2015), which was demonstrated in 
our clinical study. The greater sensitivity of the SIs were demonstrated by their 
predictive value relating to behavioural change in the first week, with increasing self-
positivity and decreasing self-negativity, to predict reduced depression at Week 11 
and the change in depression across the study period. This relationship was 
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maintained even after controlling for changes in depression in the first week. The 
predictive value was observed, despite not controlling for interventions or their 
commencement, thus confirming the sensitivity of our measures specifically to subtle 
behavioural changes rather than specific effect of interventions. This shows the 
potential of our measures for wider application and adaptability across interventions.  
9.5 Predictive value of behavioural measures 
It is interesting that the same set of stimuli used in our clinical study was 
perceived differently with change in mood, and brings up the questions why we 
observe related changes in attribution, and how these stimuli were sensitive enough to 
be able to predict improvements in mood. Prior studies have used a variety of 
measures to predict mood improvement. Bouhuy et al. (2006) proposed greater risk 
for recurrence of depression when there is a coupling of high level of cortisol 
secretion and altered fear perception, while Chan et al. (2009) proposed enhanced 
neural response to fearful expressions as risk factor for depression. Consistent to this, 
reduced accuracy for neurotic facial traits (Ward, Sreenivas & Rogers, 2016) and 
fearful expression (Harmer et al., 2003b) was observed following TD, and improved 
accuracy for fearful expression after selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor treatment 
(Bhagwagar et al., 2004). These interesting results demonstrate that early but subtle 
changes in cognitive processes have the potential for predictive quality, however, fall 
short of providing a sensitive behavioural predictor irrespective of the treatments for 
depression. This limitation could be because the commonly used behavioural tasks 
explicitly measure accuracy for facial emotions, but have little explicit relevance to 
self-facial appearance or evaluation of the current mood-state through self-
attributions. Another drawback could be related to the limited variance in the scale 
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used to measure responses. By allowing greater variance in responses, there is greater 
possibility of accounting for individual differences and therefore measures could 
feature greater sensitivity.  
 From the results of the clinical study in this thesis, it is evident that self-
attributions changed across the study period and were sensitive to mood 
improvements, however, social attributions changed only non-significantly over the 
same period of time. We could infer a time-series of behavioural changes starting 
initially with self-perception, and later spreading into the social context, which echoes 
Beck’s cognitive triad (Beck, 2008; Beck & Bredemeier, 2016). Such a behavioural 
time series could explain why the self-attributions measured in our study were 
sensitive to early implicit changes prior to mood improvement; unlike the tasks using 
emotional faces or faces of others’. The self-attribution task could be measuring the 
early changes in the self-negativity, which is a core symptom of depression, thus 
explaining the early changes observed in our clinical study. The fact that the 
predictive values of these measures were despite not controlling for interventions 
indicates its sensitivity for wider cognitive and neurobiological processes.  
The predictive value of measures relating to early improvement in mood is not 
very commonly demonstrated. I propose the predictive quality of the self-attribution 
measures from our study is underpinned by a few factors. Firstly, we used 
individualised stimuli using self-face that would have inevitably warranted self-
referential and self-evaluating processes, which is affected when experiencing 
depression. Secondly, our face stimuli combined ambiguous neutral expression with 
the subtle under tones of neurotic traits that were attributed to fear-like characteristics; 
the cognitive processing of which is affected when experiencing depression. Thirdly, 
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by using face stimuli, we would be tapping into the broad range of social processes, 
and thereby having the benefit of measuring changes in the related cognitive 
functions. Finally, all the three factors discussed here rely, to some extent, on the 
fronto-limbic network, which is closely associated with depression (Frye, Schaefer, & 
Alexander, 2007; Harmer, 2014; Keenan et al., 2000; Lemogne et al., 2012; Mayberg, 
1997; Platek, Keenan, Gallup Jr., & Mohamed, 2004; Sheline, 2003; Warren et al., 
2015). We might have measured the early behavioural changes reflecting the changes 
in this neural network in relation to early intervention response. The sensitivity of the 
self-attributions therefore, underpins its potential for future clinical applications. 
9.6 Potential clinical and research implications of the self-attribution task 
Innovative techniques are being introduced as interventions to modify 
maladaptive cognitions relating to affective disorders (Adams et al., 2013). 
Techniques such as emotion recognition or cognitive modification trainings are used 
to reduce cognitive biases, with the intention to improve adaptive behaviour, and 
consequently impact mood (Adams et al., 2013; Blackwell et al., 2015; Browning et 
al., 2010; Browning et al., 2012; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Heeren et al., 2013; Murphy 
et al., 2015). Various methods are used to target cognitive modification, and improve 
positive bias. One method is to present emotional faces, and to provide corrective 
feedback when the perceptions are inaccurate (Adams et al., 2013). Another method is 
to present positive and negative emotional faces or words immediately followed by 
dot probes appearing in the place of the positive stimuli to improve attention to 
positive cues (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). A recent study compared the effects of 
cognitive modification paradigm using emotional faces, with the adaptation of the 
same using composite faces showing more naturalistic emotional expressions, and 
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reported greater generalizability of emotion recognition after using the latter (Dalili, 
Schofield-Toloza, Munafò, & Penton-Voak, 2016). Consistent with the theme of this 
thesis, it was proposed that cognitive modification training using composite faces 
could be used to reduce the negative cognitive biases affecting the perception of 
ambiguous faces, which is widely related to mental health disorders (Dalili et al., 
2016). 
On the basis of the evidence, I suggest that the self-attribution task could be 
adapted for cognitive modification training with corrective feedback to reduce self-
negativity and improve self-positivity, as a complimentary therapy alongside the 
mainstream treatments. Besides, as demonstrated in this thesis, the early behavioural 
changes appear to originate from self before extending into the social domain, and 
therefore the potential for using self-stimuli could be rationalised. I further propose 
that, by completing the self-attribution task, individuals could have potentially 
experienced therapeutic effects, because the process of evaluating a series of self-
images could realign self-perception through the natural process of self-evaluation. 
The neurotic face scale displays a series of self-images on a continuum that increase 
in neuroticism across the scale; explicitly giving a visual distinction of how one might 
look when experiencing emotional instability from when experiencing emotional 
calmness. Such stark visual distinctions of self could be a reminder to aim for greater 
emotional calmness or a reassurance, that I could have been in a worse emotional 
state than my current self.  
The direct clinical implications of the results so far include, monitoring and 
predictive qualities of our self-attribution measures. The versatility of the attribution 
task opens up new avenues for developing potential applications that could directly 
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impact the real world. The process of setting up the self-attribution task could be 
automated to the level of individuals’ selfie taken on their smartphone being used to 
automatically create the 19 images, and set up the task for self-administering as a 
phone app. Such a proposition is not impossible, and could mean the health care 
teams could remotely monitor the changes in self-attribution and manage 
interventions in real-time. Unlike the functional imaging techniques, using the self-
attribution task could be cost effective yet ensure an individualised method of 
monitoring and predicting behavioural changes. Thus the sensitivity of the self-
attribution task to subtle behavioural changes could be utilised extensively to benefit 
and improve quality of life by developing pragmatic applications.  
Another potential for the self-attribution task is its application to improve 
social functioning of individuals with developmental disorders. Individuals within the 
autism spectrum are known to have social dysfunctions due to misreading of social 
cues (Frith, 1994). One of the behavioural interventions is to explicitly learn social 
cues including facial signals (Baron-Cohen, Golan, & Ashwin, 2009; Bellini & Peters, 
2008). It is also proposed that self-perception will be altered in this population  
(Uddin, Kaplan, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2005; Uddin et al., 2007), and 
therefore self and social attribution tasks could be adapted as social learning tools, as 
an alternative using natural looking facial cues to the widely used explicit emotions.  
I have so far discussed, the potential use of our attribution task in providing 
assessments, monitoring, predicting mood-improvement, and utilising the self-face 
properties for devising complimentary therapies. Given these interesting findings so 
far, further research using self-attribution task is recommended to appreciate its full 
potential. It could be used to investigate other social and mental health issues. 
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Behavioural issues relating to body image, including the changes in physical 
appearance due to accidents, disease or side effects of treatments seem obvious topics 
that could be investigated using this paradigm. Social behaviours relating to 
interpersonal relationship could be investigated to understand change in partners’ 
perception and its association with the quality of their relationship. Self-esteem, with 
implication for individual’s adaptive behaviours and success, could similarly be 
investigated. To give a flavour of future research potential using the self-attribution 
task, I will briefly discuss two pilot studies to investigate the change in self-
attributions following mindfulness practice, and a period of stress. 
9.6.1 Changes in self-positivity with mindfulness practice and stress 
We conducted two small pilot studies to investigate whether mindfulness 
practice improves self-attribution as measured using our self-attribution task, and 
whether stress can bring about an opposing change in self-attribution. Mindfulness 
practice adopts self-referential process to reduce judgmental thoughts about self in 
order to enhance positive self-perception (Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Kemeny et al., 2012). 
Stress, on the other hand, could have the opposite effect on self (Kubota et al., 2014). 
In these studies, 10 (7 females) individuals who attended the eight weeks 
mindfulness course at Bangor University and 6 (4 females) university students who 
had exams within a period of eight weeks consented and participated. Consistent with 
the procedures of the self-attribution study (Chapter 5) we measured the basic self-
attributions and computed the SIs (self-negativity, self-positivity and self-
discrepancy) before and after the eight weeks of mindfulness practice, and exam 
period in the respective studies. We measured depression (Rush et al., 1996), 
wellbeing (Diener et al., 2010) and neuroticism (Donnellan et al., 2006) at both time-
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points of the two studies. We further used Five Facets Mindfulness Questionnaire 
(Baer et al., 2008) and Experience questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007) to measure 
mindfulness, and Undergraduate Stress Questionnaire (Crandall, Preisler, & 
Aussprung, 1992) to measure stress in the respective studies. Using paired samples t 
test, we compared the measures across the two time-points. 
We found a significant increase in self-positivity after eight weeks of 
mindfulness practice, t(9) = 2.314, p = .046. Over the same period there was a 
significant decrease in depression and neuroticism, and increase in hedonic wellbeing 
and mindful behaviour. It was interesting to find reduced neuroticism after 
mindfulness practice. Neuroticism refers to the reactive behaviours, such as being 
moody, emotionally unstable and anxious, and is considered as a stable trait. 
Barnhofer, Duggan and Sriffith (2011) reported that mindfulness moderates the 
relation between neuroticism and depressive symptoms, which could explain the 
reduced depression score observed in our study, even though none of the participants 
were experiencing clinical depression. Thus, our results show that individuals were 
able to better control their emotional reactivity and anxiety, after eight weeks of 
mindfulness practice, which could be indicative of the related therapeutic effect.  
In the other pilot study, self-attribution was not significantly different between 
the two time points, but interestingly neither was stress. Other measures including 
depression and wellbeing were also not significantly different across the two time-
points. This null result is interesting because it shows that when there is no significant 
change in the mental state of individuals, their self-attribution does not change 
significantly either. 
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The results of these pilot studies, albeit with small sample size, further 
demonstrate the quality of our self-attribution task. Firstly, our self-attribution 
measures are sensitive to mood but remain unchanged if there was no significant 
change in mood and stress. Secondly, the changes in self-attribution are related to 
subtle changes in mood and wellbeing, and not just clinical symptoms. Finally, the 
change in self-attribution is not a natural by-product or artefact of time. Thus the 
quality of our self-attribution task with the neurotic face scale, is further confirmed 
and is recommended for future research. 
9.7 Conclusion 
 I will conclude my discussion with a final reminder of the key aspects from 
this thesis. The main goals were to develop a behavioural task that provides 
individualised measures, which are sensitive to depression, wellbeing and 
neuroticism, and have monitoring and predictive values relating to depression.  
The research presented herein, has succeeded in these goals by successfully 
developing an attribution task for measuring attributions of facial appearance in self, 
social and observer contexts. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7 we demonstrated the sensitivity of 
the attribution measures to individual’s depression, wellbeing and neuroticism. 
Furthermore, the mental self-representation measures of self-negativity, self-positivity 
and self-discrepancy were especially sensitive to individual’s transient mood and 
wellbeing state, but also had the quality to distinguish maladaptive and adaptive 
behaviours relating to the personality traits of neuroticism and agreeableness 
respectively. These studies also demonstrated classic social projection, with mood-
state driving consistent misattributions in self and social context. The highlight of the 
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three main experimental chapters in Part C was the attribution measures of self, 
social, and observers’ for each participant, demonstrating individual differences. 
 The monitoring and predictive values of mental self-representation measures 
were demonstrated in the clinical study discussed in Chapter 8. Specifically, we 
demonstrated decrease in self-negativity and increase in self-positivity, overlapping 
with decreasing depression, and increasing wellbeing longitudinally. Besides this 
monitoring quality, changes in these measures were found to be early predictors of 
reducing severity of depressive symptoms, which highlights its potential to identify 
early intervention response for depression.  
Furthermore, results from the pilot studies demonstrated the sensitivity of our 
self-attribution measures to subtle changes in mental state, and not just clinical 
symptoms of depression. Increasing self-positivity after mindfulness practice 
substantiates the sensitivity of our measures to adaptive behavioural change, while no 
difference in attributions without change in stress levels or depression shows that the 
changes are not an artefact of time. Additionally, the work here demonstrates novel 
information regarding a complex nexus of mood, wellbeing and personality traits 
affecting individual’s attributions of facial appearance. Our self-attribution task could, 
therefore, be used creatively to investigate other psychological disorders. 
 The self-attribution task has the potential in not just monitoring and predicting 
intervention response for depression, but also to improve visual attributions of self. 
This task could be adapted for assessing the response to treatments for depression at 
earlier time points than is currently the case. It could potentially confirm whether a 
treatment will be successful or otherwise, thus improving recovery time frame and 
quality of life. Supplementary interventions to reduce negative bias to self, relating to 
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affective disorders or similar paradigms could be adapted for training individuals with 
developmental disorders, to understand subtle facial cues.  
– The End – 
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Appendix 
Supplementary results 
Self-attribution study 
Table App.1. The correlations of individual’s self-attributions with measures of 
depression, wellbeing, personality traits and attributional style 
 
 
Social-attribution study 
Table App.2. The correlations of individual’s social-attributions with measures of 
depression, wellbeing, personality traits and attributional style 
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